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ABSTRACT  
This dissertation elucidates the policy roles of foundations in Canadian public policy by 
comparing three case studies at the federal and inter-provincial levels, and across three policy 
domains, i.e., in fiscal, post-secondary education, and health-research policy. The research 
method is a comparative, qualitative review of these recent cases informed by semi-structured 
interviews of over 40 people conducted over 36 months, and document analysis.  
 The three case studies are explored in this research span a period of approximately 30 
years, from 1987-2016. The first case considered concerns a tax incentive for donations of 
capital to charities that was piloted by the federal Liberal government in 1997. Private 
philanthropic foundations were excluded as qualified recipients for this tax exemption until 
2007. Consideration for further extension to the capital gains tax exemption were still 
underway in 2016 based on the ideas of the original policy entrepreneurs noted in this case. 
Second, between 1987 and 1998, Crown foundations for provincial universities, including the 
University of Saskatchewan (U of S), were established across nine provinces in order to take 
advantage of unique tax structures for this organizational type. Third, in 2006 a partnership 
between the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (the Gates Foundation) in support of the 
Canadian HIV Vaccine Initiative (CHVI) was formalized in a memorandum of understanding 
and publicized at the 16th International AIDS Conference in Toronto. The partnership 
concluded in 2016, but did not necessarily meet the ambitious objectives that were originally 
set out.  
 Each of these cases establishes that foundation and third sector policy entrepreneurs use 
collaborative strategies to increase their policy influence. These research findings indicate that 
foundations are also increasingly active in Canadian public policy. Across each case, 
foundations’ roles varied at different stages of the policy cycles. Foundations’ access to 
government processes was consistently higher at the problem-definition and agenda-setting 
stages of the cycle. Also in each case, foundations’ impacts on Canadian public policy waned 
at the policy implementation and evaluation stages. In the Canadian context, foundations’ 
varying degrees of influence across stages of policy cycles can be attributed to the particular 
character of the Canadian public and third sectors. Canada’s parliamentary system, the closed 
fiscal policy regime, and the fragmented nature of oversight and regulation of charities 
constrain outsider access at the latter stages of policy cycles, thus impeding successful 
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implementation of foundations’ policy agendas. That said, as a result of their 
entrepreneurialism, foundations’ engagement in Canadian public policy is increasing.  
The theoretical starting point for this dissertation is John W. Kingdon’s (1995) concept 
of policy entrepreneurship, although his original conceptualization is expanded to cover the 
entire policy cycle, rather than just agenda setting. The policy-cycles framework is used to 
organize the case study materials into straightforward chronological narratives. The main 
concepts of policy entrepreneurship and the policy-cycles framework are also supplemented 
with institutionalism. Institutionalism helps to account for the potential differences reported in 
the existing literature on United States (US) and Canadian think tanks and foundations.  
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Do philanthropic foundations engage in policy making in Canada, and if so, how and why, and 
why should we care? Foundations in the third sector hold and allocate philanthropic funds for 
public purposes and charitable causes. They do so not only by funding charities, but also by 
engaging directly with governments to influence public policy. Philanthropic foundations are 
charities, and they generally hold significant endowments. Public foundations operate at arm’s 
length from their donors; private foundations do not. There is a debate about whether private 
foundations represent the narrow interests of the economic elite or a broader range of views. In 
a liberal democracy, foundations’ limited size and significant resources, alongside their 
perceived influence, lack of transparency, and questionable accountability, result in their 
contested legitimacy. In contrast, foundations contend that they promote innovative ideas, 
minority interests, and/or pluralism. Yet they also benefit from (or are even the product of) 
increasing income disparities in Canada and internationally. In their efforts to pursue their 
policy preferences, it is not surprising that foundations seek to acquire value and stability as 
organizations in order to legitimize their policy activities. As they become more organized, 
foundations can be powerful social forces. Foundations, as policy entrepreneurs, increasingly 
build policy networks in order to effectively engage in Canadian public policy. 
 As governments continue to downsize and download social services in the wake of 
“new public management” (NPM), too little is known about the potential influence of third-
sector organizations, especially philanthropic foundations for Canadian public policy. This lack 
of information combined with preconceived notions and sometimes ingrained negative 
attitudes toward the roles of foundations in the democratic state trickle down from other 
jurisdictions and from historical conflicts between elites and the masses in Canada (Reich 
2016; Roelofs 2003; Salamon 1987, 1995; Salamon and Anheier 1997; Laforest 2013; Brock 
2010). The result has tended toward system-wide biases against foundations. Hydemann and 
Toepler (2006) highlight the contested legitimacy of foundations in the United States (US) and 
the United Kingdom (UK) in a critique from a foundation executive:  
Foundations are dandy things, but the truth is few institutions are as 
complacent, and potentially unaccountable to the real world as private 
foundations. When I was a public official, my dealings with philanthropy often 
left me with the question—who do they think they are? (Quoting Douglas W. 
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Nelson, President of the Annie E. Casey Foundation in Hydemann and Toepler 
2006, 3). 
The overarching purpose of this study is to shed light on the actual roles of foundations in 
Canadian public policy in a way that does not perpetuate oversimplification and polarity in the 
assessment of foundations’ roles as being either positive or negative. Three qualitative case 
studies are examined in depth, using an appropriate conceptual framework, to glean more 
insight into their policy roles. Taken together, these cases cover a 30-year period of 
foundations’ policy engagement in Canada. The entrepreneurial strategies and organizational 
pathways of foundations, as well as the opportunities and constraints they face in attempting to 
influence public policy, are considered.  
  As of 2018, there were approximately 76,000 charities in Canada. In total, foundations 
comprise about 12% of those organizations. As of 2016, out of approximately 10,800 
foundations in Canada, roughly half were private foundations and half were public foundations 
(Philanthropic Foundations Canada [PFC] 2018). Foundations are the fastest growing type of 
charitable organizations in the country – from 4,800 foundations in 2008 to 10,800 foundations 
in 2016. In addition, over a period of eight years, from 2008-2016, foundations’ assets more 
than doubled – from about $34.1 billion to $73.0 billion. During that time, foundation grants 
increased by $1.1 billion – from $3.6 billion to $5.7 billion (PFC 2018). In 2016, foundation 
giving across Canada amounted to nearly $5.7 billion: private foundation giving was nearly $2 
billion, and public foundation giving was $3.7 billion (PFC 2017). At the same time, the 
majority of Canadian foundations have modest operations, with most of the assets concentrated 
in a small number of foundations (Kryvoruchko 2013). The number of foundations also varies 
by province and territory; while there were only 13 in the Northwest Territories in 2016, there 
were over 4,000 in Ontario. In Saskatchewan, there were nearly 400 foundations, only 1% of 
all Canadian foundations (PFC 2016a). Given the landscape of foundations in Canada, and as 
this research reveals, governments are increasingly interested in their proliferation, and in 
partnering with and regulating them. 
 When foundations make investment decisions, they do more than distribute funds to 
charities; they also make significant contributions to policy. In Canada, welfare state cutbacks, 
a challenging fiscal situation, and changes in the social-policy environment have increased 
pressure on the third sector (Laforest 2009, 2013; Evans and Shields 2005). Combined with 
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increasing tax incentives for charitable donations, as well as rising costs in the key areas of 
health, education, and social services (which are under the jurisdiction of the provinces), there 
is an opportunity for foundations to engage in public policy more than they have in the past 
(Abelson 2016; Pearson 2010; Lyons and Pearson 2017; PFC 2017a; Anheier and Daly 2007; 
Phillips and Rathgeb Smith 2011). But is this involvement appropriate and legitimate? 
 To get at this question, more nuanced understandings of the interactions and 
relationships between foundations and the Canadian state are required; these findings could 
lead to better policy outcomes. Phillips aptly summarizes the discourse about the third sector 
and the need for improvements in Canada:  
Accounts of funding for the charitable and nonprofit sector are generally 
presented in one of two ways. The first is the familiar story of cutbacks. 
Beginning in the 1990s, propelled by fiscal restraint and by neoliberalism 
that favoured smaller government, market-based instruments, stricter 
accountability… The second account focuses on the potential of venture 
philanthropy, entrepreneurship, and new forms of social finance… [a] much 
more detailed and nuanced analysis of the history and current state of 
government funding policies and practices [is required]. (Phillips 2016, 3) 
Foundations participate in the development of these types of new strategies for funding 
charities and non-profits. New research and information can foster policy learning and policy 
transfer and can better direct resources to those areas where they are most needed or where 
there is the most potential for foundations to have a positive impact. Laforest also points out, 
“Governments are looking for new institutional solutions that will enable them to do more with 
less… [and] the nonprofit sector is a critical part of their ability to develop economic strength 
and social wellbeing within communities” (2013, 1). Foundations may be able to provide added 
value to Canadian public policy, perhaps to a greater extent than decision makers, state 
officials, and the media currently presume. Foundations may also welcome the opportunity to 
employ the successful strategies and lessons, which are documented in research studies such as 
this.  
 This dissertation examines the roles of philanthropic foundations in Canadian public 
policy. These roles are explored using a qualitative analysis that focuses on three cases in three 
policy domains (see Glossary): (1) foundations’ engagement in the development of tax reforms 
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to encourage giving; (2) the establishment of university Crown foundations (see Glossary) 
across the country, including the University of Saskatchewan (U of S) Crown Foundation; and 
(3) the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s (Gates Foundation) support of HIV/AIDS research 
in Canada. I used a cross-unit case study approach that draws on over 40 interviews that took 
place over about 36 months. These cases were selected because they cross several policy 
domains, jurisdictions, timeframes, and organizational types. There was also evidence of 
varying levels of foundations’ engagement in each case (Bird 2015; Bromley 1997, 1993; 
Canada 2006, 2010; U of S 1994).  
 In the first case, private foundations appeared to have had only an absentee role, as they 
were explicitly excluded from the legislation for the tax incentive. This case of the capital gains 
tax exemption would potentially contrast with the other two cases, which were selected 
precisely because foundations appeared to have been directly involved in the policy process. 
The second case saw Crown foundations (see Glossary) being created across the country in 
order to spur giving to universities. The third case involved a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) between the government of Canada and the Gates Foundation to fund increased 
vaccine manufacturing capacity for HIV/AIDS.  
 The theoretical starting point of this dissertation is John W. Kingdon’s concept of 
“policy entrepreneur.” Policy entrepreneurs use their time, energy, and resources to access 
government policy agendas (1995; and see Glossary). Kingdon is widely cited in the literature 
on foundations and think tanks in the US, and his framework has been successfully applied in 
select case studies of public policy and the non-profit sector in Canada. The notion of policy 
entrepreneur provides insight into the internal organizational characteristics, developments, and 
strategies of non-government stakeholders for engaging in public policy (Lindquist 1989, 2006; 
Elson 2009a, 2016; Mintrom 2013; Mintrom and Norman 2009; Abelson 2016; Badelt 1997; 
Petridou, Aflaki, and Miles 2015; Benz 2009; Stone 2000; 2007; Roberts and King 1991; Rich 
2005; 2007; Charles 2011). Only one article, by Elson and Hall, S. (2016), has applied this 
framework to the study of foundations in Canada. Howlett has also used the concept of policy 
entrepreneur to examine the role of stakeholder engagement across the whole policy cycle, not 
just at the agenda-setting stage in Canada (1997; 1998). Throughout my dissertation, the 
concept of policy entrepreneur is used across the policy-cycles framework, and is 
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complemented by political institutionalism in order to consider unique attributes of the 
Canadian policy environment and foundations’ engagement therein.  
 Evidence of foundations’ participation in Canadian public policy is considered across 
three cases (see Glossary). The fiscal policy case (Chapter 5) highlights a new umbrella 
organization, Philanthropic Foundations Canada (PFC), which was created in 1999 to organize 
private foundations and lobby the government to include them as qualified recipients of capital 
gains tax exemptions (see Glossary). In the post-secondary education (PSE) policy case 
(Chapter 6), Crown foundations were established at major universities across the country 
between 1987 and 1998 to increase major giving to the sector. In both of these cases, 
foundations sought to change government policies or structures related to foundations or to 
enhance charitable tax incentives and thereby entice major giving (see Glossary) in Canada. 
With respect to health-research policy (Chapter 7), the Gates Foundation and the Canadian 
government entered into a formal partnership in 2006. The partners renewed the memorandum 
of understanding (MOU) in 2010. The agendas were driven by the scientific policy community 
(see Glossary), represented by the Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise (GHVE), and implemented 
through this partnership and the Canadian HIV Vaccine Initiative (CHVI).  
1.1 Research Problem  
The most recent data available indicates that the number of foundations in Canada grew 
between 2005 and 2016 (PFC 2016). Foundations, along with other third-sector actors, are 
increasingly engaged in public policy–making at the local, provincial, and national levels 
(Foundation Centre 2010; Imagine Canada and PFC 2014). Foundations have influence, but to 
what degree and to what end? Studies of American and European foundations indicate (and 
some caution) that foundations use private tax-exempt resources to advocate for, and even 
direct, government priorities and policies (Prewitt 2006, 370). Given that foundations’ asset 
bases are built primarily on the wealth of private or corporate entrepreneurs who have 
benefitted from their particular contexts, and that their interests do not represent those of the 
electorate, is their role in a democratic state’s policy making appropriate and legitimate?  
 The cases shed light on the reach of foundations and the extent to which they impact 
public policies in Canada. With this investigation, I aim to inform researchers; grantees 
(charitable and non-profit organizations [NPO]; see Glossary); policy makers; elected officials; 
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and foundation staff, boards, and executives about foundations’ growing involvement in public 
policy. This type of research on foundations in Canada is important for three reasons: national 
and institutional contexts directly affect foundations; public policy is affected by power, which 
foundations wield while representing particular interests; and both those policies that 
foundations pursue and the ones by which they are regulated can make a difference for the 
public good.  
 As the comparative research on foundations in the US, Canada, and UK has shown, 
national contexts shape the roles of third-sector organizations in policy making (Abelson 2005; 
Elson 2010a, 2011; Phillips and Smith 2011; Stone, Denham, and Garnett 1998; Toepler 2006; 
see Glossary). Differences between parliamentary and presidential democracies are significant 
in terms of the actual and potential roles that third-sector organizations can have in policy 
making (Abelson 2005; Lindquist 1998). With respect to foundations, however, current policy 
practice in Canada tends to lean heavily on policy ideas generated in the US (Anheier and Daly 
2006; Lipset 1990) while keeping an eye on the UK, but seldom does it go so far as to 
formalize partnerships between the state and the third sector in truly substantive ways.  
 Foundations have power in several forms: money, connections, and the attention of the 
public, governments, investors, and the media. The Gates Foundation, for example, obviously 
has a good deal of influence that is leveraged by these factors (Klausner et al. 2003; McCoy, 
Kembhavi, Patel, and Luintel 2009; McCoy and McGoey 2011; Rushton and Williams 2011). 
While at times contested, the lure and tacit legitimacy of such significant players in global 
health policy can more easily garner support for a government’s policy agenda than that of 
smaller foundations, as the selected cases illustrate. 
 At times, however, the most effective form of influence is that which goes unnoticed 
(Abelson 2002, 7, referring to a quote by Judith Maxwell, the founder of the Canadian Policy 
Research Network). We need to have a better understanding of the actual and potential extent 
of foundations’ influence on public policy in Canada beyond their public personas. Their roles 
cannot only be extrapolated from studies of the policy roles of foundations in other countries 
like the US or the UK. We need more data to inform Canada-specific understandings of 
foundations in order to better inform the legislation and regulations regarding foundations. The 
results of this type of research should be disseminated to the public, politicians, and the media 
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to inform their perceptions of foundations’ legitimacy, and to the third sector and the public 
sector to better utilize and leverage the resources of foundations.  
 Research on foundations in Canada can make a difference by providing more nuanced, 
empirically based depictions of their policy roles thereby fostering improved public policy, 
adding diverse perspectives and new ideas to the discourse. This research can assist in 
evaluating when and where the assistance of foundations in policy making is most effective, 
and where it is most desirable (or not); this can in turn inform appropriate amendments to tax 
incentives, charitable regulations, and public partnerships respecting foundations. This research 
offers insights into foundations’ strategies as actors in the policy process; governments’ 
receptivity to foundations’ policy ideas; the institutional contexts that shape foundations’ 
policy engagement; and the extent of their influence at different points in the policy cycle. 
Research on Canadian foundations is important because governments and foundations invest 
significant resources (time, energy, reputation, money, etc.) in pursuit of social and fiscal 
policy ideas or in formulating policies that affect foundations. Not only can case-study research 
inform governmental approaches to working with foundations, but it can also inform 
foundations’ strategies for working more effectively and efficiently with governments.  
 While this dissertation cannot completely address all of these opportunities for 
improvement, it can, with respect to the three cases under consideration, offer insights into 
foundations’ strategies as actors in the policy process; governments’ receptivity to foundations’ 
policy ideas; the institutional contexts that shape foundations’ policy engagement; and the 
extent of their influence at different points in the policy cycle. The discussion of the findings in 
the last chapter of this dissertation compares and contrasts foundations’ public policy 
participation between the cases, and foundations’ strengths and weaknesses as actors across the 
selected policy domains and jurisdictions.  
 There is a plethora of case studies of foundations in the US, especially of the major 
grant-making foundations (see Glossary) like the Rockefeller, Ford, Carnegie, and Russel Sage 
foundations (e.g., Berman 1983; Fleishman 2007; Lagemann 1985, 1999; Rushton and 
Williams 2011; Wormser 1958). By comparison, there are far fewer academic studies of 
foundations in Canada. Several authors note that: 
Foundations’ operations are made strategic by [their] links to understanding 
of the public policies that inform, influence, and perhaps even decide the 
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outcomes and effect of grantmaking. The independence of the foundation 
form may have little or no bearing on its ability to bring about social and 
policy change without the strategic understanding of the environment in 
which foundations operate (Breiteneicher and Marble in Anheier and Daly 
2007, 203-4). 
Where studies of foundations have been conducted in Canada, they have considered the 
collaborative strategies of foundations (Pearson 2010), the growth of the sector (Kryvoruchko 
2013a), and regulation (Bromley 1997; Phillips 2010; Brock 2008; Elson 2011; Kryvoruchko 
2013), or they are noted within studies of think tanks (Lindquist 2004; Abelson 2005). None of 
them are comparative, qualitative case studies.  
 I found two Canada-specific case studies concerning foundations. First, Foster, 
Meinhard, Berger, and Wright (2005) present a study of strategic philanthropy, but not of 
foundations per se; not surprisingly, they focus on the “big three” US foundations (the 
Carnegie Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Ford Foundation) operating in 
Canada (Arnove 1980; Arnove and Pinede 2007). Second, Brison’s (2005) research is on the 
role of the Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations in the development of Canadian culture, 
through funding of the arts and letters in the early 20th century, a period before the federal 
government provided this kind of support through Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada (SSHRC) and Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of 
Canada (NSERC). Given the limited scholarly research on the policy roles of foundations in 
Canada, the present study is a valuable contribution to the literature. The findings of this study 
will further add to the public policy and third sector literatures by providing thick descriptive 
accounts of foundations’ policy-making roles in Canada in these three cases.  
1.2 Research Questions 
From a public policy perspective, Kingdon’s (1984, 1995, 2003) concept of policy 
entrepreneurs is used to frame an understanding of foundations’ specific roles in policy making 
(alternative definitions of entrepreneurship are explored in Chapter 3 and listed in the 
Glossary). The theoretical framework presented in this dissertation builds on this concept; it 
assesses the roles of these actors in the policy-making process. By employing the policy-cycle 
approach and institutional perspectives to this research, I will address some of the limitations of 
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the multiple streams framework (MSF) which would otherwise overshadow the usefulness of 
the concept of policy entrepreneur for these purposes. Using institutional perspectives also 
underscore the differences between the roles of foundations in Canada, the US and, to a lesser 
extent, the UK. The following six research questions guide this dissertation: 
1) Who are foundations as policy actors in Canada? 
2) Why do foundations engage in policy making in these cases? What are their 
motivations as compared to politicians’, policy makers’, or the public’s perceptions 
of their motivations? 
3) What resources do they have at their disposal, what were their strategies, and what 
was the extent of the influence of foundations beyond investing money in policy-
making efforts? Does it vary by policy domain? 
4) When (i.e., at what stage of the policy cycle) are foundations most involved or 
effective in shaping policy? 
5) How receptive are governments to the influence, ideas, and agendas emerging from 
the third sector, brought forward by, for, or with foundations? 
6) What are the barriers/enablers of foundations’ participation in these policy processes? 
1.3 Overview of the Case Studies  
To overcome the problems with generalization inherent in case study research, and to 
understand similarities and differences across policy areas and between organizations, a 
comparative, multiple case-study approach is appropriate (Yin 2009). This approach is in 
keeping with case selection methods for the study of think tanks and foundations (Abelson 
2002; Fleishman 2007; Lindquist 1989; Rich 2005). The rationale for having chosen these 
cases is that foundations’ engagement in policy discussions varies depending upon 
geographical scope, political context, time, and the nature of the specific policy issue under 
consideration (Anheier and Daly 2006; Salamon and Anheier 1997; Stone 2007). Therefore, 
comparing policy domains at the federal level to those at the provincial level, and comparing 
fiscal policy to social policy is valuable.  
This research considers roles of the following types of foundations associated with the 
selected case studies. The first is an umbrella organization: Philanthropic Foundations Canada 
(PFC). The PFC is a private foundation that today represents the public-policy interests of 
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foundations with the government of Canada; when it was established in 1999, it represented 
only the interests of private foundations on the very narrow policy interest of the capital-gains 
tax exemption for the donation of publicly listed securities. The second type is a group: 
“Crown foundations”; these were established parallel to some post-secondary institutions 
between 1987 and 1998. In particular, I will focus on the University of Saskatchewan’s Crown 
foundation, with which I am most familiar. The third type is a private foundation based in the 
US: the Gates Foundation. The Gates Foundation is also the largest foundation in the world, 
which affords it unique international reach and influence. The Gates Foundation partnered with 
the Canadian government to spearhead the fight against the HIV/AIDS epidemic through 
vaccine development from the early 2000s to about 2014.  
Each of these cases was selected because there were indications early in the research 
process that they might provide insight into the public policy roles of philanthropic foundations 
in Canada (beyond grant-making). The cases were identified from media scans, searches of 
government websites, publicly available committee documentation, and Hansard. Each case 
provides unique insight into the evolution of foundations’ roles across the policy cycle, from 
agenda-setting to implementation. First, the capital gains tax exemption case is important 
because the very policies underpinning a private foundation’s ability to shape social policy 
were in question. Second, the Crown foundations case shaped the fundraising strategies of, and 
opportunities for, universities across the country (although only for a short time). Third, the 
Gates Foundation case marks a point in time when the “gloss” of private-foundation support 
for world health epidemics had not yet rubbed off (Klausner et al. 2003; Rushton and Williams 
2011; Ulbert 2011). 
1.4 Fiscal Policy: The Capital Gains Tax Exemption (1997–2017)  
In 1997, the federal government authorized a pilot program for the exemption of capital gains 
tax for the donation of publicly listed securities. The measure was intended to incentivize the 
donation of major capital assets to charities (see Glossary) in Canada. The policy was inspired 
by the US, where similar legislation had been in place for private foundations since at least 
1984 on term bases and was made permanent in 1994. In 1998, the exemption for qualifying 
publicly listed securities was amended to 100%. This idea provided evidence of policy 
entrepreneurship in the third sector, with Canadian legislation lagging behind US counterparts 
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by about a decade (Arnsberger, Ludlum, Riley, and Stanton 2008). Some authors contend that 
this type of policy, aimed at institutional change around the regulation of the sector itself, is the 
only “real” kind of policy entrepreneurship – that which affects one’s own operations or 
institutional context (Dacin, Dacin, and Matear 2010, 50; and Quinn, Tompkins-Stange, and 
Meyerson 2012, 952 refer to this as institutional entrepreneurship; also see Glossary). 
 However, for a variety of reasons (which I explore in Chapter 5), private philanthropic 
foundations were excluded from the list of qualified recipients of such donations when the 
legislation was introduced in 1997. (It is possible that this exception can be traced to the US 
roots of the donation incentive and to a similar exclusion in the US legislation that was 
resolved in 1994.) This meant that gifts of capital assets to private foundations were still 
taxable. For private foundations in Canada, this essentially eliminated the prospect of receiving 
any such gifts. Foundations, and particularly grant-making private foundations, are asset-based 
organizations by definition (Anheier and Daly 2007), so to eliminate this potential funding base 
by providing an advantage to other types of charities was effectively a coup de grâce. In 
response, a group of Canadian foundations established Philanthropic Foundations Canada 
(PFC) to ensure that their fiscal policy objectives were considered in the federal government’s 
policy. This is a case of foundations’ agenda-setting and policy development in the third sector.  
1.5 PSE Policy: The Establishment of University Crown Foundations (1987–1998) 
Crown foundations for Canadian universities were established during the late 1980s and early 
1990s, starting at the University of British Columbia (UBC). The purpose of establishing these 
parallel, public foundations for universities was to take advantage of tax incentives only 
available in connection with donations to the Crown. In the late 1980s, following the pan-
Canadian trend that began in British Columbia, key policy actors at the University of 
Saskatchewan (U of S) lobbied the provincial government to establish a Crown foundation. 
The advantage would be that there were no limits to charitable tax deductions on lifetime 
earnings. In 1994, the University of Saskatchewan Foundation Act established the U of S 
Foundation as a Crown corporation of the province of Saskatchewan (Saskatchewan 1994). 
The purpose of the foundation was to raise, hold, and distribute funds to support the operations 
of the U of S. By 1997, however, the government of Canada had levelled donation incentives 
for Crown and other charitable foundations (see Glossary) through a policy change in the 
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Income Tax Act (Income Tax Act 1997). This meant that donations of lifetime earnings to any 
type of charitable organization (not just Crowns), would be subject to the new maximum 
threshold of 75% allowed as tax-exempt contributions on lifetime earnings. Following these 
federal legislative changes in the Income Tax Act, in 1998, the assets of the U of S Crown 
Foundation were transferred from the Crown foundation to a parallel public foundation (see 
Glossary) of the U of S (Saskatchewan 1957).  
 This case provides an example of the development of the third sector in Canada during 
the 1990s that resulted from efforts to both increase the philanthropic resources available to 
universities, and maximize tax advantages for donors. While this is a historic example, it was 
part of an important policy trend, and it is relevant to the evolution of foundations and the third 
sector in Canada. The proliferation of university Crown foundations across the country affected 
the distribution of wealth across types of charities, causes, and geographies.  
1.6 Health-Research Policy: The Gates Foundation and the CHVI (2004–2016)  
The Canadian HIV Vaccine Initiative (CHVI) was led in partnership with the Gates Foundation 
and the Global HIV Vaccine Initiative (GHVE) before it coalesced under the Gates Foundation 
and the government of Canada’s partnership in 2006. This case of policy-making between the 
largest private foundation in the world and the government of Canada is a clear example of a 
private foundation’s engagement in public policy where the foundation (or other individuals 
working in or with the foundation) drove the policy direction. The original plan was to 
construct a facility to conduct research in a field that had been identified as a priority by the 
Canadian government after it signed on to the CHVI. Two memoranda of understanding 
(MOUs) were signed in 2006 and 2010. However, the policy approach changed between the 
signing of the first and the second agreements, i.e., upon implementation. The second MOU 
was up for renewal in 2014, but there is no indication that it was signed. The funding support 
ended in 2016 and a final report was publicly released in 2017.  
As described in the 2006 MOU, the funding from the Gates Foundation and the 
government of Canada was to be directed toward the construction of a vaccine-development 
facility. The partnership was valued at $138 million. The Gates Foundation donated $28 
million and the federal government contributed $111 million (Canada 2016; 2017). In 2011, 
however, the partnership was restructured with a focus on funding the primary research 
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required to develop an HIV vaccine. When the capital project was cancelled, it caused 
considerable consternation amongst the applicants and proponents of the project, as well as 
speculation about the rationale and motivations behind the decision (Government of Canada 
2011). Although it is quite unique, this case provides evidence of a large private philanthropic 
foundation’s influence on policy making at the federal level. The case is important because it 
shows the extent of the influence that a private foundation can have on a public policy agenda 
and, in fact, on decision making.  
1.7 Value and Significance 
Foundations play a role in forming public policy (outside of simply providing funding) by 
contributing to social policy discourse, policy ideas, and policy solutions. Only since the 1990s 
has serious consideration been given to the involvement of organizations such as think tanks 
and foundations in policy processes in Canada (see, for instance, Abelson 2002; Rich 2004; 
Stone 2000a). Three decades later, much of the literature still tends to focus, first, on the US 
and, second, on the organizational level rather than the institutional level of analysis. Much of 
the existing literature is on foundations’ internal organizational strategies and effectiveness in 
soliciting donations or allocating grants to charitable organizations. Moreover, though other 
studies consider alternative actors such as non-profits in public policy, these have tended to 
focus (for professional purposes) on the more popular issues of social innovation and 
investment, rather than on public policy. 
1.8 Plan of the Dissertation 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature. Chapter 
3 presents the conceptual framework. Chapter 4 outlines the research methodology. Chapter 5 
examines foundations’ involvement in the policy process regarding the capital gains tax 
exemption for the donation of publicly listed securities. Chapter 6 explores foundations’ roles 
in the establishment of university Crown foundations across Canada. Chapter 7 presents the 
case of the Gates Foundation and the government of Canada partnership for the CHVI vaccine 
development facility. The findings are discussed in Chapter 8, as are the conclusions and 
limitations of this study, as well as ideas for further research on this topic. Additional 
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information on the interviews is provided in Appendices A and B, a Glossary is provided in 
Appendix C, and supplementary tables are in Appendix D.  
1.9 Summary  
This dissertation contributes to the empirical evidence available on the roles of foundations in 
Canada. Drawing on the concepts of policy entrepreneur and policy cycles, and adopting an 
institutionalist lens, this dissertation offers three thick descriptive case studies of foundations’ 
policy engagement. It should enable further cross-national research on foundations that will 
elucidate the implications of foundations’ roles in public policy. The findings will assist policy 
makers, foundation executives, and scholars in clarifying the place of foundations as policy 
actors in Canada. This will also contribute to comparative research on foundations that, at the 
moment, largely ignores Canada. 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
The objective of this chapter is to review current and relevant literature related to the study of 
the Canadian philanthropic foundation sector. This summary of the literature describes what is 
currently understood about the research problem, what we do not know, and what areas for 
future research are suggested by noted scholars. This review points to the possibility that 
Canadian foundations are a unique and increasingly institutionalized set of organizations that 
strategically contribute to public-policy agendas, leading from within the third sector as policy 
entrepreneurs. This finding is based on secondary research and will be explored as a possible 
way to encapsulate the empirical evidence presented in this dissertation.  
 This chapter is organized as follows: first, philanthropic foundations in the third sector 
in Canada are mapped out; an overview of the institutional, historical, and governance contexts 
is provided; and the literature on foundations in Canada is reviewed briefly.  
2.1 Mapping Foundations within the Canadian Third Sector  
In 2013, the Johns Hopkins Centre for Civil Society Studies released The State of the Voluntary 
Sector and Civil Society, which rated and compared the third sector across OECD and other 
countries, and explored the profile and economic footprint of the sector in Canada (Salamon, 
Sokolowski, Haddock, and Tice 2013). The report stated that on average, among the 16 
countries explored, employment in the third sector accounted for 7.4% of total employment. 
The report found that the value of paid and volunteer work in the third sector in Canada 
accounted for 8.1% of GDP. This is more than the 4.5% average for the other 15 countries and 
is the highest among them. In fact, Canada ranked above average in the majority of the 
indicators presented (Salamon, Sokolowski, Haddock, and Tice 2013). The policy domains of 
health, education, and social service account for 74% of the third sector initiatives in Canada 
(Elson 2009, 14-15; see also, Kryvoruchko 2013, 2013a). 
 Publicly available data on foundations indicates that there are at least 86,000 registered 
charities in Canada, and over 10,000 foundations. About half of these foundations are public, 
and half are private. Foundations are in fact the fastest growing type of charity in Canada 
(Blumberg 2016; Imagine Canada and PFC 2014; PFC 2016). PFC reports that in 2015, 
foundations managed approximately $71 billion in assets, and made over $5.6 billion in grants. 
Of this sum, public foundations made $3.6 billion in grants, and private foundations $2 billion 
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(Imagine Canada and PFC 2014). Yet, amongst the members of PFC that were primarily 
private family foundations (see Glossary), about two thirds of grants were made to 
“foundation-managed” charitable causes. This could be interpreted as evidence of the primarily 
donor-directed nature of private foundation funding (PFC 2017) that has historically garnered 
critique. However, this family foundation funding represents only about 10–12% of total 
foundation giving in Canada. 
In terms of the distribution of assets among foundations, as of the most recent available 
data in 2014, 150 of the top grant-making foundations in Canada1 contributed over 25% of total 
grants made by foundations, which represented approximately $1 billion in gifts. The 
MasterCard Foundation, the largest foundation in Canada, gave the most in 2014, at $84.1 
million. In 2014, 30% was distributed to education, 17% to health, followed by social services 
at 10%. The remainder included, for example, international causes, voluntarism, fundraising, 
environment, and housing. Only 1% (or $9.1 million) was directed at legal, political, or 
advocacy (see Glossary) causes; only 8% ($77.6M) went toward religious causes (Imagine 
Canada and PFC 2014).  
Foundations’ granting practices contribute to the disparities and divergence in 
organizations’ size and scope in the Canadian third sector in the context of declining public 
funding and increasing costs of social services like higher education and healthcare. 
Geographically, information from T3010 tax forms and data self-reported to Imagine Canada’s 
Grant Connect database also shows that, of the annual donations for the 150 largest foundations 
in Canada (which control over $10 billion in assets), about half are distributed in Ontario, a 
fifth in Québec, and only a twelfth across Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and the Maritimes 
combined (Imagine Canada and PFC 2014, 15).  
                                               
 
1 “Top grantmaking foundations were identified using a combination of T3010 financial data and criteria derived 
from Grant Connect for each year from 2002 through 2012. T3010 data was obtained from Canada Revenue 
Agency (CRA) in the form of an electronic database. To be evaluated, organizations had to meet a number of 
scope criteria: 1. to be designated by CRA as either a public foundation or a private foundation; 2. to have not had 
their charitable status revoked for cause; and 3. to have received more than 50% of their revenues from non-
governmental sources.” Out of scope of this survey data were “Operating charity – Charitable status revoked for 
cause; More [sic] than 50% revenues from government sources; Less [sic] than $50,000 in gifts to qualified 
donees on line 5050” (Imagine Canada and PFC 2014, 18). This means that Crown foundations and parallel 
foundations (such as hospital foundations or university foundations) were beyond the scope of the available data.  
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The latest available data from 2012 shows that there were only three grant-making 
foundations in Saskatchewan (excluding parallel foundations, operating foundations, and 
private foundations supporting only one grantee, the definitions of which are provided later in 
this chapter; also see Glossary). Saskatchewan foundations accounted for only 1% of the assets 
of grant-making foundations in Canada. Altogether, in terms of attention to different policy 
domains, in 2011, the top grant-making foundations in the province provided 28% of top grants 
to education and research, 16% to social services, 15% to health, and 9% to religion (Imagine 
Canada and PFC 2014, 13).  
The University of Victoria undertook a deeper mapping of the social economy (see 
Glossary) in Canada between 2005 and 2011. The geographical scope was primarily Ontario, 
Québec, and Nunavut. Smaller studies were undertaken in Prince Edward Island. More 
piecemeal studies were conducted in British Columbia and Alberta. The scope of social 
economy activities, social enterprises, levels of policy support, financial trends, economic 
impacts, and physical infrastructure were documented (Thompson and Emmanuel 2012, 95). 
The mapping’s findings point to early evidence of the importance of organizational 
collaboration within the third sector in order to pursue stated policy objectives. The mixed 
economy (e.g. trading and harvesting native vegetation) in Indigenous communities in the 
North was also a particular focus of the study. Over 1,000 social economy organizations in 
Nunavut were identified, about a quarter of which were run by Indigenous peoples. In addition, 
over half of the representatives on these third-sector boards in Nunavut were Indigenous. 
Elsewhere in Canada, there is an under-representation of Indigenous people on foundation staff 
and governing boards (Salamon et al. 2013, 114). Since the 1980s, Canadian and American 
foundations have both moved away from the traditional forms of humanitarian relief aid 
provided to developing countries (Oxfam, for instance) to supporting local and Indigenous 
charitable organizations. The University of Victoria study aside, quantitative research on 
Canadian foundations has been conducted primarily by professional associations, including 
Imagine Canada, Community Foundations Canada (CFC), and PFC (save for Kryvoruchko 
2013, 2013a, or those that are mixed in with think tank research such as Abelson [2005], and 
Lindquist [2004]).  
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2.2 Institutional Context 
Foundations are organizations operating within the third sector. Private foundations’ policy 
roles are contested because they have limited representational scope, i.e., an elite of a few 
donors. Historically, disunity and lack of coherent policy objectives both amongst themselves 
and in relation to the rest of the third sector has constrained their policy influence. The 
emerging literature on foundations points to this long-standing phenomenon in Canada 
(Phillips and Rathgeb Smith 2011; Pearson 2010; Reckhow 2016).  
 The Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) defines a foundation as “a registered charity that 
makes grants to other charities and to those organizations recognized by the federal 
government as ‘qualified donees’” (Canada 2016, 1). The Income Tax Act establishes the 
legislative framework for charities and foundations, provides foundations with an operational 
mandate, and more generally, sets the basis for the relationship between the government and 
the third sector. The Income Tax Act is also a source of challenges for the third sector (Phillips, 
J. 2000; Payne and Zhao 2007; Phillips, J., Chapman, and Stevens 2001; Phillips and Rathgeb 
Smith 2011; Sharpe 1994; Sexty 1980; Hoffstein 2007; Bromley 1999; Burrows 2009). The 
contentious issue is whether the CRA should assist and enable the sector to achieve their policy 
goals, or whether its primary function is to enforce appropriate regulation, accountability, and 
oversight. 
 The contemporary Canadian landscape for foundations – including the definition of 
charity, the lack of clarity in that definition, and how a charitable purpose is understood – is 
rooted in the Elizabethan Poor Laws enacted in Great Britain in 1601. The sentiment of these 
laws was embodied in Canada in 1891 in Pemsel vs. Special Commissioners of Income Tax. 
The modern framework for foundations is found in the Income Tax Act. While no specific 
definition of “charity” is provided in the Income Tax Act or any other federal legislation, 
charitable purposes are identified as the relief of poverty, advancement of education, 
advancement of religion, or purposes beneficial to the community. Other legal developments 
have further refined the Canadian Revenue Agency’s (CRA) interpretation of the meaning of 
“charity,” but it has not been prescribed or laid out definitively in one piece of legislation other 
than the Income Tax Act (Innes and Boyle 2006, 3-4; Kryvoruchko 2013). While registered 
charities and non-profit organizations (NPOs) have tax-exempt status, the CRA only permits 
the former to issue tax receipts to donors (see Glossary).  
 19 
 Legally, according to CRA policy statements, there are three types of charities in 
Canada: registered charities, public foundations, and private foundations. The difference 
between public and private foundations is that public foundations are controlled by boards 
made up of a majority who operate at arm’s length, while at least 50% of private foundations’ 
directors do not deal at arm’s length (i.e., they have directly made significant financial 
contributions to the foundation). For example, the United Way is a public foundation, whereas 
the McConnell Foundation is a private foundation (Innes and Boyle 2006; PFC 2016a. For 
additional information, see Glossary.) 
There is no comprehensive, agreed-upon taxonomy of foundations (Fleishman 2009; 
Powell 2006, 355), yet there are legal (below), academic (Graddy and Morgan 2006; Hall and 
Reed 1998, 45), and professional typologies (Pearson 2016; Lenkowsky 2002). These vary by 
country (Canada 2005; Anheier and Daly 2007). There are also nationally based, generally 
accepted operating rules for foundations that assist in describing their roles (Lagemann 1999; 
McCoy and McGoey 2011; Pearson 2016; Phillips 201; Prewitt 2006; Ulbert 2011). The legal 
nomenclature is an important starting point for exploring these typologies. Legally, “tests of 
charitable intent are essentially, at least in theory, expressions of current judgment about the 
kinds of activity that qualify for these more or less automatic benefits” (Gregory 1993, 53). In 
Canada, according to the Income Tax Act, foundations fund charities – that is their common 
purpose. 
Some argue that foundations’ roles in policy making are akin to, or limited to, their 
roles as funders. For instance, in a multinational, qualitative, and comparative study, 
Lenkowsky notes the institutional nature of foundations as “bankers” in the third sector (2002). 
Foundations also play an intermediary function between individual donors and recipients, 
which serves to reduce information asymmetries (see Glossary) and inefficiencies that arise 
from crowding out of a growing number of potential recipients. In an empirical study of 
Canadian foundations and tax policy and the charitable sector, Kyrvoruchko finds that, for 
every dollar invested by foundations in charities, private donations to those charities increase 
on average by $3.70 (2013). Neither of these are benign or apolitical functions, however. The 
funding decisions and systemic policy agendas (see Glossary) require judgment and decision-
making by individuals or organizations who are not democratically elected. In a collection of 
articles on the politics of foundations in the United States, Teles (2016) similarly argues that 
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the character of funding sources, including the organizational form particular to foundations, 
and their political preferences determine the allocation of resources and foundations’ strategic 
choices.  
The nature of foundations’ policy roles is inherently political. In a comparative study, 
Anheier and Daly note the impact that different national and jurisdictional contexts have on 
foundations’ political roles. The authors find that, despite these differences, the use of a 
consistent analytical framework across case studies and jurisdictions can assist in identifying 
common themes across cases, and common issues, opportunities and challenges (2007). Reich 
(2016) suggests that private foundations represent the legal institutionalization and acquisition 
of private wealth in the place of public funds for public purposes. Although he suggests that 
foundations are an institutional form particular to the United States, this proposition is not 
borne out by other research (Prewitt 2006). The existing research on foundations shows that, as 
foundations grow in number and as their assets increase, they become increasingly politicized 
and institutionalized, although their roles in democratic society tend to be somewhat 
contentious (Anheier and Daly 2007; Elson 2011; Stone, Dehnam and Garnett 1998; Abelson 
2016; Phillips 2007). Their legitimacy is contested depending not only on the issue but also on 
the jurisdiction (Anheier and Daly 2007; Prewitt 2006). Though the focus of this dissertation is 
specifically the policy roles of foundations, rather than their political roles, the contributions of 
these aforementioned authors are important to keep in mind. Moreover, this study will explore 
the roles of foundations in public policy beyond their roles simply as funders of charitable 
organization.  
 Separate foundations also work together toward shared policy goals. With respect to 
foundations in the US, Reckhow notes that, in part to overcome some of the challenges 
presented by foundations’ institutional constraints and governance frameworks, they “have 
coordinated their efforts by supporting aligned issue agendas, research programs, and advocacy 
efforts, and by linking organizations engaged in related policy efforts” (2016, 450). This 
observation is further supported by Pearson’s research on the strategies of Canadian 
foundations, which she bases on interviews with foundation executives in Canada (2010). 
Pearson (President and CEO of Philanthropic Foundations Canada) provides evidence that 
foundations have been collaborating with one another across policy domains since at least 2009 
in an attempt to overcome such challenges (2010). In Canada, federal cutbacks related to both 
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Liberal and Conservative governments’ move to NPM since the 1990s have had implications 
for foundations (Canada 1996, 68; Elson 2011b; Philips 2016). The closed fiscal policy regime 
(see Glossary), embedded in the primacy of the Income Tax Act for the regulation of 
foundations, has necessitated these developments. Collaborations between Canadian 
foundations have occurred through formal financial arrangements, strategic alliances, and 
policy learning (Phillips 2010; Reckhow 2016). Like Cohen and March (1972), Pearson (2005) 
refers to this activity “loose coupling” (2005).  
 Given the challenges foundations face, it seems that reform is necessary. However, 
quoting Philips, a leading Canadian scholar in studies of the third sector and community 
foundations (see Glossary), and Rathgeb Smith, a professor of public policy at Georgetown 
University, “Arguably the most important impediment [to third-sector reform] is the lack of 
vision of the role of the third sector in the guiding philosophy of the public management” 
(2011, 229). This observation reinforces the importance of increasing the evidence available to 
support more sophisticated discourse on the roles of foundations in Canadian policy processes.  
 Foundations are enduring and adaptable. They operated as trusts in the early 20th 
century and were officially recognized by all of the provinces in 1950, at which point they also 
faced new requirements to meet disbursement quotas. Thus, even as they are conferred 
legitimacy by the state, they are increasingly regulated, thereby decreasing their autonomy. Nor 
are they autonomous in relation to their benefactors. The prevalence and proliferation of 
regulations regarding arm’s-length dealings points to the risk that donors’ interests and values 
may supersede the state-sanctioned mandates of foundations (regulated through the Income Tax 
Act, the CRA, and the Charities Directorate) and supported organizations (via indirect expenses 
provided through tax credits and deductions). Their organizational forms have become more 
complex: from trusts and estates of religious organizations or wealthy benefactors, to 
innovative organizations in the social economy. More and more, they have large professional 
staffs, communications programs, and bureaucratic procedures that provide institutional 
coherence and unity of direction. Coherence is also evident in the adoption of common codes 
of ethics amongst foundations, and their participation in umbrella organizations.  
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2.3 Historical Context  
Developments in the Canadian foundation sector have closely followed those of the US 
(Kryvoruchko 2013). However, research shows that regulatory policy in Canada also tends to 
follow UK policy trends. Although this tendency is less evident in the popular discourse, with 
the exception of the Voluntary Sector Accord (VSA), which can be linked to the UK’s compact 
with the voluntary sector (2010; see also Elson 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Phillips and Rathgeb 
Smith 2011; Prewitt, Dogan, Heydemann, Toepler 2006; Laforest 2013). Other cross-national 
research suggests that claims about the legitimacy of foundations tend to be based on legal or 
moral grounds, rather than on foundations’ contributions to innovation in the third sector. 
Legally, foundations are not dependent on political processes or market forces for determining 
their preferences, which makes them uniquely independent; additionally, there is a moral (or 
political) imperative for foundations and their donors to complement the role of the state by 
delivering or funding public goods (Anheier and Daly 2007). The histories of foundations 
across all three countries show the jurisdictions grappling with similar issues in different ways. 
As evidenced in the literature, the modern discourse on the policy roles of foundations is 
riddled with concerns regarding their legitimacy, transparency, and accountability vis-à-vis the 
democratic state, and similarly in public policy (e.g. the early 1960s, and the late 1970s in the 
US [Brilliant 2000]; the 1980s and 1990s in Canada [Elson 2011b]; and the 1990s in the US 
and Europe [Anheier and Kendall 2001; also BBC 2006; Prewitt, Hydemann, and Toepler 
2006; Williams 2010]).  
 Even before the issue of taxes became entangled with the operation of foundations, 
there was a good deal of concern about them. While charitable exemption from income tax was 
applied to all charitable organizations in Canada in 1917, in the US, foundations were only 
included in 1921 (Kryvoruchko 2010; Brilliant 2000; Fraser 2003; Dobkin Hall 1999). 
Canadian understandings of and attitudes toward foundations are rooted in this historical 
context, and influenced especially by legal and political developments in the US. As foundation 
executive, Yale professor, and author Leonard Bacon questioned in the early 20th century, “a 
true responsibility of the executive to some superior or constituent power is a security against 
mismanagement and the gradual perversion of the trust” (Dobkin Hall 1999, 15). Bacon 
warned against two specific deviations in the mandates and operations of foundations. First, 
that although possibly unintentional and gradual, “fraudulent mismanagement” was a 
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“consequence of devoting their minds too engrossingly to the one particular interest which they 
have in hand” (1999, 15). Second, Bacon warned, “Power, and especially executive power, if 
placed in irresponsible hands, grows and accumulates till nothing but the violence of revolution 
can resist it… [therefore, it] should be carefully guarded and bounded by corresponding 
responsibility” (15). His was essentially the first American study of what should be considered 
appropriate governance and accountability for foundations.  
 The fear of plutocracy (see Glossary), the power of an elite few, in the form of 
foundation or “trust associations,” as they were referred to at the time, was pervasive in the 
early 20th century. These perceptions of foundations’ legitimacy, motivations, and (lack of) 
accountability can be traced to the roles of robber barons and men like Rockefeller, Ford, and 
Sage, and the well-known philanthropists of the industrial era like Carnegie (Lagemann 1999). 
This distrust infused the Canadian discourse on foundations for decades. Brock notes, “There is 
a joke in Canadian policy circles that Canada is usually ten to twenty years behind Britain and 
the US in awakening to new policy realities and adopting innovative policy reforms” (2000, 1). 
This research suggests, however, that this lag between Canada and both the UK and the US has 
grown wider in recent decades. This pattern is also evident in Canada. 
In the early 20th century, the philanthropic contributions of the Carnegie Corporation 
and the Rockefeller Foundation to Canadian arts and letters were significant. The aim of the 
contributions was to supplement functions not then provided by the government, in order to 
eventually have them publicly funded, thereby aligning public and philanthropic policy 
agendas. These private foundations’ investments are evidence of the perceived American 
influence on Canadian culture through the contributions of private foundations:  
The goal of both foundations was, after all, to act as catalysts for the reform of 
society and culture, to support and empower individuals and organizations who 
shared their goals for the arts and letters, and later, when their influence was fully 
institutionalized, to quietly relinquish control and overt influence… by 1957 
American foundations’ influence had thoroughly permeated the institutions that 
formed the infrastructure of Canadian culture. (Brison 2005, 201) 
There were concerns about this US influence on Canadian culture, and of the use of culture as 
propaganda in totalitarian regimes. In 1949, Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent established the 
Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences. It is commonly 
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referred to as the Massey Commission, after the chair, Vincent Massey.2 The final report of the 
Massey Commission was released in 1951, essentially advocating for increased federal funding 
for these Canadian endeavours that were funded by American philanthropists (Brison 2005; 
Steward and Kallmann 2006). The report noted, “It is in the national interest to give 
encouragement to institutions with express [Canadian] national feeling” (Stewart and Kallman 
2006, 3). Thus, it acknowledged and affirmed the influences of foundations for Canadian 
public policy in relation to the arts, letters, and sciences, and it enacted federal policies to limit 
American influence.  
 The Massey Commission resulted in the establishment of the National Library of 
Canada in 1953 (now the Library and Archives Canada), and in 1957, the Canada Council 
(now the Canada Council for the Arts), and it increased funding for the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (CBC). It signified a change in the Canadian political economy for support of the 
arts, letters, and sciences from one of American philanthropic patronage to one of public 
patronage. Two Canadian industrialists, Izaak Walton Killam (of the Killam Foundation) and 
Sir James Dunn endowed the new Canada Council with $100 million. The president of the 
Rockefeller Foundation at the time noted that the contributions to the new Canada Council 
were greater in the first few years of its operations than those to his foundation over 45 years 
(Brison 2005, 198). Brison (2005), Roelofs (2003), and Arnove (1980) point to these US 
philanthropic foundations’ contributions as evidence of the plutocratic pursuit of American 
cultural hegemony.  
As for tax exemptions, in the 1950s, Canada was also among the first developed 
countries to implement disbursement quotas of annual revenues for foundations. The objective 
was to regulate their accumulation of wealth, as well as to ensure that foundations were 
fulfilling their charitable purpose of putting private dollars to work for the public good. (It was 
not until 1966 that a charitable registration number was also required to issue a donation receipt 
in Canada, which some argue contributed to the lack of historical data (perhaps also 
transparency in the third sector) preceding this time on the third sector in Canada [Drache, 
Hayhoe, and Stevens 2007]).  
                                               
 
2 Hilda Neatby, a history professor at the University of Saskatchewan was a member of the Massey Commission 
(Stewart and Killmann 2006). 
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Concerns about foundations continued well into the 20th century. In 1965, the US 
Treasury Department gave a public report to the House Committee on Ways and Means 
entitled, The Treasury Report on Private Foundations. The report recommended the following 
measures: 
1) Prohibiting financial transactions [self-dealing] between a foundation 
and its contributors, officers, directors, or trustees. 
2) Limiting the period during which a foundation may withhold income 
from charity. 
3) Limiting the ownership of stock to less than 20% in any business. 
4) Limiting the use of a foundation to maintain family control over a 
business. 
5) Barring speculative practices by foundations, such as borrowing money 
for investment purposes, etc. 
6) Broadening the base of foundation management after the first 25 years of 
a foundation's life so that after that time the donor or related parties could 
not make up more than 25% of the foundation’s governing body.  
(IUPUI 2016) 
These recommendations were in response to growing public concern regarding the 
accumulation of wealth in private foundations, and reports of abuse of funds, tax shelters, tax 
fraud, and mismanagement of funds. Given their tax-exempt status in a time of rising taxes for 
citizens, there was a problematic perception that foundations were not doing their share to 
contribute to the public good (IUPUI 2016). These recommendations continue to provide the 
basis for legislation on the responsibilities, accountability, and transparency of philanthropic 
foundations in both the United States and Canada.  
In 1968, in the wake of the House committee’s findings, John D. Rockefeller III formed 
the Commission on Foundations and Private Philanthropy (known as the Peterson 
Commission) to “analyze the role of foundations and tax incentives” (Brilliant 2000; 
Burlingame 2004, 372). The commission was supposed to independently and objectively assess 
foundations’ roles. The recommendations of both studies informed the Tax Reform Act of 
1969 (TRA), which imposed a number of accountability measures and tax policies for 
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foundations, including the mandatory disposal of at least 6–8% of a foundation’s annual 
income.  
The Peterson Commission also recommended the establishment of the Commission on 
Private Philanthropy and Public Needs (also known as the Filer Commission, after the chair, 
John Filer), which was created in 1972 (Burlingame 2000, 372). The Filer Commission was 
supported by the chairman and the secretary to the treasury of the House Committee on Ways 
and Means, among others. Its mandate was to make recommendations on how to increase the 
strength and effectiveness of the philanthropic sector (IUPUI 2016b). With respect to the 
regulation of philanthropic foundations, recommendations included: 
• That all larger tax-exempt charitable organizations except churches 
and church affiliates be required to prepare and make readily 
available detailed annual reports on their finances, programs, and 
priorities. 
• That all tax-exempt organisations be required to maintain "arms-
length" business relationships with profit-making organisations or 
activities in which any principal of the exempt organisation has a 
financial interest [commonly referred to as arms-length dealing]. 
• That non-profit organisations, other than private foundations, be 
allowed the same freedom to attempt to influence legislation as are 
business corporations and trade associations, that toward this end 
Congress remove the current limitation on such activity by 
charitable groups eligible to receive tax-deductible gifts. 
• That a permanent national commission on the nonprofit sector be 
established by Congress. (UIPUI 2016b) 
When the Commission’s work was completed, the process to follow the recommendations and 
organize a national commission was determined, but fell off of the policy agenda at the next 
election. The absence of a consistent and prominent federal policy advisory group, as the Filer 
Commission recommended for the third sector, continues to create problems for the third sector 
in Canada and the United States (Phillips and Smith 2011). The implications for Canada are 
discussed below.  
Policies in Canada closely followed these developments in the US (Kryvoruchko 2013). 
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The Canadian reforms followed in the Carter Commission, formally known as The Royal 
Commission on Taxation, published in 1967. Most notably for foundations, the 1977 Canadian 
Tax Reform Act, enacted under Liberal Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, followed the 
spirit of the 1969 American Tax Reform Act. The Carter Commission was fundamentally 
different from its preceding US commissions in that it was commissioned by the Canadian 
government (rather than by foundations) and had a broader scope: it considered the entire 
Canadian tax system. The main policy objective of the Carter Commission was to reinforce the 
fact “that the purpose of the tax system was to raise revenue equitably: ‘The first and most 
essential purpose of taxation is to share the burden of the state fairly among all individuals and 
families’” (Carter Commission 1967, 635). It was also firmly rooted in welfare economics and 
neo-Keynesian fiscal policy, which informed the modern Canadian tax regime.  
The Carter Commission concluded, “for the foreseeable future…the charitable sector in 
Canada will be subsidized through the tax system” (Woodman 1988, 537). For Canadian 
charities, the principal change to the Income Tax Act that resulted from this commission was 
the requirement introduced in 1966 while the work of the commission was still underway that 
charities be registered to provide receipts to donors for the purposes of tax deduction. 
Afterwards, universities like the U of S were able to issue tax receipts, and therefore had to 
establish parallel foundations in order to do so. For foundations, the other effect was that 
charitable corporations and trusts were required to spend 90% (later 80%) of their annual 
income on operating charities or through donations to charities. Foundations were also not 
allowed to own businesses, conduct business, or acquire control of a corporation (Woodman 
1988, 547-548). Today, these regulations are known as self-dealing rules.  
In 1977 and 1987, new regulations for charities were introduced. In 1977, the minimum 
requirements for charities’ spending on charitable causes (as opposed to fundraising or 
administration) was increased. Also in 1977, new definitions were created to distinguish among 
private foundations, public foundations, and charitable organizations. Charities were also 
required to file public information returns. In 1987, absolute limits were made on tax credits for 
charitable donations. These new regulations amended the policy for tax credits from one that 
placed limits based on the proportion of annual income, to one that placed “a federal tax credit 
of 17% on the first $250 of donations, and a credit of 29% for any donations exceeding that 
amount” (Domingue 1996, 4). The Canadian history of tax regulation since the 1990s as it 
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relates to the regulations of foundations is explored in Chapter 5, as it is closely linked to the 
policy changes for exemption of capital gains tax for the donation of publicly listed securities. 
2.4 Governance 
Today, these public, legal, and institutional constraints in Canada set the stage for the 
interactions between the government and third-sector organizations such as foundations. For 
instance, the Income Tax Act is a formal closed fiscal policy regime; the social policy regime 
(see Glossary) is also formal, although slightly more accessible, whereas third-sector 
collaborations are non-formal, as opposed to informal (see Glossary). There are no federal or 
provincial ministries responsible for third-sector organizations, whereas ministerial 
representation at both levels of government exists for fiscal policy, health, and social welfare. 
As Elson states,  
The non-formal institutional structure type features transitory representational 
and reporting system that is non-transferable across time and issues. Informal 
institutional structures reflect an ad-hoc representational and reporting protocol 
that is also non-transferable across time and issues. (2008, 12) 
At the same time, the third sector is increasingly represented by umbrella organizations, such 
as the PFC, CAGP, and Imagine Canada. As these increasingly formal organizations become 
bureaucratized, prevailing research suggests that incrementalism might become dominant 
(Baumgartner, Jones and Mortensen 2013; Lindquist 2006, 10; Stone 2000a), thus reducing the 
potentially innovative contributions of foundations to public policy. As Lindquist suggests with 
respect to think tanks in Canada, “investment in the existing policy regime builds an element of 
inertia into these subsystems, resisting the criticism and ideas from those inside and outside 
government not aligned with those interests” (2006, 9). This suggests that the same insight 
might be applied to foundations. It could perhaps even be part of the reason for their apparent 
absence from fiscal policy discourse about the third sector, for example. At the same time, this 
inertia may provide a counterbalance to the contested legitimacy of the influence of 
foundations on public policy. 
A unique characteristic of the Canadian context compared to its US counterpart is that, 
with federal and provincial powers centred in a prime minister or premier’s office and cabinet, 
the Canadian system encourages the development of policy networks and interest groups. 
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Networking takes place because the policy system is by nature a closed regime, although it is 
subject to feedback from outside the system (Elson 2007; 2011b; McRae 2011). Strong 
coalitions are better able to influence governments. The importance of strong coalitions is even 
more so the case with fiscal policy than with social policy. Power is more dispersed and 
diffused in the US system than in the Canadian system, which provides less incentive for 
formal organizing in the third sector. The point of power also changes with the issue, time, 
actors, and context (Lecours 2005).  
The institutional space for foundations in policy processes exists in an interesting “no 
man’s land” located between federal and provincial jurisdictions, i.e., in a non-formal regime 
(see Glossary). The formal nature of the fiscal regime and the non-formal nature of the third 
sector regime, as well as their contested legitimacy, make policy engagement for foundations a 
challenging endeavour (Howlett 1997; Phillips, J. 2000; Phillips 2009). In Canada, the Income 
Tax Act (a fiscal policy instrument) imposes limitations from the federal level on the social 
policy pursuits of foundations. Foundations can also be constituted through provincial 
legislation. But at neither level is there a minister solely responsible for charities, despite 
numerous attempts to create one (see the People in Action [1977] and Broadbent [1999] 
reports, the Panel on Governance and Accountability [1999], and the Imagine Canada 
campaign [2002]) (Elson 2008, 67). In a historical institutional analysis of the study of the 
relationships between the government and the voluntary sector in Canada, Elson notes, 
“Institutions are not the instruments of key policy actors; rather, they constrain and shape the 
actions of policy actors and ultimately influence policy outcomes” (2011, 7). This is an 
accurate assessment, but at the same time, others suggest that it is only through direct 
engagement in policy discourse related to the foundation sector itself that constitutes public 
policy engagement (Mintrom and Norman 2009; Prewitt 2006; Petridou, Aflaki, and Miles 
2015; Scharpf 1997).  
The resultant challenges for the third sector of the non-formal policy regime have been 
documented in many reports. For instance, in 1974, the National Advisory Council on 
Voluntary Action was established (Elson 2011, 61). Three of the issues identified were (1) 
broadening Canada’s narrow definition of charity, (2) improving funding arrangements and tax 
policies, and (3) improving collaboration between the government and the third sector in terms 
of policy development. All of these are still pertinent issues. According to the government of 
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Canada’s 1977 report, “implementing the work was hampered by bureaucratic procedures 
imposed by the government, by instances of outright bureaucratic resistance, and by lack of 
access to information about government voluntary-sector programs” (Elson 2011, 61). This 
imbalance in the relationship between the federal government and organizations in the third 
sector, as well as limited transparency amongst foundations results in further mistrust of both 
the government’s and foundations’ policy objectives (Brock 2000, 7; Bourassa and Stang 
2015).  
Two consequences and complications for the third sector’s delivery of social goods 
have resulted from federal funding cuts in the 1990s under the Liberal government that 
persisted into the 2000s under the Conservative government. Demand for third-sector programs 
and services went up as governments restructured the social safety net or cut social programs; 
while they expected that these services would be picked up by the third sector, they 
simultaneously cut, targeted, or tied strings to the government funding that had been left over 
for those organizations (Brock 2000, 4; Miller 1999, 76). In an environment of contract funding 
and increased complexity and demand on third-sector organizations, there has been a decrease 
in base operating funding available to NPOs. Meanwhile, similarly to governments, 
foundations are also increasingly providing funding on a project, grant, and term basis while 
imposing reporting requirements on recipient organizations (Elson 2011, 168; Phillips and 
Rathgeb Smith 2011). The implications for this include a widening gap between large charities 
and newer, smaller organizations, the former being better able to adjust to the changing funding 
environment than the latter.  
Questions regarding legitimacy and accountability have been a recurring theme for 
government, foundations, and the public. As Clotfelter and Ehrlich (1999) note, “concerns 
about the unchecked power of philanthropic foundations raised by conservatives in the 1960s 
were resurrected by liberals in the late 1980s and 1990s” (2007, 391; Clotfelter and Ehrlich 
1999; see also Arnove and Pinede 2007, 391; and, Bourassa and Stang 2015). Public concern 
and media attention permeated perceptions of third-sector organizations (see Appendix D for 
applicable legislative changes). In the 1990s and 2000s, there was again (like in the 1960s and 
1970s) widespread concern regarding private sector improprieties in business dealings, as well 
as public sector excess and wastefulness. 
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Concerns regarding the governance, transparency, and accountability of charities and 
foundations peaked again in the 1990s. Media exposés revealing misuse of funding within the 
Red Cross and United Way reinforced these worries (BBC News 2006; Shepard 1992; 
Williams 2007; Brock 2000; Stewart 1996). Brock notes,  
Perhaps most damaging of all was the publication by an Ontario Member 
of the federal Parliament, John Bryden, MP’s Report: Canada’s 
Charities—A Need for Reform, alleging that the organizations were 
unrepresentative and self-serving special interests lacking accountability 
and legitimate purpose. The upshot was that the Department of Finance 
commissioned a review of grants to so-called special interest groups, 
cutting their funding by $300 million within a year (Miller 1999, 76), and 
reformed the Income Tax Act to ensure greater transparency within the 
sector. However, the longer-term effect was to give birth to the Broadbent 
Commission and Joint Tables. (2000, 4) 
John Bryden proposed Bill C-262, which would have required that salaries for highly paid staff 
in third-sector organizations be disclosed and penalties imposed where the reporting 
requirements were not met (Hall 1995). The bill prompted the CRA to make some amendments 
to the T3010, the annual return form for registered charities, requiring disclosure of the top five 
salaries in the organization, and adding a few questions about them (Canada 1996). Bryden 
continues to make critiques of the third sector today.  
  Thus, in the 1990s, partly in reaction to a few high-profile public scandals, but also as a 
response to the “program evaluation” undertaken by the Liberal government under the 
leadership of Finance Minister Paul Martin, the tone of the policy dialogue shifted from one 
that had for the previous 25 years been characterized as “harmonious” to one of mistrust 
(Miller 1999). A prominent UK expert on local democracy, and accountability and governance 
of voluntary organizations signalled that the election of the Liberal government in Canada in 
1993 was a: 
Temporary end to the largely harmonious 25-year relationship between the 
voluntary sector and the Canadian state. Within two years of assuming office, 
the new government cut grants; increased contractual, targeted funding; 
downloaded responsibilities; removed national service standards; sponsored a 
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sweeping attack on welfare recipients; and, in sum threatened the whole social 
welfare system. The voluntary sector felt “under siege.” (Miller 1999, 75) 
The public discourse stemming from these critiques focused on the need to increase 
accountability, transparency, and oversight of Canadian third-sector organizations and 
foundations.  
 Given this mistrustful environment and the difficult fiscal situation that third-sector 
organizations were experiencing, the Voluntary Sector Roundtable (VSR) was established in 
1996 by a group of 13 Canadian NPOs (Elson 2007). Following the 1997 federal election and 
partly in response to the VSR, the Liberal caucus, led then by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, 
established the Voluntary Sector Task Force. The task force was housed in the Privy Council 
office. Part of the purpose was not only to address the Broadbent Report’s recommendations, 
which had received considerable attention, but also to “overshadow” the government’s 
neoliberal policy agenda vis-à-vis the third sector (Elson 2007, 55).  
 The goal of the VSR, the horizontal approach, was to advocate for the sector’s policy 
objectives in the forthcoming 1997 federal budget, including working toward a friendlier 
regulatory environment. On behalf of the sector, the roundtable would be the official liaison 
with government. What prompted the initiative was, in short, “the recent history of financial 
set-backs, forced structural changes, dissolutions and amalgamations within the voluntary and 
charitable sectors” (Dover 1996). The roundtable led to the formation of the Panel on 
Accountability and Governance of the Voluntary Sector (PAGVS), which in turn produced the 
Broadbent Report. 
The Broadbent Report had a significant impact and continues to be relevant (possibly 
because many of the recommendations were not implemented). In a review of this report 
shortly after it was released, Gordon Floyd, then Vice-President Public Affairs at the Canadian 
Centre for Philanthropy, states: 
Perhaps most significantly, [the report] challenges the sector, and also the sector’s 
partners in government, to work in a more coordinated fashion towards a common 
goal of improving the quality of life for Canadians. It proposes, for example, 
stronger umbrella organizations and a negotiated operating agreement between 
the sector and the federal government. It recommends a regulatory regime that 
nurtures voluntary organizations as well as polices them (1999, 6). 
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In this sense, the 1999 Broadbent Report was recommending the organizational development 
and improved coordination amongst third-sector organizations. Following the 
recommendations of the federal government’s task force, in 2000, the Voluntary Sector 
Initiative (VSI) was established.  
 The VSI was slated as a five-year, $95 million collaborative project between the federal 
government and the third sector, although the work had not been formally completed in the 
mandated period. The VSI breathed new life into conversations between government and the 
third sector, and reinvigorated members of the third sector. Phase one of the VSI resulted in a 
Voluntary Sector Accord in 2001. The accord was similar to the UK’s equivalent precursor 
from 1998 called “Compact14.” The accord was a “policy agreement that outlines a framework 
and processes for a mutually desired relationship, including a shared vision of civil society and 
a desire for collaboration and partnership” (Phillips, 2002, 12). It outlined a “mutual 
commitment to building a positive future relationship toward common purposes” between the 
third sector and the public sector (Elson 2007, 56). The VSI was followed by the Conservative 
government’s “Blue Ribbon Panel” review of the $27 billion in “grants and contributions” to 
the sector in 2006 (Phillips 2009, 7). This Conservative policy agenda was foreshadowed by 
the Liberal government’s similar focus on funding reductions, delegation, placation, and 
increased oversight and accountability of the third sector. However, it has since overshadowed 
the Liberals’ earlier actions. These broader conversations about the place of the third sector in 
Canadian society provide an important backdrop to the present study. The VSR and VSI are 
examples of two possible strategies for improving relations with government, according to 
Phillips (2003): either work better horizontally within the third the sector; or vertically with 
government.  
There are several factors that have had the effect of ensuring an asymmetrical 
relationship between the third sector and the state in Canada. In spite of concerted and 
sometimes coordinated efforts on the part of other ministries, the federal Department of 
Finance had persisted in controlling policy discussion relating to the third sector and social 
policy more broadly (for example, Canadian Heritage, CIDA, and PHAC) (Ashton, 2011; 
Drache, Hayhoe, and Stevens 2007; Esparza 2000; Klausner et al., 2003; McRae 2011). By 
most accounts, however, the third sector has endured a “lack of traction [in] moving federal 
government policy” (McRae 2011, 249), though it was not for lack of trying. Moreover, “It is 
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unclear, however, if this lack of success is due to limited structures created by voluntary 
organizations, or as Elson (2011) points out, the movement of control of social policy from 
various government departments to the Department of Finance” (McRae 2011, 249; see also 
Elson 2011; Laforest 2009; Phillips and Smith 2011). These observations are critical to this 
research study. 
2.5 Literature on Canadian Foundations  
As noted, there is limited empirical research on Canadian foundations and, therefore, 
inadequate insight into the unique organizational forms that they take on in this country. The 
Canadian literature includes reports on the distribution of foundations in the third sector across 
Canada, sources of funding, recipients of funding, giving trends, and monetary assets across 
policy domains and over time. Quantitative research on Canadian foundations has been 
conducted primarily by professional associations, including Imagine Canada, Community 
Foundations Canada (CFC), the Max Bell Foundation, and PFC. Imagine Canada has 
conducted research on the entire third sector; CFC has researched community foundations; and 
PFC has investigated public and private foundations (including community foundations) 
(Imagine Canada 2010; Johnston 2012; Northcott and Uytterhagen 2002; Imagine Canada and 
PFC 2014). Kryvoruchko has contributed quantitative information from an academic 
perspective on recent trends in the Canadian foundation sector (2010). These reports have not 
considered the unique developments of Canadian foundations. These innovations include 
Crown foundations, state-owned foundations, and Indigenous foundations, discussed below. 
 Crown foundations are one of many types of “agents of the Crown” (Bromley 1993). 
Generally, Crown agencies are established (and usually also funded primarily) by their home 
provincial governments. In their respective provincial acts, universities are charities, and 
critically, may also “acquire by gift, purchase or any other means, and hold in trust for the 
Crown” (Saskatchewan 1995, c.U-6.1, s.7 [1]). Crown foundations are a unique hybrid because 
they are Crown agencies but can also be interpreted as public, tax-exempt charities. Like a 
parallel foundation, a Crown foundation operates alongside a charitable organization, and 
similarly provides funding only to that charity. Neither Crown foundations nor parallel 
foundations are explicitly identified in the Income Tax Act. They are created by statutes or by 
common law (Neely 1994, 31). Their recipient charities must therefore have been created by a 
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statute of the provincial or federal government (the Crown) to benefit from funding from a 
Crown foundation, as agencies of “her Majesty in right of Canada [or] Her Majesty in right of 
provinces” (Bromley 1992, 7).  
 Indigenous foundations are another noteworthy organizational type of foundation in 
Canada. (Unfortunately, they go beyond the scope of this study, but are an area ripe for further 
research). Briefly, they are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) (see Glossary), i.e., public 
foundations. They are not bound by the non-distribution principle, but are also tax-exempt. For 
instance, the Saskatchewan Indian Equity Foundation provides non-repayable loans for 
Indigenous people or communities to access capital for business start-ups. As per the Canadian 
legal context, entrenched in the treaties and the Income Tax Act, First Nations governments 
qualify as grant recipients, similar to the Crown, which makes for unique funding structures. 
These foundations create unique opportunities for the use of foundations to meet community 
development goals aligned with principles of self-governance. In the literature on third sectors, 
these types of innovations are more commonly referred to as social enterprises, but thus far the 
literature has overlooked these types of foundations. As of 2011, there were about 600 
philanthropic funders of Indigenous charities in Canada, which represents about 6% of 
Canadian foundations (Circle on Philanthropy and Aboriginal Peoples in Canada 2014).  
 Scholars of the third sector observe that the lines between the public, private, and third 
sectors are overemphasized, perhaps even artificial constructs (Brody 1998; Elson 2010; 
Phillips and Smith 2011; Weisbrod 1978). Crown foundations and Indigenous foundations 
noted above are good examples of this overemphasis. There is good reason, therefore, to 
examine these kinds of innovations that are unique to Canada. In addition to Crown 
foundations, parallel foundations to universities and hospitals are also are competitors in the 
global philanthropy for higher education, community development, and healthcare.  
 Phillips’ research also notes the strength of another specialized organizational form of 
Canadian foundations is the community leadership foundation. Similar to Crown foundations 
and Indigenous foundations, they are grounded in their connections to the local community 
(Phillips 2010, 2010b; Hoffstein 2007). Phillips suggests that the strength of these “place-
based” foundations is rooted in their sense of community, but also in their “institutional logics” 
and their unique structures. Community foundations are unique in that they are both endowed 
foundations and public foundations focused on grant-making for a variety of charitable causes. 
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At the same time, they facilitate donor-driven giving, and act as conduits to the successful 
philanthropic investments of their “clients.” Phillips argues that sense of “rootedness,” 
increased collaboration among community foundations, and growing awareness of their roles, 
has increased the policy engagement capacity (2017).  
Given the historical context noted above, and the ongoing issues raised about public 
trust in charities in Canada, in 2013 a survey was conducted by the University of 
Saskatchewan, published by Imagine Canada and the Muttart Foundation. The report, called 
Talking about Charities 2013, provides insight into current trust of charities based on telephone 
surveys of nearly 4,000 Canadians. The results indicate that 79% of Canadians still trust 
charities, and this number has been relatively stable for over a decade. Trust in different policy 
domains and across different types of charities varied however. Charities focused on health 
care or children’s issues were most trusted, with international and religious organizations 
trusted the least (2013, 9).  
An interesting collection of cases in Funding Policies and the Nonprofit Sector in 
Western Canada provides much needed empirical data on granting policies for the non-profit 
sector in western Canada was recently published (Elson 2016). It documents cases of third-
sector efforts related to housing, social services, culture, and economic development in the 
western provinces. The particular focus is on funding partnerships between foundations, 
corporations, donors, and governments for the delivery of social services. Contributors also 
explore the idea of third-party governance, describing the funding regimes for the third sector 
in the western provinces as a “patchwork system.” The specific structures vary based on the 
policy domain under consideration, the target population, the location, and available resources. 
This research is an important contribution because it focuses on provincial governments, which 
are the largest source of funding for third-sector organizations in Canada. This collection of 
cases enriches the existing understanding of non-profit organizations in Canada, which tends to 
focus on either NPOs’ struggles with respect to the NPM cutbacks of the 1990s, or the move 
toward social innovation and venture philanthropy (see Glossary). 
 37 
One of the main questions in Canadian publications on the third sector and foundations 
is whether the role of the regulator, the CRA3, is to encourage third-sector organizations’ civic 
engagement or simply to provide oversight and regulate tax incentives (Phillips 2010). 
Canadian authors, critics, and sector roundtables have all suggested a longstanding need for 
institutional change with regard to clarifying the role and mandate of the CRA vis-à-vis the 
third sector (Bridge 2002; Broadbent 1999; Brock 2003; Drache and Hunter 2000; Elson 
2010b; Evans and Shields 2000; Phillips, S.D. 2010; Phillips, J., Chapman and Stevens 2001). 
Phillips suggests that the third sector in Canada is fundamental to “citizenship and democracy, 
as a community builder and social innovator, and as a force for economic development [but 
they] are largely absent from public discourse” (2010, 66). Evans and Shields reiterate the 
point, stating that in Canada, “neo-liberal restructuring assigns a key role to the third sector as 
an agent of the state in the production and delivery of ‘public goods’” (2000, 2). Skocpol, on 
the other hand, speaks from a statist perspective about foundations in the US and argues that 
public subsidies provided for foundations through tax breaks to wealthy donors are the root 
cause of concerns regarding the legitimacy of foundations’ policy roles (2016). According to 
the statist perspective, the oversight role and focus of the CRA is necessary and appropriate.  
2.6 Discussion of Analytical Approaches  
Analytical approaches for understanding the roles of foundations vary considerably; they 
include popular literature, policy-elite studies, pluralist perspectives, policy networks, and 
institutionalism. Popular literature on foundations tends toward policy elite perspectives in 
either a starkly positive or negative light (Bishop and Green 2008; Fleishman 1999; Pallotta 
2009; Reich 2016; Roelofs 2003; Stewart 1996). Policy-elite studies focus on the role of 
foundations as actors who comprise “part of the nation’s power structure” (Abelson 2002, 49; 
Arnove 1980; Jacobs in Lagemann 1999). Pluralism emphasizes that a variety of stakeholders 
adds value to politics and policy making, complementing the power and perspectives of 
                                               
 
3 The role of the CRA as regulator for the third sector is provided by the Income Tax Act and carried out by the 
Charities Directorate. To illustrate the regulatory role of the CRA, for example, if charitable status is revoked as a 
result of violating terms for the operations of charities under the Income Tax Act, “A charity is liable to pay a tax 
for its taxation year that is deemed to have ended on the day the Canada Revenue Agency issues a notice of 
intention to revoke the registration of the charity or on the day that it is determined that a certificate served under 
the Charities Registration (Security Information) Act is reasonable. The tax is payable on or before the day that is 
one year after the charity's taxation year is deemed to have ended” (CRA 2005).  
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governments. Policy network approaches emphasize the restricted, structured, and formal 
nature of policy discourse in democratic societies. 
 From a pluralist perspective, foundations compete alongside other policy actors for the 
attention of government and the public. Foundations’ major roles are (1) to contribute ideas to 
policy agendas and (2) to contribute money to support good policy ideas and agendas (Hojer 
2009; Stone and Garnett 1998; Kingdon 2003; Phillips and Smith 2011). Pluralist scholars 
examine the role of foundations in shaping government priorities, and the value they bring to 
policy-making processes. Pluralists tend to downplay inequities in terms of access to power 
between constituencies (Dahl 1982; Frumkin 2002; Mintrom 2005; Stone and Garnett 1998). 
They emphasize the roles foundations play in representing a diversity of groups, including 
minority perspectives in a majoritarian democratic environment.  
The policy networks literature highlights the importance of institutions for 
understanding the third sector and foundations as organizations within it. As policy networks 
such as PFC or community foundation collaborations become more formal, they may also tend 
toward incrementalism (Jones and Baumgartner 1993; Lindquist 2006, 10; Phillips 2010, 
2010b, 2017; Powell and DiMaggio 1991, 29; Zucker 1988; Béland 2016; Graddy and Morgan 
2006, 6). The institutional contexts noted herein, which clearly affect foundations’ policy roles 
and organizational forms in Canada, including through legislation, therefore require 
consideration in this study. 
To bring these contrasting perspectives together into a coherent analysis for this study 
of Canadian foundations (Kingdon 1995), I will use the concept of policy entrepreneurship but 
apply it to the whole policy cycle (Lasswell 1956; Howlett 1998; 2007). 
2.7 Summary 
The literature on Canadian foundations suggests that they are engaged in public policy, but it 
inadequately address how, why, and to what extent or effect they are so engaged. The popular 
literature should be read with caution, as it tends to be quite polarizing. But it is still important 
because it informs the public and political discourse on foundations. Pluralist perspectives also 
have considerable potential for framing discussions of foundations’ policy roles. Mainly, this 
review suggests that the literature on institutionalism can assist in conceptually unravelling the 
contexts, processes, and structures that shape foundations’ policy roles.   
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3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The literature review that I conducted for this dissertation, along with my own additional 
research, insights, and experiences, have contributed to the development of the conceptual 
framework that shapes this dissertation. The framework provides a lens through which to 
interpret the data collected, as well as the analysis and discussion of the findings. It builds on 
key applicable frameworks and theories from public-policy and third-sector literatures. 
According to Scharpf, “policy, by definition, is the intentional activities of actors who are most 
interested in achieving specific outcomes” (1997, 36). Therefore, the conceptual framework 
connects understanding between the roles of these actors to their operating contexts. 
This conceptual framework is built on two main constructs: policy entrepreneurs and 
policy cycles. To address research questions for this study, the theoretical starting point is 
Kingdon’s notion of policy entrepreneur. In summary, my research questions, as presented in 
Chapter 1, are: who are foundations as policy actors? What resources do they have at their 
disposal to affect public policy making? When or at what stage do they participate in the policy 
cycle? Where do they participate in policy processes; in other words, what policy domains 
(areas) do they care about? Why do foundations participate in policy processes? Finally, what 
strategies do they employ to influence public policy making?  
The literature review presented in Chapter 2 suggests that foundations in Canada may 
face public sector constraints when attempting to influence public policy. The US, UK, and 
Canadian research on foundations and think tanks also indicates that these policy actors are 
often described as policy entrepreneurs (Kendall 2000; Abelson 2000; Fleishman 1999; Stone 
1997). In order to explore these two potentially divergent propositions, therefore, I combine the 
concept of policy entrepreneur with the policy cycles approach to unravel the selected case 
studies presented in chapters 5, 6, and 7.  
I selected the concept of policy entrepreneur in part because it is widely used in the 
literature on foundations and think tanks in Canada. In this literature, think tanks are often 
confounded with foundations; with foundations being the funders of think tanks, or foundations 
themselves being identified as described as think tanks, or through misnomers, i.e. think tanks 
being called foundations even if they technically do not fit the definition (Abelson 2002, 2012; 
Lindquist 1989, 2006; Rich 2005; Stone 1996; Kendall 2000). In the public-policy literature, 
think tanks generally are characterized as NPOs that pursue policy interests or ideas on behalf 
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of particular stakeholders or for the benefit of the public. Their audiences are either specifically 
targeted to certain constituencies, to the general public, media, or the government (Stone 1997).  
This point of confusion in differentiating between think tanks and foundations both 
within and across jurisdictions is understandable given their porous definitions. They are not 
mutually exclusive terms. Examples of foundations that are confused with think tanks in 
Canada include the following: the Canada West Foundation (established in 1973), a public 
foundation that describes itself as a think tank, and that researchers generally refer to as a think 
tank; the Fraser Institute (established in 1974), which is now supported by the Fraser Institute 
Foundation (established in 2003); and the Canadian Tax Foundation (established in 1946), 
which is a registered charity but not a foundation, according to CRA records (Canada 2017; 
Lindquist 1998). 
The policy-cycle approach, the multiple-streams framework, and political 
institutionalism are three commonly used frameworks for the study of public policy and I use 
them to develop the conceptual framework for this dissertation (see Glossary).4 This chapter is 
organized into five parts. First, an overview of the usefulness of these frameworks for the study 
of public policy is provided. Second, the concepts of policy cycles, policy streams, and policy 
entrepreneurs are reviewed as they pertain to the study of foundations. Third, these insights are 
considered within traditions of institutionalism. Fourth, briefly explored is the notion that 
foundations may act as policy entrepreneurs in the Canadian context. And fifth, the key 
elements of the conceptual framework for this dissertation are presented.  
3.1 Frameworks  
Elinor Ostrom (2005) provides a useful overview of the levels of analysis that provide the basis 
for studies of public policy: frameworks, theories, and models. In this dissertation, I focus 
exclusively on frameworks because theories and models are meant to predict human behaviour 
and policy outcomes, which this dissertation does not attempt to do. In other words, both the 
literature review and the analytical approach outlined below are framework-based, rather than 
theory- or model-based. More generally, outlining the framework for this dissertation helps 
                                               
 
4 Other public policy frameworks not considered here include punctuated equilibrium (Baumgartner and Jones 
1993), the advocacy-coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1988, 1993), and policy diffusion (Berry 
and Berry 1990, 1992; Sabatier 2007, 9-11).  
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select the most useful elements of this existing literature to develop an integrated approach. 
This chapter therefore explores the interrelated and interconnected elements of the main 
frameworks that I have selected. 
According to Ostrom (2005), a framework defines the common elements of phenomena 
or problems and the relationship between those elements. It is understood that a “framework is 
not a theory” (Scharpf 1997, 37) in the predictive sense of the term; in this dissertation, I aim to 
shed light on the cases and the research questions using an appropriate methodology, i.e., a 
comparison of three qualitative case studies.  
As noted, I use the concept of policy entrepreneur to elucidate the roles of foundations 
as policy actors. The concept of policy entrepreneur, as developed by Kingdon (1984), was 
intended to describe the role of policy actors at the agenda-setting stage of the policy cycle 
within the multiple-streams framework (MSF). Zahariadis (2007) and Kingdon (1995) both 
have suggested that decision-making occurs when the agenda is set – that this is one process. I 
consider foundations’ potential influence across the different stages of the policy cycle, not 
only the agenda-setting stage. 
However, in a later edition of his book, Kingdon (2003) appears to amend this stance 
and limits the analytical power of his framework to agenda setting. Other authors have since 
expanded MSF to decision making (Howlett, McConnell and Perl 2013; Zohlnhofer, Herweg, 
and Hub 2016). In the existing literature, other concepts have also been lifted from MSF and 
applied outside of MSF, though somewhat haphazardly and imprecisely. In this dissertation, I 
focus on the policy cycle rather than the MSF focus on agenda setting, because the latter 
excludes key components of the policy process for the study of foundations’ roles, which 
explains my decision to employ the policy-cycles framework rather than MSF.                                                          
3.2 Policy Cycles 
The policy-cycles framework breaks down the policy-making process into a series of 
sequential stages: problem definition, agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation, and 
evaluation. Various authors (Brewer 1974; Lasswell 1956; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, and 
Theoret 1976) describe these stages in different ways. Originally, Lasswell depicted policy 
making as a linear process or series by which component parts called stages. Lasswell 
described that those stages were to: gather information, promote, prescribe, invocate, apply, 
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terminate, and appraise. This approach focused on the machinations of policy making inside of 
government (1956). I used the policy-cycles approach because it was clear that foundations had 
influence on agendas, so there was limited potential for added insight into foundation roles if 
this was my sole focus – therefore, I extended the analysis to the whole policy cycle.  
Brewer built on Lasswell’s work, improving the terminology he had used to describe 
the stages: invent, initiate, estimate, select, implement, evaluate, terminate. Brewer also 
allowed more room for the role of non-government actors (1974). Later iterations recognized 
that policies are not in fact terminated; rather, they experience feedback and are subject to 
amendments in the form of “rounds”; this understanding led to stages being conceptualized as 
part of the larger, more iterative, “cycle(s)” of policy making (Howlett, McConnell, and Perl 
2013; Sabatier 1991). The stages framework helps organize complex policy processes into 
smaller steps to make its study more feasible, and to enable the isolation of component parts or 
contextual elements, such as institutions and actors (Howlett 1997). 
This cycles/stages approach to the study of public policy has been successful because it 
is a logical model of policy making, and it assists in unravelling complexity in a broad range of 
situations. According to the policy-cycles framework, the policy-making process is vertical, 
temporal, linear, and orderly. It allows for the isolation of “sites” of policy making at different 
critical points (Birkland and DeYoung 2013, 176; Howlett 1997). It is also applicable to 
different levels of government, including municipal, provincial, and international governments 
(Howlett, McConnell, and Perl 2013; 2016).  
Still, the policy cycles approach has the advantage of describing the whole policy 
process in an encompassing, albeit perhaps oversimplified manner (Howlett, McConnell, and 
Perl 2013, 2016). Its inherent logic also simplifies the problems of introducing complicating 
variables into the study of policy making, such as the consideration of the roles of non-
government (NGO) actors like foundations. More than MSF, the cycles approach has also been 
applied internationally, so there is less concern translating it from the US to the Canadian 
context. MSF would add to the challenge of trying to explain an already complex empirical 
study with a complex conceptual framework. For the study of complex relationships between 
foundations and governments, this approach is better suited than MSF.  
The procedural, rule-making focus of the policy cycles framework has come under 
scrutiny, however. Sabatier even refers to it as an “assembly-line” model and not reflective of 
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reality (1991). Policy making in reality is not strictly linear. For example, solutions can come 
before problems, or assessments before implementation (Kingdon 1984, 9-10). Additional 
critiques of the policy-cycles approach include that it does not identify causal drivers; that it 
can be inaccurate in terms of its description of the policy process; that it has a government and 
legislative bias; and, that it only focuses on one policy at a time, which is not ordinarily the 
case in reality (Kingdon 2003; Sabatier 2007, 7).  
3.3 Policy Streams  
Kingdon built MSF based on Cohen, March, and Olsen’s (1972) work on the Garbage Can 
Theory (see Glossary). MSF suggests that three concurrent streams (i.e., the policy, the politics, 
and the problem streams) combine in policy making and that they can come together or be 
coupled together by policy entrepreneurs in the form of policy “windows,” as Kingdon 
explains (Kingdon 1984, 1995, 2005). Policy entrepreneurs are able to open policy windows 
(opportunities) in order to access government policy agendas.  
MSF shifted the procedural focus of the cycles/stages view of policy making to a more 
organic perspective. According to this framework, policy processes are more permeable, more 
open to feedback, and more subject to the influence of other non-governmental actors and 
outside events. MSF facilitated a shift away from linear, logical, systems-based, procedural, 
and temporal understandings of policy cycles. This move away from the “systems-thinking” 
inherent to the cycles model has provided valuable insights into policy making, although, to be 
fair, the stages and the streams depictions of policy making are both highly idealized 
conceptualizations.  
When I started this research, MSF was more intuitively appealing. The concept of 
policy entrepreneurs seemed very much applicable to my work in that it emphasizes the 
inherent complexity of policy processes: “its occasional chaos, and sometimes highly 
contingent nature – facets sometimes lost in the cycles approach” (Howlett, McConnell and 
Perl 2016, 2). However, in application it did not prove useful for explaining the complex roles 
of foundations or for unravelling the complicated chronologies of the selected cases. I therefore 
switched to policy-cycles framework, which allowed me to more accurate identification of the 
locus of foundations’ influence at different stages in the processes.  
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More than other frameworks, MSF also downplays the role of institutions (Béland 
2016), which are a critical component of this study; this is due in part to evidence of policy 
transfer across national boundaries, namely from the US and UK to Canada. Given the limited 
literature on foundations in Canada, there is a need for scholarly comparison across these 
jurisdictions, which requires us to pay close attention to the effects of domestic institutions on 
public policy. Several authors have made attempts to use the streams and policy-cycles 
frameworks together in order to provide “complementary and cumulative” insights into the 
study of policy making (Howlett, McConnell, and Perl 2015, 2016). I will not attempt such a 
feat. Rather, I borrow the concept of policy entrepreneur and use it to understand foundations’ 
roles across policy cycles, in the Canadian context. 
3.4  Policy Entrepreneurs 
Foundations are epitomized by Kingdon’s definition of policy entrepreneurs in their 
“willingness to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in the 
hope of future return” (Kingdon 1984, 204). The present research, though, is especially 
concerned with the policy roles of foundations beyond simply allocating resources. The focus 
beyond grant-making policy influence is why it is important to consider other types of 
foundations, such as Crown foundations or parallel foundations (see Chapter 6).  
The concept of “entrepreneur” has been used in US studies of foundations, though it is 
interpreted more loosely in that context (Anheier and Daly 2006; Badelt 1997; Ferris and 
Mintrom 2002; Fleishman 2007; Frumkin 1999; Hammack and Anheier 2013; Lageman 1999; 
Leat 2016; Pallotta 2008; Tompkins-Stange 2016). It has also been referenced in US, UK, and 
Canadian studies of think tanks. As noted, the definitions of think tanks are often confounded 
with those describing foundations. Therefore, it is reasonable to anticipate that there may be 
findings from the think tank literature that might be useful for the study of the policy roles of 
foundations.  
Alongside the policy-cycles approach, the concept of the policy entrepreneur is key to 
this dissertation. Stone, in her study of the role of think tanks in transnational policy transfer, 
indicates that “They transfer the ideas and ideologies, the rationalizations and legitimizations 
for adopting a particular course of action… However, to see policy transfer occur, these 
organizations are dependent on formal political actors… They are better described as policy 
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entrepreneurs for transfer” (Stone 2000, 66). Foundations and think tanks are often discussed in 
parallel, the former being the chief funder of the latter. The organizational types are sometimes 
confused, either in practice or in study (Bird 2015; Davies 2004; Meyerson and Wernick 2012; 
Rich 2005a; Abelson 2002, 2016; Roelofs 2003). In reference to the concept, in their popular 
book called Philanthrocapitalism: How the Rich can Save the World, Bishop and Green even 
go so far as to refer to these actors as “philanthropreneurs” (2008). Much of their analysis 
focuses on the top private grant-making foundations of the 21st century.  
Policy entrepreneurs, who can be within or outside of government, can have privileged 
access to policy deliberations. Foundations are among these privileged actors. Significantly, 
policy makers who work within government often pursue their own agenda and interests, and 
not just those of the government (Baumgartner and Jones 2010; Howlett, McConnell and Perl 
2015). Policy developments brought forward by entrepreneurs, though, still require formal 
political support. With respect to tax policy, in Canada this means that the support of the prime 
minister or the minister of finance is generally required. In addition, as has been established for 
think tanks, support of the civil service is also needed. “The details concerning the wording of 
new legislation or the creation of new policy-delivery agencies is in the hands of government 
officials” (Stone 2000, 66). At least in the context of a majority government, decision making 
in the Canadian context (Westminster political system) is straightforward if a majority party 
backs the proposal, but it is woefully constrained for an opposing actor to the policy proposal 
(Howlett 1997; Howlett, McConnell, and Perl 2013; Zohlnhofer, Herweg, and Hub 2016).  
Although the original MSF only considered the concept of policy entrepreneurs for 
agenda setting, this concept can also be applied to decision-making and the policy cycle as a 
whole (Kingdon 1995; Zahariadis 2007). The implication is that, in keeping with the stages 
heuristic, policy entrepreneurs are setting policy agendas but they can also shape public policy 
more generally. The potentially wide-ranging scope of foundations’ roles suggests that the 
application of the notion of policy entrepreneurs alongside the policy-cycles framework is 
appropriate.  
 It is, however, important to note that one of the critiques of Kingdon’s discussion of 
policy entrepreneurship is that the concept has not been sufficiently developed. This critique 
can be readily addressed in the interdisciplinary literature on the topic. At the broadest level, 
the conventional definition of an entrepreneur is “an agent who enables or enacts a vision based 
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on new ideas in order to create successful innovations” (Schumpeter 1950, quoted in Dacin, 
Dacin, and Matear 2010, 44; also, see Glossary). New developments in the management 
literature build on this definition and extend action beyond the private sector to the public and 
third sectors as well (Dees 1998; Drucker 1985, 1993; Perrini and Vurro 2006). Policy 
entrepreneurs “seek policy changes that shift the status quo in given areas of public policy” 
(Mintrom 2015, 103-104; also, see Glossary), something that foundations do in Canada, as this 
dissertation suggests.  
3.5 Institutions  
Developments in both the stages and streams frameworks have identified, but not necessarily 
paid sufficient attention to, the fact that institutions set the parameters for private and non-
government actors to organize and potentially influence policy making (Elson 2011; McRae 
2011). For instance, some scholars argue that established institutions are especially important 
at later stages of the policy cycle, where governments exert more control (Baumgartner and 
Jones 2010; Howlett 1997; Zohlnhofer, Herweg, and Hub 2016, 244). The corollary for 
foundations is that, in a parliamentary system, given the strength of majority governments, 
energy is wasted once a bill has received a first reading in the House of Commons (Abelson 
2016, 131). Institutional variations particular to Canada (in comparison to the US and UK) are 
therefore important to consider when attempting to apply potential lessons regarding the roles 
of foundation actors in policy processes (Elson 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Phillips 2007; Anheier and 
Daly 2007; Phillips and Rathgeb Smith 2011).  
In keeping with Baumgartner and Jones’s (2010) observations noted above regarding 
the varying influence of organizations across policy cycles (2010), in two studies of think tanks 
across Canada and the US, Abelson notes that the policy roles of think tanks (which he 
sometimes confounds with foundations) are more prominent at different stages of the policy 
process. Abelson indicates that think tanks were more involved at the problem-definition and 
the agenda-setting stages (2002). However similar foundations and think tanks may be, it is 
still prudent to consider foundations as a separate topic of study, apart from think tanks. In 
addition, these particular organizations may display varying roles in different contexts, i.e. in 
Canada vs. in the US.  
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Howlett’s research indicates that in Canada, opportunities to access government 
agendas occur at more regular intervals than they do in Kingdon’s US-based research, often 
aligning with the budget cycle (1997; 1998). Canada’s parliamentary system also reinforces the 
need for strong party unity, which results in a high degree of centralization in decision-making, 
thereby constraining non-government actors’ access. Foundations’ access to decision makers 
and policy makers also depends on the political party in power. To the degree that the Canadian 
context is centralized, it contrasts with the more decentralized and less restrictive structures for 
individually elected officials in the US party system. The US political system provides more 
opportunities for think tanks (or foundations for that matter) to influence policy by simply 
casting as wide a net as possible, given how diffuse power is in the American system (Abelson 
2005, 753). There are by contrast fewer opportunities for access in the Canadian system due to 
strong party discipline and centralized executive and legislative power (Abelson 2005, 753). 
This suggests a need for more organized, proactive planning on the part of non-government 
actors to effectively influence policy making in Canada.  
We might extrapolate from this literature and our understandings of the behaviours of 
foundations in Canada discussed in Chapter 2 that perhaps foundations in Canada collaborate 
with others in order to gain better access to decision makers. It also follows that foundations 
may “embrace elitism as a necessary strategy” to make impact with the comparatively limited 
(vis-à-vis government) resources at their disposal, which is more pronounced in Canada than in 
the US (Hammack and Anheier 2013, 73). More practically speaking, foundations and charities 
in Canada are further constrained in their potential policy engagement because they are only 
allowed to spend 10% of their annual revenues on advocacy (though the concept of advocacy is 
ill-defined). Alternatively, Phillips asks, if it is not external constraints such as these that limit 
third-sector organizations’ success at policy engagement, is it the limited resources available, 
or is it simply “the fact that they are not very good at it” (Phillips 2010, 66)? Alternatively, 
perhaps the development of foundations in Canada contributes to their effectiveness at 
influencing the policy process. In addition, institutional differences may also play a part in the 
potential applicability the concept of policy entrepreneurs in Canada. 
A summary of the possible application of these concepts is provided below. Kingdon’s 
MSF focused on the US specifically. To some success, several authors have attempted to adapt 
the concepts of policy windows (and by extension policy entrepreneurs) to the study of policy 
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making in Canada. Some insights into the transferability of the key elements of this conceptual 
framework are as follows: 
• Of the four types of policy windows that Kingdon identifies (routine political windows; 
discretionary political windows; spillover problem windows; and, random problem 
windows), a Canadian study found no evidence of random windows, and that 
discretionary windows were rare, and routine policy windows were more prevalent, as 
related to government procedures and cycles, such as the budget cycle (Howlett 1998, 
515).  
• Howlett raises more general questions about Canadian policy processes. Howlett asks, 
“Why do issues appear on government agendas and then disappear prior to 
implementation? Is this part of the politics of policy formulation, decision making, or 
implementation, or all three? What does it tell us about the actors involved in these 
processes?” (1998, 517). This suggests there may be similar patterns to look for in this 
study of foundations.  
• Abelson highlights in his research that think tanks in Canada and the US both have 
policy influence, but “in different ways and at different stages of the policy cycle” 
(2002, 4). For example, think tanks like the Heritage Foundation have played active 
roles in presidential campaigns in the US. Such active support for election campaigning 
is not permitted in Canada, where they are more active at other stages of the policy 
cycle, especially “when the parameters around policy debates are being framed” (2002, 
4). Canadian think tanks also tend to work more closely with senior civil servants and 
identify the most important issues in policy debates. Although they are perhaps less 
visible in policy debates than their US counterparts, that does not necessarily mean they 
are less influential (2002, 7).  
Sociological institutional research on the third sector focuses on power structures involving 
donors of private funds invested for public purposes (Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Mauss and 
Halls (2000); Salamon 1987, 2002). The framework suggests that institutions are comprised of 
more than simple organizational structures, i.e., they are political structures. Nor are they are 
defined simply by their historical contexts. Rather, according to Powell and DiMaggio (2012), 
they are the product of people’s value systems, norms, beliefs, and objectives. Similarly, 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), Mauss (1954), and Godbout and Caillé (2000) explore giving 
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as a cultural phenomenon, where self-interest is overcome, creating solidarity in a world 
pervaded by consumerism. Other authors emphasize the connection to organizations that 
people feel when giving (Akerlof and Kranton [2010] refer to this as organizational identity; 
for March [1991], it is an organizational code). 
The unique attributes of organizations in the third sector such as foundations result from 
institutional constraints including the non-distribution of profits, altruism, and the nature of 
presidential and parliamentary democracies. Lindquist, in a study of Canadian think tanks and 
foundations, notes that their effectiveness at influencing the strategy or priority of government 
depends on their entrepreneurialism and their capacity to build robust organizations in difficult 
environments (2006, 2).  
At the same time, other studies reveal similarities across jurisdictions than might be 
identified despite significant differences (Green-Pederson and Mortensen 2013, 170-173; 
Anheier and Daly 2007). A comparative study of the evolution of think tanks across the US and 
UK, for example, found few differences based on external factors, i.e., parliamentary vs. 
presidential democracies (Stone 1996; Stone, Denham, and Garnett 1998). However, Lindquist 
observes that, in Canada, there has been less foundation involvement in the start-up of the 
foundation sector than in the US. There are examples, like the Maytree Foundation’s support 
for the establishment of the Caledon Institute for Social Policy, or the Donner Foundation and 
Max Bell Foundation’s contributions to social causes, including funding think tanks (2006, 7). 
Ostrom also offers the argument that a framework identifies the structural factors present in all 
institutions across jurisdictions, but that their characteristics (rules, norms and strategies) vary 
across those jurisdictions (2007, 26-27). So, when examining foundations across the third 
sector, we might expect to see some commonalities.  
 In a similar vein, different disciplinary traditions emphasize foundations’ altruistic, 
utilitarian, economic, or efficiency motives (Becker 1981; Prewitt 2006). Utility is obtained 
from making a gift that benefits the recipients or the donor. Emphasis on returns to the donor is 
understood as reciprocity (Mauss 1954; Trivers 1971), and emphasis on the recipient is 
understood as altruism (Arrow 1972; Titmus 1970). Marketing and management literature 
indicates that individuals have relationships with organizations and that the extent of the 
investment depends on emotional connections (Bishop and Green 2010; Dobkin Hall 2006; 
Hall and Reed 1998; Hirshman 1970; Pallotta 2008). Appeals to these different motivations 
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will vary somewhat between individuals and jurisdiction, but they are all ways of explaining 
the commonalities of organizations and individuals working from within the third sector. 
These observations are also supported by Béland (2016) and Scharpf (1997). Building 
on Kingdon’s concept of policy entrepreneurs, Béland suggests that a better understanding of 
the interplay between institutional and economic positions of policy actors could help explain 
how policy entrepreneurs shape their interests and develop their policy positions (2016, 139). 
Scharpf calls this a “framework of actor-centered institutionalism [which] emphasizes the 
influence of institutions on the perceptions, preferences, and capabilities of individual and 
corporate actors and the modes of their interaction” (1997, 38). As such, understanding the 
policy roles and styles of foundations as policy entrepreneurs requires consideration of their 
contexts. In reference to the policy roles of foundations in Canada, Phillips refers to this 
characteristic as “policy styles” (2007, 501). For instance, Lipset suggests, “If one society 
[Canada] leans toward communitarianism – the public utilization of resources to fulfil group 
objectives – the other [US] sees individualism – private endeavor – as the way an ‘unseen 
hand’ produces optimum, socially beneficial results” (Lipset 1990, 110). This implies perhaps a 
more welcoming environment for policy entrepreneurs and foundations in the US than in 
Canada. 
 Formal decision-making structures enable and constrain how actors can navigate policy 
engagement for successful acceptance of their pet policy proposals. Béland observes that 
formal institutions determine structures for decision making, i.e., which actors must be 
convinced, or which majorities won (bicameral, tricameral, presidential, parliamentary, etc.) 
(2005, 8). Different levels of government, different cross-national settings, and different policy 
domains shape the roles that policy actors are able to play. This emphasizes once again that 
actors (individual or corporate) operate within institutional contexts.  
 The literature on institutionalism can assist in sorting through the complexities for the 
study of the decision making for foundations in Canada: i.e. rational choice, sociological, and 
historical institutionalism (see Glossary). According to rational choice institutionalism, the 
existence of the third sector is a result of market or government failures (see Glossary; Lecours 
2005, 17, 27; Salamon 1998). Foundations as policy actors may have a legitimizing effect on 
charitable organizations by reducing information problems for consumers. Kryvoruchko notes, 
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for example, that individuals may look to foundations to provide an indication of where they 
should donate: 
Individuals may face time and financial constraints to learn about 
charities. Foundations, on the other hand, can more easily absorb the 
cost of gathering such information. Moreover, foundations have better 
access to information about charities from reviews of charity grant 
applications. (2013, 6) 
But foundations play a subsidiary role to the private and public sectors. By conferring 
legitimacy to an endeavour, foundation funding or involvement can assist individuals and 
governments in determining where to invest by alleviating information problems in the third 
sector (Coase 1960; Loasby 2002; March and Olsen 1989; Simon 1950). In other words, 
foundations may have a legitimizing effect on charitable organizations by reducing problems 
related to information accessibility (Anheier and Seibel 1990; Kryvoruchko 2013; see 
Glossary).  
 It follows, therefore, that paying close attention to institutional factors such as the 
national context, particular policy actors at different stages of the policy cycle, is a valuable 
empirical research endeavour for the study of foundations. As Scharpf states, “Once we know 
the institutional setting of interaction, we know a good deal about the actors involved, about 
their options, and about their perceptions and preferences” (1997, 41). While we cannot 
determine policy outcomes by simply understanding the preferences and perceptions of 
individuals, we can improve our understanding of public policy by examining an organization’s 
relationship to a plurality of actors within them (44). 
3.6  Conceptual Framework 
I adopt the concept of policy entrepreneur supplemented with institutionalism and explore 
these cases across the policy cycle in order to assist in elucidating the roles of foundations as 
particular non-government policy actors in this study. The research propositions are as follows. 
Policy entrepreneurs are able to influence decision-making processes generally, not only 
agenda-setting, as Kingdon suggests (1995). The policy-cycles framework is used to assess 
foundations’ potential influence over the whole policy cycle (Abelson 2013; Lindquist 2004). 
As discussed in Chapter 3, the stages and streams frameworks are supplemented by an analysis 
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of the institutional contexts within which policy entrepreneurs such as foundations operate 
(Frumkin 1999; Hammack and Anheier 2013). In addition, the context for this study of 
foundations differs from the majority of the available research because I consider foundations’ 
roles in Canadian public policy, rather than US or British policy processes.  
It is common for the concept of policy entrepreneur to be lifted from MSF and applied 
to other frameworks. I do this here by using it in the context of the policy-cycles framework, 
which underlines the role of institutions (Baumgartner and Jones 2010; Howlett, McConnell 
and Perl 2015; Zohlnhofer, Herweg, and Hub 2016). It is important that the potential policy 
roles of foundations are considered in this research across the stages of policy cycles – and not 
just in the agenda-setting stage – because their involvement may vary at different points. In this 
thesis, I suggest that, as policy entrepreneurs, foundations must consider institutional contexts 
in order to be successfully in their policy pursuits. 
3.7 Summary 
This dissertation seeks to understand where, when, why, and how foundations influence (or 
not) policy making in Canada. The conceptual framework suggests that, in order to shed light 
on foundations’ policy roles, it is imprudent to limit the examination of their participation in 
policy processes to one stage of the policy process, i.e., the agenda-setting stage. Foundations 
have different priorities, different strategies, and operate in different policy fields. Therefore, 
we should expect to uncover differences across the policy cycle and across the three cases 
explored here. For these reasons, I use the policy-cycles framework supplemented by the 
concept of policy entrepreneur and an attention to institutions.
4 METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this research was to examine the role of philanthropic foundations in public 
policy–making in Canada. In order to expound the roles of foundations, the following research 
questions were posed (see Chapter 1):  
 (1) Why did foundations engage in policy making in these cases?  
 (2) What were their strategies and how effective were they?  
 (3) How receptive were governments to their influence, ideas, and agendas?  
 (4) When, or at what stage of the policy cycle, were foundations most effective?  
 (5) What were the barriers and enablers of foundations’ participation?  
A descriptive, qualitative, multi-case research study was developed to shed light on these 
issues. Semi-structured interviews with 40 policy actors and experts were conducted over the 
course of a 36-month period. This was complemented by extensive reviews of primary-source 
documentation, archival materials, and secondary research. The research design and analysis 
involved explanation building, constructing a thick-descriptive chronological narrative, 
discovering and recording the findings, and building the theoretical contribution through an 
iterative analytical process. 
This chapter describes the research methodology for this study and presents a synoptic 
overview of the cases. The chapter then focuses on the rationale for the research design, and for 
the selection of the cases and offers a summary of information requirements; data collection 
methods, including research interviews; and construct validity. 
4.1 Cross-Unit Case Studies  
A case study, according Gerring, is “an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to 
generalize across a larger set of units… a unit connotes a spatially bounded phenomenon – e.g., 
a nation-state, revolution, political party, election, or person – observed at a single point in time 
or over some delimited period of time” (2004, 341-342). A cross-unit case study compares 
findings across several units. This approach has the added benefit of increasing the breadth of 
the research, providing added representativeness, allowing researchers to infer causal effects or 
insights in a probabilistic way, and has the potential to be confirmatory (theory-testing), as 
opposed to simply exploratory. The latter is not presented in this study, although the potential 
was considered. 
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Three national, cross-unit cases are presented in the chapters that follow: the first 
considered the role of private foundations in fiscal policy making in the late 1990s and early 
2000s through the public-policy case of the capital gains tax exemption of publicly listed 
securities that the Liberal government introduced in 1997 at the behest of some vocal policy 
actors in the third sector. As such, it was a well-known case in the policy community. What 
made this case intriguing from a public-policy research perspective was the exclusion of 
private foundations from the qualifying recipients in the original legislation. This severely 
hampered their ability to compete in the fundraising market. Thus, a lobbying campaign to 
amend the policy was undertaken over the next decade. The case reveals that there was a 
contrast between foundations’ lack of engagement at the agenda-setting stage of the policy 
cycle, followed by significant efforts to effect policy change after implementation, at the 
evaluation stage.  
 The second case considers the role of Crown foundations in post-secondary education 
in the 1990s. This was a little-known case with potentially far-reaching impacts. The case was 
identified later in this research project in one of the interviews conducted for the tax-policy 
case study when “a smart tax lawyer” noticed that the Crown, and by extension Crown 
foundations, had no limits on tax exemptions granted for lifetime giving. Given the national 
scope, and the potential to examine the roles of foundations across the provinces, this case 
replaced an earlier chapter that focused at the organizational level of the University of 
Saskatchewan. In addition, Crown foundations are a unique organizational type when it comes 
to foundations, and therefore an area for future research that compares foundations cross-
nationally. 
The last case study considered the role of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Gates 
Foundation) in health-research policy in the 2000s. At the agenda-setting stage of this policy 
case study, it appeared that the foundation had a great deal of influence on the Canadian 
government’s policy agenda. The intriguing characteristics of this case were twofold. First, the 
Gates Foundation attached a preconceived policy solution (vaccines) to a highly complex 
health-research issue, i.e., HIV/AIDS. Although there was no ready vaccine at that time, there 
was some promise in the scientific community. Second, the influence of the foundation 
appeared to increase in the later stages of the policy formulation, and in fact, the media 
reported (Ashton 2011; McCoy and McGoey 2011) that the partners (the government of 
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Canada and the Gates Foundation) drastically changed course. There were contrasting 
viewpoints as to why this happened. The Gates Foundation’s apparent influence on the policy-
making process raised alarm bells for the public and garnered media attention. It also posed an 
interesting research problem: what constitutes undue influence? 
While these are indeed historical examples, there are few such case studies of 
foundations in Canada. These cases were selected partly because they were time bound. More 
recent cases would present the challenge of being open-ended. This would risk not having a 
fully clear understanding of the roles of foundations through the whole policy cycle.  
4.2 Research Design  
The case-study approach is the starting point for the qualitative research design in this 
dissertation. Whether used in anthropology, sociology, political science, or public policy, the 
case-study approach and qualitative research more generally, lends itself well to descriptive 
field research. Moreover, cases generate knowledge. In this research design, the cases 
generated deep, context-dependent knowledge that highlighted the complexities of both policy 
making and foundations in Canada through the “force of example” (Flyvbjerg 2006, 229). 
According to Babbie (2007), a qualitative method enables research without “a precisely defined 
hypothesis to be tested; provides an approach to observing social phenomena in their natural 
environment; and is well suited to the study of social processes over time” (286–7). This 
exploratory research strategy also facilitates building on the selected, existing, theoretical 
framework (as discussed in Chapter 3).  
 When research projects like this one are searching for more extensive explanations 
(e.g., the roles of particular types of organizations across a country), greater breadth of cases 
balanced with “boundedness” is recommended, suggesting that a cross-unit case study method 
is appropriate. In terms of breadth, broadly speaking, foundations are the focus of this research. 
Three types of foundations are considered: public Crown foundations; Canadian private 
foundations; and one American private foundation. In terms of boundaries, the scope of this 
research is national in scope and is focused on federal and provincial-level policies, and the 
policy domains and cases selected (Gerring 2004, 347).  
Case studies have been an effective research method for the study of philanthropic 
foundations in the United States (Berman 1983; Brison 2005; Lagemann 1985, 1992; McCory 
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and McGoey 2011; Davies 2004). They are also the main research method used for the 
multiple-streams framework (Ackrill and Kay 2011; Herweg and Zohnhofer 2015; Ridde 
2009). Yet, based on my exhaustive searches, there are at present only a few academic case 
studies of foundations’ engagement in public policy in Canada (see footnote 1). This 
dissertation will help fill this gap in the literature. The extended, descriptive, cross-unit case 
study method used here has the advantage of exploring the similarities and differences between 
these cases to reveal something about the main concepts they have in common (Babbie 2007, 
293-302; O’Leary 2004, 99). The argument I have presented, based on my own and others’ 
research, thereby contributes both empirically and conceptually to the literature.  
 All of that said, there are commonly held critiques, as well as some misconceptions, 
about case-study research methods. Among these is the issue of generalizability. Case study 
research is not necessarily an appropriate method for testing theory or predictive hypotheses, 
except in instances when one arrives at, or sometimes stumbles upon, a critical finding in the 
case that may contradict a well-known theory, for instance. This generally occurs in extreme 
and unique circumstances (Gerring 2004). However, the goal of this type of research is not to 
generalize the results of hypothesis-testing. The case-study method is an appropriate method 
for examining propositions or hypotheses in the “softer” sense of the term. When research 
questions are context dependent, as they were in this study, context-rich methods are best 
suited.  
 There are, of course, challenges and limitations to alternative approaches, as indicated 
by the research on think tanks and foundations. For instance, quantitative research on the 
number of media hits a particular think tank receives have been used as a proxy to assess their 
influence. But influence on whom? For what? More in-depth analysis is required to answer 
those questions. Media scans are a more useful metric for internal evaluations of think tanks 
and foundations. How much media attention a think tank or a foundation receives is actually a 
measure of attention, not policy influence (Soroka 1999).  
 Other measures focused on access to government include quantitative evidence of 
foundation participation in government committees, meetings, and other consultations 
(Abelson 2005). However, this still does not speak to the weight that policy makers, decision 
makers, or the electorate place on the input of foundations. Government-centred approaches to 
research would not have provided the answers to the research problem I explore in this 
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investigation (Howlett 1998; Soroka 1999) (how and why do foundations engage in policy 
making in Canada, and why should we care?). Surveys might have assisted in this regard, but 
given the lack of time and resources available for a doctoral dissertation, such a study would 
not have been feasible, especially given the lack of such studies in Canada. There are very few 
examples of successful survey research in this regard. More of the work on the impact of policy 
entrepreneurship has been conducted through case study research. 
There are many case studies of Canadian charities’ roles in public policy, but they do 
not examine foundations specifically. Two Canadian scholars comment on this research lacuna: 
“There is, in our view, a chronic lack of information regarding either the collective or 
individual impact of grant-making foundations [see Glossary] in Canada” (Elson and Hall 
2015, 4). Susan D. Phillips’ work is an exception. Phillips has contributed to the research on 
community-based foundations and what she refers to as community-leadership foundations and 
place-based philanthropy in Canada (June 2015; April 2012).  
 There are, as well, studies on think tanks in Canada that have employed the case study 
approach (Abelson 2005; Lindquist 1989, 1991, 1998; Stone 2004). As discussed in Chapter 3, 
there are enough similarities between think tanks and foundations to suggest that research 
methods may be applicable across these organizational types. Studies of policy entrepreneurs 
also use this method (Abelson 2002, 2016; Birkland and DeYoung 2013; Davies 2004; Stone 
2000a, 2000b). Finally, research on the applicability of MSF in Canada has also been 
conducted (Charles 2011; Howlett 2007; Elson and Hall 2015; Lindquist 2004) and provides 
particular insights that both align with and contrast Kingdon’s findings in the US, and suggest 
that this is an area ripe for future research. 
4.3 Case Selection 
The research questions drive the research methods (i.e., the qualitative approach). To answer 
my research questions, cases were intentionally (as opposed to randomly) selected through a 
review of federal and provincial public records, news releases, media reports, and direct 
observations (O’Leary 2004; Yin 2009, 26). This is referred to as an “information-oriented 
selection strategy [which] maximizes the utility of the information in small samples” 
(Flyvbjerg 2006, 230). The case presented in Chapter 5 on the discriminatory treatment of 
private foundations in the capital gains tax exemption was selected for the apparent lack of 
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engagement on the part of foundations, or their lack of success at such engagements. This 
contrasted with the rationale for the selection of the cases presented in Chapters 6 and 7, where 
foundations were either the policy instrument or a main player in the policy process.  
  To support this selection process, several criteria were borrowed from the scholarship 
on think tanks as well as research about foundations in the United States (Lindquist 1989; 
O’Leary 2004, 109; Rich 2005; Tupper 1993). The think tank literature suggests that there 
should be differences between policy actors or organizations, and that policy questions should 
be relatively current, something that was more difficult to achieve. Different actors’ roles in the 
same policy process might be compared or separate cases might be contrasted. Cases selected 
had to be reasonably similar in terms of purpose, scope, and timeframe; be a manageable size 
for analysis; and comprise both a clear policy agenda and sufficient evidence of foundation 
engagement (O’Leary 2004, 117). 
 A policy process was defined as distinct if it demonstrated “policy formation, agenda-
setting and decision-making” (Zahariadis 2007, 65). The latter stages of the policy-making 
process were considered insofar as they related to changes to the original agendas. It was also 
important to have variety amongst the cases in order to “obtain information about the 
significance of various circumstances of each outcome” (Flyvbjerg 2006, 230). The three cases 
that were identified allowed for a comparison between the roles of smaller and larger 
foundations, and private and public foundations, in both federal and provincial policy making 
in three distinct policy domains. 
 Lessons on successful case selection could also be drawn from the research on 
American foundations. A survey the Foundation Centre conducted in 2010 revealed that the 
policy area foundations were most involved in was education and youth. The second most 
prevalent policy areas for foundation involvement were the environment, health, and civic 
engagement. The survey also found that foundations emphasized particular strategies when 
engaged in policy: they are more likely to focus on fostering and accelerating change and 
improving public education and information than on government accountability and 
transparency or exploring research and training (Foundation Centre 2010). This helped in 
sampling foundation engagement in policy making across Canada. 
 The cases selected (and summarized above) covered recent but distinct periods in 
federal politics: the Liberal majority government (1993–2003) under Chrétien, the Liberal 
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minority government (2003–2006) under Martin, and the Conservative minority and majority 
governments (2006–2016) under Harper (Laforest 2009, 1–14). They also cover transitions in 
government in Saskatchewan between the end of Grant Devine’s Progressive Conservative 
(PC) government (1982–1991) and the New Democratic Party (NDP) governments of Roy 
Romanow (1991–2001) and Lorne Calvert (2001–2007). These overall timeframes ensured that 
factors such as how Canadian politics might affect foundations’ policy engagement could be 
considered. In addition, 1997 marked the year that the Voluntary Sector Roundtable convened 
the Panel of Accountability and Governance in the Voluntary Sector. (Significant research has 
already been conducted on the initiative [Canada 2011; Elson 2010a and 2009; Phillips 2009; 
Laforest 2009]). This was a pivotal time for collaboration between the third sector and the 
public sector in Canada. This made the tax case particularly appealing.  
The CRA’s definition of a charitable purpose was used to narrow down the policy areas 
under consideration. While foundations may engage in any policy area, they can grant their 
funds only to qualified recipients, i.e., charitable organizations. According to the CRA, “The 
courts have identified four categories of charity: the relief of poverty; the advancement of 
education; the advancement of religion; and certain other purposes that benefit the community 
in a way the courts have said is charitable” (CRA 2009). This investigation used the CRA’s 
parameters to identify potential research topics. 
Next, policy agendas that had some longevity were considered, but the scope had to be 
reasonable. Considerable longevity was necessary to ensure that an array of actors had the 
opportunity to engage in the processes. Moreover, due to complications stemming from special 
CRA restrictions on the eligibility of international gifts for tax credits, the geographical scope 
of the research was limited to donations given to Canadian organizations (Innes 2006). 
However, international foundations that had an impact on domestic policy issues were included 
(Lindquist 1989, 29-31; Stone 2000b). Consideration was also given to policy areas where 
apparent differences in public, media, and government attention were evident, and where the 
types and levels of government engagement varied. Moreover, cases where there was 
accessible data (such as committee records, media reports, key contacts, or secondary-source 
data) were a consideration. Though other leads were traced, some led to dead ends due to the 
lack of evidence available.  
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4.4 Information Requirements and Data Collection  
The main data-collection approaches for this dissertation were document collection and 
research interviews with policy participants and experts. Document collection involved the 
identification, procurement, review, examination, and analysis of different texts. This was a 
key source of primary research data (O’Leary 2004, 176). The information was collected from 
a variety of primary and secondary sources: books, articles, newspapers, legislative 
proceedings, reports, letters, emails, and correspondence with participants.  
 Surveys and reports from Statistics Canada, PFC, Imagine Canada, and other 
organizations were also used in an environmental scan of foundations. In addition, legislation, 
policy documents, legal decisions, parliamentary debates, committee minutes, and CRA reports 
concerning the selected policy areas were collected and analyzed. Foundations’ policy 
strategies were surveyed as they related to the policy areas through reviews of websites, annual 
reports, strategic documents, transcripts of oral reports, and grants awarded for the selected 
cases. 
 I also made a freedom of information request to the Canadian government on the Gates 
Foundation (Chapter 7) to access the memoranda of agreement (MOA) between the Gates 
Foundation and the government of Canada, which were not publicly available at the time. In 
addition, though Hansard records referred to two reports on the CHVI pilot-scale facility, 
neither was available to the public (Canada 2006, 2010). The 2012 public records also 
indicated that foundation and government officials were in regular contact. The FOI request 
was pursued to substantiate this initial observation.  
 The process of procuring these federal records took just under three months – January 
to March 2012. The Access to Information and Privacy (ATIP) office promptly acknowledged 
receipt of the application on the day the request was submitted. The assigned ATIP officer 
provided information on the process for identifying and accessing records, applicable fees, and 
timelines, and offered advice to expedite the request by providing a listing of previous requests 
that had been fulfilled; this officer also assisted in narrowing the scope of the request to 
decrease the time to completion. In the end, I received more than 600 pages of material both by 
email and in hard copy from Health Canada and the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC). 
The data included memos, emails, PowerPoint presentations, briefing notes to ministers and 
senior staff, MOAs, internal evaluations, progress reports, committee minutes, meeting agendas 
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and minutes, records of teleconferences between the partners, records of steering committee 
and sub-committee proceedings, administrative forms documenting correspondence between 
the partners, budgets, records of the funding program structure, consultant reports, and redacted 
submissions from PHAC to cabinet. 
4.5 Interviews 
Individual research interviews provided a rich data source. The recordings, hand-written notes, 
and transcripts served as primary data. Questions and analyses were focused at the 
organizational level; the individuals interviewed represented their experiences within their 
organizations. The contributions to my research of those interviewed were about the content of 
their work at these organizations, not about their personal lives. For that reason, the study was 
exempt from ethics approval from the Behavioural Research Ethics Board (Beh-REB). Articles 
2.1 and 2.5 of the Tri-Council Policy Statements (TCPS) state, “the research may involve 
interaction with individuals who are not themselves the focus of the research in order to obtain 
information. Such individuals are not considered participants for the purposes of this policy” 
(TCPS quoted in Rigby 2012). While the dissertation was considered exempt from Beh-REB 
approval, according to the ethics committee, I, as the researcher, was still responsible for 
conducting the research (particularly the interviews) in an ethical manner and I would have to 
demonstrate to my committee and to the College of Graduate and Post-Doctoral Studies that I 
had conducted research ethically. 
Upon review of available documentation, I identified senior officials, concerned 
foundations, government agencies, and other policy actors in the selected cases as potential 
interview candidates. Some others were identified on a referral basis. The goal was to conduct 
a minimum of 10 to 12 interviews to support the findings in each case. Overall, for this study, 
61 interviews were requested, and 44 were granted, for a response rate of 70%. In the end, 42 
interviews were conducted with 40 people (two people participated in the same interview, and I 
interviewed them twice; see Appendix A for details on interviews). On several occasions, 
interview requests were accepted, but scheduling proved impossible. Politicians’ participation 
proved particularly difficult to secure. For each of the cases, at least nine case-specific 
interviews were conducted, in addition to 14 general interviews (further information on the 
interviews is provided in Appendices B and C). Interviews were conducted in confidence as a 
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result of considerations regarding ongoing employment and the maintenance of professional, 
personal, and political relationships. Also because of the relatively recent nature of the selected 
cases, some of those interviewed could be at risk of losing their jobs if their names were 
released. Some of the issues considered in the cases also continued to be debated by 
government officials, and were therefore highly political. Efforts were made to provide 
assurances regarding confidentiality. This confidentiality extended to not naming the 
participants, unless expressed permission was granted. Generally, interviewees were 
uncomfortable speaking candidly without assurance that they would not be specifically named 
in the study. To protect identities, when interview data is referenced or quoted in this 
dissertation, it is referenced according to a random numbering scheme. However, to provide 
more insight into the perspectives of the policy participants, the organizations that each 
interviewee represented are provided in Appendix B.  
Preliminary interview questions were generated through literature reviews, media 
searches, and public reports. The interview format was semi-structured. Each interview began 
with a short overview of the research and, if applicable, the particular case in question. 
Interview questions were provided in advance and were tailored to each person, though the 
research objectives and questions were kept at the forefront (Kingdon 2003; O’Leary 2004, 
164). (A summary of the guiding research questions used in the interviews is provided in 
Appendix C.) Not infrequently, unforeseen themes emerged during the actual interviews that 
sometimes guided the discussions, informed further research, or generated new research 
questions. A conversational format was taken for the interviews so as to encourage participants 
to provide as much information as possible.  
Interviews were conducted face-to-face where possible or by telephone or by video-
conference if meeting in person was not possible. In three instances, the participants opted to 
respond to the interview questions in writing. Unanticipated or additional questions sometimes 
surfaced after the interviews; when this occurred, further discussion took place over email. 
Often, this also led to improved access to primary-source documents. Data was also collected 
through additional email correspondence with individuals and organizations involved in the 
cases, especially when contacts were unable to participate in interviews. Such documents 
included organizations’ proprietary information, published articles, and reports or studies that 
had not been widely circulated. Second interviews were conducted on two occasions, when 
 63 
further clarification was required and when the conversation had not come to a logical close 
during the allotted time. 
Interviewees represented 43 different organizations (several people represented more 
than one organization, and more than one person from the same organization were 
interviewed), including federal and provincial governments, foundations, businesses, registered 
charities, law firms, tax advisory firms, banks, research organizations, universities, 
international government organizations (IGOs), international NGOs, and umbrella 
organizations, which were non-profits, foundations, or charities. Policy actors were identified 
through the secondary research. Interviewees were board members, executives, managers, 
donors, professionals, fundraisers, professors, researchers, scientists, volunteers, staff, 
politicians, lawyers, and experts. The data collection methods involved multiple sources to 
establish the “chain of evidence” for the selected cases (Yin 2006, 40-41).  
In all but four cases, interviews were recorded and transcribed. In several of the 
interviews, additional primary source documentation was either identified or directly provided 
to the researcher. Additional contacts were also suggested at some of the interviews, but often 
these individuals were only peripherally involved. Secondary referral interviews tended to 
corroborate previously collected data; new evidence was rarely revealed. The interviews were 
pivotal in establishing the chronology in the cases, particularly where personal interactions and 
private meetings were the main forms of communication essential to setting policy agendas 
(Yin 2009). Interviews were conducted for each case until no further contacts could be 
identified, or until a point of saturation was reached.  
4.6 Construct Validity  
A range of steps was taken to ensure the validity of the findings. Select interviewees (where 
appropriate) were asked to validate preliminary observations I had made based on my review 
of the relevant documentation in each of the case studies. Additionally, documentation was 
collected and interviews were conducted until a point of saturation was reached (Yin 2006, 40-
42). Observed phenomena in the cases were reviewed with an eye for variance and similarities 
in magnitudes, structures, processes, causes, and consequences (Babbie 2007, 379; Yin 2006, 
136 -137). Using multiple cases also provided external validity (Babbie 2007; Rich 2005).  
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 Ideographic (descriptive) explanations were developed to describe the series of 
complex and unique events that took place in each specific case. The phenomena observed in 
the cases “stipulate[d] a presumed set of causal links about ‘how’ and ‘why’ something 
happened” (Yin 2006, 141). Each of the chapters was summarized into a chronology of events, 
describing what happened, and postulating why those events transpired (Yin 2006, 36). The 
case-specific interviews were supplemented with additional general interviews on the policy 
role of foundations in Canada.  
 Cross-referencing the findings (and their limitations) with alternative analytical lenses 
also established the construct validity. This cross-referencing drew on historical research, 
primary sources, secondary sources, and available empirical data. To supplement and analyze 
the data, the research drew on findings from the US and other cross-national comparative 
studies. The use of secondary research on foundations internationally and in the US further 
contrasted or corroborated the findings and helped build a model to analyze foundations’ roles 
in public policy. 
4.7 Limitations  
A common critique of case studies is that they contain selection bias. As indicated above, in 
this dissertation, selection bias was intentional and actually adds to the value of the study. 
There must be an indication of relevance (covariance) for research such as this to be a 
worthwhile undertaking. That said, there may also be a tendency to place pre-determined or 
pre-existing notions on the data. Inevitably, according to other scholars who have mastered the 
case-study method, my preconceived notions, including my assumptions, personal views, 
concepts I focused on, and preliminary hypotheses, were challenged. Indeed, as these experts 
would have predicted, I was forced to revise my argument on several essential points 
(Flyvbjerg 2006, 235). 
 A random approach to case selection would not assist in addressing the research 
questions, because they are in fact specific to each case. An exhaustive, longitudinal, 
comparative analysis, or survey research method aimed at addressing these questions across a 
variety of cases in similar or different policy domains, while exciting and potentially 
revelatory, would have been beyond the scope, individual abilities, time, and resources 
available (Bloomberg and Volpe 2008; Dobkin Hall 2006).  
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 Moreover, if the case had been selected randomly, the identified grants’ connection to 
the research questions would have been a matter of chance. The obvious drawback of the 
direct-selection approach for the comparative cases was that it introduces selection bias. 
However, it is consistent with other US research on foundations and think tanks, and Canadian 
research on think tanks. It also was necessary to set a relevant period of time (O’Leary 2004). 
Cases where a conclusion to the process or topic was not clear were excluded. This restricted 
the research to a manageable scope.  
It is also interesting to note that scepticism regarding the motivations for the research 
posed a barrier to being able to secure interviews. Some of those who accepted my interview 
requests indicated that they were expecting that the research was attempting to “expose” 
foundations’ misdealing actions or political agendas. While this view might be common in the 
public discourse and is often highlighted by the media, proponents or representatives of 
foundations declare that such negative attitudes do not reflect their motivations or their actions 
as philanthropists or policy participants. This reluctance to assist in my research also came up 
when I was submitting my FOI requests. The administrators shared with me that they mostly 
dealt with journalists who were “looking for a scoop.” 
 Obviously, these perceptions (while perhaps not widely held, they do tend to pervade 
the public discourse) might have influenced some of my initial perspectives about the roles of 
foundations, but I really tried to remain objective in my observations (Stewart 1995). This 
incongruence between commonplace discourse and reality was in fact part of my motivation 
for conducting research on foundations in Canada in the first place. After all, foundations 
surely could not all be that bad (as has been suggested). At the same time, it did prompt the 
question: what type of role would be appropriate for foundations in Canadian public policy?  
Lastly, a common methodological problem in the study of think tanks’ and foundations’ 
influence on policy making is how to appropriately measure influence. Abelson poses some 
poignant questions in this regard:  
Should influence be measured by recording media citations, tracking the number 
of website hits, monitoring appearances before legislative committees, the number 
of publications, or the number of staff appointed to high-level positions in 
government? Or are there other tangible and intangible indicators that should be 
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considered? Do some indicators provide a more accurate measurement of policy 
influence than others? (2002, 170) 
He suggests that given these challenges, perhaps a better focus of study is to understand the 
roles or relevance of think tanks, rather than to try to measure their influence. By extension, 
this insight can also apply to this study of foundations. 
4.8 Summary 
The methodological approach used in this dissertation was a cross-unit, qualitative case study 
comparison. Three cases were studied where foundation involvement in policy making in 
Canada was evident, relatively recent, and held promise for shedding light on these particular 
organizations’ policy roles. I used a thick-descriptive approach to explore the roles of private 
and public, and US and Canadian foundations across the policy domains of fiscal policy, PSE, 
and health-research policy. The methodological design involved identifying the research 
problem, articulating the purpose, developing the study objectives, determining the research 
design, forming research questions, and proposing an argument. The specific methods included 
case selection, document and data collection through interviews, primary and secondary 
research, submission of freedom-of-information requests, archival searches, and reviews of 
government, organizations’, and university records (O’Leary 2004, 99). The analytical 
technique was explanation building. The analysis and theory building were iterative, involving 
the generation of many drafts of the cases. Writing was a critical part of the analytical process 
(O’Leary 2004, 205). My argument required considerable revision upon completing the case 
study research, which is consistent with the warnings of experts in this research method 
(Flyvbjerg 2006; Gerring 2004). 
5 FISCAL POLICY FOR FOUNDATIONS 
This chapter considers foundations’ policy engagement from 1993 – 2007 in the capital gains 
tax exemption for the donation of publicly listed securities under the Income Tax Act. A brief 
update is provided on the most recent 2017 third-sector proposals and the government’s 
responses for amendments to this tax incentive. The government of Canada extended the 
capital gains tax exemption for the donation of publicly listed securities to charitable 
organizations on a trial basis in 1997. The charitable tax incentive included community 
foundations and public foundations, but excluded private foundations. While the measure was 
made permanent in 2002, private foundations were only made eligible for this tax incentive in 
2007, 10 years after the legislation was first introduced, and following significant lobbying 
efforts from the foundation sector.  
This case shows that policy entrepreneurs successfully mobilized to eventually secure 
an extension of the capital gains tax exemption to private foundations. However, the narrow 
focus of the PFC distracted policy community from the broader public concerns regarding the 
legitimacy and accountability of private foundations in Canada, and the related, more 
fundamental changes to regulatory regime for foundations that were taking place concurrently. 
 This case raises interesting research questions: why were private foundations excluded 
from the original pilot legislation? Why foundations were not sufficiently engaged in the 
policy-making process so as to prevent this? The research on Canadian foundations suggests 
that the exclusion of private foundations from the donation incentive might have been due to 
the closed nature of the fiscal policy regime. Historically, there has also been a prevalent bias 
against private foundations in Canada (Kryvoruchko 2013). According to the CAGP, 
retrospectively, the government’s reservations regarding the extension of the capital gains tax 
exemption to private foundations were that: 
Government was concerned that persons could use their shareholdings 
combined with the holdings of the foundation to influence a corporation for 
their own benefit, in our [CAGP] experience these abuses are exceedingly 
rare and could be dealt with under existing law. The regime has overly broad 
application and will impact private foundations across Canada in ways we 
expect the Department of Finance has not understood. (Manwaring and 
Campbell 2006, 6) 
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The perception was essentially that foundations were mainly tax shelters (see Glossary) or tax 
havens for the rich. There was a fear of abuse on the part of private foundations, e.g. that they 
might be used to advocate for the donor or director(s)’ private interests. This resulted in their 
differential treatment (Payne 2005). In addition, the extension to private foundations might 
cede the federal government’s considerable influence on social policy via charitable regulations 
in the Income Tax Act, i.e., through the indirect expenses related to this tax incentive.  
5.1 Overview  
The government of Canada incrementally introduced tax policy changes for the donation of 
publicly listed securities in 1997, 2001, 2006, and 2007, as incorporated into the Income Tax 
Act (Farber and Berg-Dick, 2015). The policy changes are summarized below. Originally, the 
new tax exemption applied only to donations given to registered Canadian charities and to 
public or community foundations. It did not apply to private foundations. (Recall that private 
foundations are distinguished from public foundations by the proportion of controlling non-
arm’s-length individuals and sources of funding [Payne and Zhao 2007]).  
 When the policy was first introduced, the government did not explicitly communicate 
why private foundations were treated differently. However, in hindsight, insights can be found. 
According to an interview with the Globe and Mail, Paul Martin, reflecting on his role as 
Minister of Finance in this case, said, “The argument against [the] policy had merit… The fear 
was you would have a situation where Hospital A in downtown Toronto would be better able to 
attract donations than Hospital B in a small, poor town.” Moreover, according to both the 
interviews conducted for this research, and an earlier media interview with a key policy 
entrepreneur, Donald K. Johnson, “the bureaucrats objected to any tax cut that would cost the 
government revenue. And they really objected to a policy that would see wealthy individuals 
directing taxpayers’ money to their favourite charities, at the expense of other worthwhile 
causes” (Willis 2007). This perception continues to permeate the policy discourse, as will be 
demonstrated in this case. 
 Although a historical example, this case is still relevant today because governments can 
affect the level of resources available to foundations, and thereby charities, through either 
direct grants, indirect expenses, or donation incentives in the tax code (Abramson, Salamon, 
and Streule 2006, 107). When the extension of the capital gains tax exemption of publicly 
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listed securities to private foundations was made permanent in 2007, the same policy 
entrepreneurs began advocating that private capital become eligible. Further iterations of this 
capital gains tax incentive were still under consideration in 2017, i.e., the extension of the 
capital gains tax exemption to donations of private shares or real estate.  
 In the 2016 federal budget, then–minister of finance Joe Oliver introduced an extension 
of the capital gains tax exemption to “proceeds from the sale of appreciated private corporation 
shares or appreciated real estate” (Golombek 2016, 1). In the spring of 2017, the Liberal 
government rescinded this commitment, which had been slated under the previous government 
to come into effect on January 1, 2017. No explanation for the change was provided, but can be 
inferred from this case study. 
 This case is important because it highlights the role of the federal government in health 
and education policies, which constitutionally fall under provincial jurisdiction but are 
considerably affected by charitable regulations in the federal Income Tax Act. As one 
interviewee noted with respect to this situation:  
Most lawyers, including myself, are involved through tax because the bulk 
of charity regulation in this country is through the Income Tax Act. The 
constitution [however] makes the governing of charities a provincial 
responsibility, not a federal responsibility… and then because the 
provinces largely abandoned their authority to regulate the sector, the CRA 
started stepping in in the 1970s to draft laws that were intended to regulate 
the sector. That’s where you get the distinction that you’re talking about 
between foundations and charitable organizations, which arose from this 
idea that you need to, we need to, regulate organizations and it occurred 
through the Income Tax Act. (Interview no. 20, June 6, 2016) 
Therefore, understanding tax policy in the study of foundations’ policy roles will shed light on 
how the policy directions are determined between provincial and federal governments and 
third-sector actors. 
 Three things are evident from this case: (1) that private “grant-making” foundations 
(see Glossary) in Canada face similar legitimacy challenges as their counterparts in the US and 
the UK (Anheier and Daly 2007; Badelt 1997; Benz 2006; Bernier and Hafsi 2007; Toepler 
2006; Lagemann 1999). Governments struggle with the tension between both encouraging and 
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regulating philanthropy, especially as it concerns foundations: (1) as Dahl notes, part of the 
challenge is that “independent organizations are highly desirable and at the same time their 
independence allows them to do harm” (Dahl 1982, 31); (2) this case provides evidence of 
foundations’ involvement in policy processes in order to overcome perception issues and 
organize and legitimize their policy efforts with the Canadian government; (3), Howlett’s 
description of the Canadian policy entrepreneur is apt (1997, 1998). Both public entrepreneurs 
(politicians and civil servants) and foundation entrepreneurs use the regular budget cycles and 
the windows of opportunity to push their competing policy agendas forward. Moreover, this 
competition between public- and private-sector policy agendas pursued by both entrepreneurs 
is based on an oversimplified and polarizing debate about the roles of foundations in Canada 
(Phillips in Elson 2016, 3). 
The original policy agenda for the capital gains tax exemption emerged not from 
foundations themselves, but from individual third sector policy actors. Foundations were not 
especially engaged in the original agenda-setting effort. Once the pilot legislation was rolled 
out, however, and private foundations realized they had been excluded, they started to get 
involved. In the policy revision, though, it took a much more organized and concerted effort on 
the part of private foundations to affect the government’s policy implementation, amendments, 
and evaluations and to finally get included in the lucrative tax exemption. In addition, new 
restrictions on the operations of private foundations were introduced in 1996/97, and the 
extension to private foundations was sought in 2005 and 2006.  
 The exclusion of private foundations from the 1997 legislation was unexpected. As an 
interviewee from a central government agency stated to Elson with regard to another policy 
issue, “we see very little evidence of voluntary sector engagement [in policy making]. When 
we do hear from organizations, their concerns are often very particular and not germane to our 
policy making process” (quoted in Elson, 2011, 87). In the 2000s, there were more formal 
processes for engagement between the third sector and the government of Canada in the VSI, 
the VSR, and the Blue Ribbon Panel, for instance (Laforest 2009). That said, foundation 
executives perhaps had not given enough credence to the prevalence of negative perceptions 
regarding private foundations (as being either tax shelters for the rich or even vehicles for tax 
fraud), nor did they anticipate the effect that these perceptions might have on the policy 
development and implementation (Toepler 2006; Kryvoruchko 2015). 
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In response to what was seen as discrimination against private foundations, and in an 
effort to coordinate the efforts of the emerging policy network, new formal collaborative 
arrangements were made. In 1998 and 1999, the Muttart Foundation, Maytree Foundation, 
McConnell Foundation, and Max Bell Foundation started “getting together to talk about the 
issues” (Interview no. 13, April 23, 2015) and in 1999, established the umbrella organization 
Private Foundations Canada. The organization was established to promote the policy interests 
of foundations in the face of “perceived discrimination against private foundations that came 
about because of the capital gains tax changes” (Interview no. 21, April 13, 2015). These 
organizations then approached 20 other foundations to incorporate them into the PFC. The PFC 
became a registered charity in 2002, when it changed its name from Private Foundations to 
Philanthropic Foundations Canada, thus enabling it to represent of all types of foundations. The 
PFC now represents over 130 members from private, independent, family, corporate, and 
public Canadian grant-making foundations. In 2015, total members’ assets were approximately 
$23 billion, and annual grants were about $532 million (PFC 2017).  
5.2 Background 
Following the 1967 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation, capital gains taxes were first 
brought into the Income Tax Act in 1972. Up until then, capital assets and one-time capital 
gains were not contemplated as a potential source of income in the tax legislation, i.e., “capital 
gains were not taxed” (Canada 2016, 11). This tax arguably introduced more equity into the 
Canadian tax system since it applies primarily to individuals in upper tax brackets (Lammam 
and Clemens 2014, 36). When the capital gains tax was enacted in 1972, it was set at 50% of 
the earned income rate so as not to introduce a disincentive to investment (Burrows 2009). The 
50% rule is often referred to as the “half-inclusion rate.” In 1990, the inclusion rate for capital 
gains tax was changed to 75%, where it remained until it was gradually reduced back to the 
“half inclusion rate” (Farber and Berg-Dick 2015). In 2006, when the impact of the 1997 
exemptions of capital gains tax for the donation of publicly listed securities was being assessed 
by Imagine Canada, it was estimated that the wealth of Canadians tied up in securities (only 
one form of capital property) was about $1.4 trillion. By comparison, the year prior, Canadians 
had only made donations of $7.9 billion. So, in 1997, this represented a considerable untapped 
resource for the third sector in Canada.  
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  Most donations in Canada are made in the form of monetary donations. Gifts of capital 
were very limited before capital gains tax amendments were made. This was due to the fact that 
part of the appreciated income of the value of the asset was taxable, i.e., through the capital 
gains tax. Capital gains or losses are incurred upon the sale or disposition of capital assets or 
property. Types of capital property included in the CRA definition include “cottages; securities 
such as stocks, bonds, and units of a mutual fund trust; and, land, buildings, and equipment you 
use in a business or rental operation” (Canada 2016, 6). Capital gains or losses occur when 
gifts of such properties or assets are made or received, and they must be reported in individual 
and corporate tax returns. The implication for would-be donors is a higher income tax burden 
for donations of qualifying capital compared to donations of the equivalent amount of cash.  
 The simplest way to understand the background for this case is to know that the 
treatment of donation incentives under the Income Tax Act differs for tax rates that apply to 
earned income as opposed to those for capital assets, and that there are different donation 
incentives embedded in the legislation for each. At present, charitable tax incentives are 
provided to individuals and organizations in three forms: deductions, non-refundable tax 
credits, and full or partial exemptions from capital gains taxes (Duff 2003, 49). The first two 
incentives were built on the income-based tithing model (which has religious roots) that 
dominated the tax treatment of charitable donations in the Income Tax Act in Canada until 
1997. Until 1977, there were only two measures in the Income Tax Act that encouraged capital 
giving: one enacted in 1977 eliminated 100% of capital gains tax on cultural donations, art, and 
artefacts of national importance; and a second offset the 20% contribution limit on capital gains 
for donations of capital properties to charity (Burrows 2009, 5).5 This proposed tax incentive 
for capital gains therefore contemplated a fundamental shift in the prevailing paradigm for 
encouraging philanthropic giving in Canada.  
 The tithing model considers that donation incentives should be aimed at encouraging 
charitable giving through regular donations of a portion of an individual’s annual earned 
income. The approach is based on a narrow definition of income that does not include capital 
                                               
 
5 There are several other provisions and exemptions in the Income Tax Act to incentivize giving, but they are 
outside the scope of this study. Additional tax breaks for donations consider lifetime exemptions, small business 
holdings, farms, fishing, and economically sensitive property (Hogg, Magee and Li 2012, 532-534). 
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gains (Burrows 2009). Individuals receive a 50% tax credit on donations of earned income. 
Before 1997, the cost of giving under the Income Tax Act was higher for capital gains because 
the donation of capital assets “triggered a tax on the accrued, unrealized gain,” but was 
otherwise consistent with the differential tax treatment between income brackets in Canada 
(Innes 2003, 906). The capital considered in this policy includes appreciations of publicly listed 
securities (see Glossary). Such a donation incentive would alleviate some of the tax burden for 
more wealthy donors.  
 The capital gains tax exemption for the donation of publicly listed securities was 
introduced as a five-year pilot program in 1997. The income inclusion rate for these donations 
was effectively halved. This pilot donation incentive meant that: 
When a taxpayer donates to an eligible charity, securities listed on a prescribed 
stock exchange (or certain other securities such as units in mutual funds), the 
capital gain that has accrued on the securities is included in income at only one-
half the standard capital gains inclusion rate. Currently, the standard capital 
gains inclusion rate is 50 per cent, and therefore the inclusion rate for charitable 
donations of listed publicly traded securities to eligible charities is 25 per cent. 
(Canada 2016) 
This general rule varies somewhat both from province to province and also in terms of the 
value of the tax deduction. Technically, the change meant that when a donation of a security 
was made, 25% of the capital gain was taxable, whereas if the gains were realized (and the 
owner profited), the tax rate would be 50% (Innes 2003, 906). In 2006, capital gains for the 
donation of securities were completely exempted from taxation (Lasby and Hall 2007, 2). 
5.3 Policy Agenda  
Between 1993 and 1997, policy entrepreneurs in the third sector had commenced informal 
conversations regarding the potential for a charitable tax incentive that would entice larger gifts 
(although smaller in number) by targeting capital assets. The idea behind the policy was to 
better support the third sector in a time of devolution resulting from the government’s embrace 
of NPM (Elson 2016). Members of a policy network emerged, including tax lawyers; 
investment advisors; umbrella organizations such as the CAGP and the AFP; heads of grant 
making and community foundations; civic and provincial politicians; and political consultants.  
 74 
 The donation incentive was introduced on a trial basis in the 1997 federal budget on the 
condition that it both increase donations and lead to a more equitable distribution of that 
increase across different types of charities (Canada 2002). That outcome has been debated 
(discussed below). The policy change transformed the philanthropic landscape in Canada.  
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Table 5-1. Chronology of Capital Gains Tax Exemptions for Charities (1993-2017)  
Year Policy  Politics Process & Participants 
1993/94 Agenda identified through 
US policy transfer; 
Program Review gets 
underway 
Liberals overthrow 
Progressive Conservative 
Party in 1993 election 
Overshadowed by slew of 
other proposals from third 
sector; advocacy from a 
small policy community 
1997 Capital gains exemption 
for listed securities 
introduced in the budget, 
inclusion rate of 75% of 
the gain+ 
Liberals win a second 
majority in June 1997 
election  
Chrétien’s Liberals 
compete with US for 
capital donations; VSI 
begins 
1999 Broadbent report delivered 
for the VSI§ 
Hierarchical relationship 
between sectors 
Privy Council, task force, 
politicians, third sector 
2000 Inclusion rate reduced from 
75% to 66% (gains after 
Feb. 27, 2000) 
Liberals win a third 
majority; Martin is Finance 
Minister  
Department of Finance 
decision, PFC consulted 
2000 Inclusion rate reduced from 
66% to 50% (gains after 
Oct. 17, 2000) 
Martin is Finance Minister Department of Finance 
decision 
October 
25, 2002 
Government report on trial 
results‡ 
Martin is Finance Minister  
 
Department of Finance, 
closed evaluation process 
March –
June 
2002 
Incentive made permanent 
in Bill C-49 of the budget 
Martin dismissed as 
Minister of Finance, runs 
for Liberal leadership 
Department of Finance, 
closed process 
2006 VSI policy initiative ends; 
budget reduced capital 
gains inclusion rate to 0%  
Prime Minister Harper’s 
first budget; Finance 
Minister is Jim Flaherty  
PFC and policy 
entrepreneurs advocated at 
budget hearings 
2007 Incentive extended policy 
to private foundations 
Conservative minority 
government 
PFC continued to lobby in 
letter-writing campaign 
2015 Capital gains exemption 
extended to private assets 
To be implemented Jan. 1, 
2017. Liberals won election 
in 2015 
Conservative Minister of 
Finance Joe Oliver 
committed to it pre-
election 
2017 Extension to private assets 
repealed 
Liberal Minister of Finance 
Bill Morneau in April 2016 
2007-17 advocacy from 
same network as above 
Sources: Canada 2002; Farber 2015; Innes 2003; Phillips 2003, 914; Golombek 2016; 
Interview no.18, November 21, 2014; Canada 1997b. 
+ Income Tax Act, paragraph 38(a.1), 1997. 
§ Phillips, in Phillips 2011. 
‡ Canada 2002. 
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In 1993, Donald K. Johnson,2 then chair of a fundraising campaign for the National 
Ballet of Canada, played a pivotal role in moving the policy agenda forward. In leading the 
campaign, Johnson sought out the advice of a colleague at Harvard University who suggested 
that the National Ballet’s fundraising committee solicit contributions of stock from their 
prospective donors. Given this suggestion, the National Ballet’s fundraising committee sought 
the advice of Ernst and Young on the donation incentive. Their analysis (conducted prior to 
1997) revealed that transferring accrued gains on publicly listed shares and donating the 
proceeds would trigger a capital gains tax for the donor. The cost of the capital gains tax far 
outweighed the charitable tax deduction for the donation. Consequently, “basically no one gave 
stock to charity in Canada at that time” (Interview no. 24, March 6, 2015). The result of this 
seemingly insignificant sequence of events was the formulation of the policy idea to reduce the 
capital gains tax on donations, which would create the need to eliminate the discriminatory 
treatment of private foundations and, ultimately, create a new umbrella organization for 
foundations. 
After receiving this information from Ernst and Young, a fairly standard, though vocal 
lobbying effort got underway. It commenced with a select few policy actors at the helm and 
Johnson6 at the fore. Over the course of several years, Johnson facilitated letter-writing 
campaigns to more than 700 individuals and organizations across the country. Recipients were 
key advocates for the third sector. Johnson’s objective was to get the support of the caucus and 
all members of Parliament. The strategy was based on the fair assumption that “MPs listen to 
their constituents” (Interview no. 25, May 6, 2015). For Johnson, that was just the first step. 
Once this goal was realized in 1997, he then began advocating for extending the measure for 
private foundations, and then for the exemptions for private company shares, and for private 
and commercial real estate. Johnson continued to advocate for similar measures in 2017. He 
was a critical policy entrepreneur in the overall process for opening up the charitable giving 
regime in the Income Tax Act to the notion of capital asset-based philanthropy. There were 
related, concurrent developments in the country’s fiscal situation, and the relationship between 
                                               
 
 
6 Not to be confused with Donald James Johnston, PC OC QC, former Liberal cabinet minister and president of 
the federal Liberal Party from 1990-1994. 
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the third sector and the federal government. In the 1990s, the federal government had found 
“new fiscal room,” which led to much conversation about how to use projected surpluses.  
In 1997, the Fraser Institute hosted a conference for economists to discuss the potential 
allocation of these resources. One of the key conclusions was that personal income taxes 
should be lowered “to make the Canadian system more competitive with that of the United 
States and other industrialized countries” (Grubel 2014, 1). In 1999, a follow-up conference 
focused on the capital gains tax regime. “The consensus view was that capital gains tax rates 
should be eliminated or lowered” (Grubel 2014, 1). Following from this, the federal 
government lowered the capital gains tax rate from 75% to 50% (the half-inclusion rate). The 
argument behind such policy changes was that “capital gains carry considerable economic 
costs and produce relatively little revenue… [and] impossibly high costs on the economy by 
reducing the supply of capital,” among other issues like introducing disincentives to 
entrepreneurship (Grubel 2014, 2).  
5.4 Policy Decision  
In the federal budget announced on February 18, then-Minister of Finance Paul Martin 
introduced a capital gains tax exemption for the donation of publicly listed securities. The 
legislation effectively lowered the “income inclusion rate on capital gains arising from certain 
donations to charities (other than private charitable foundations) by individuals and 
corporations from 75 to 37.5 per cent” (Canada 1997, 114). Donations to charities and public 
foundations, but not private foundations, would be eligible for the exemption. The stated 
purpose was to have “tax incentives slightly more generous than the United States system,” and 
to “increase donations and distribute the additional donations fairly among charities” (Canada 
1997, 114). However, at the same time, changes were also enacted to increase accountability of 
the third sector, and the CRA’s Charities Directorate was given additional resources to improve 
their oversight capacity. “The measures proposed in this budget represent the government’s 
response to a thorough and exhaustive review of the tax provisions relating to charities” 
(Canada 1997, 116; See Appendix D, Table D-5 for a list of changes). This policy direction is 
commonly referred to as the “Program Review,” above. 
 From idea to implementation, the policy process for the capital gains tax exemption was 
protracted. Most of the interview participants attributed the eventual success of the effort to 
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Johnson. One commented that “he would nearly jump out of the bushes as Paul Martin was 
walking from his office to get the idea in front of him” (Interview no. 24, Mar. 6, 2015). All of 
those interviewed also relayed that Martin overrode the advice even of the Department of 
Finance in introducing the capital gains exemption. The support of the Minister of Finance is 
clearly critical for these types of fiscal policy changes.  
 In February 2000, before the trial period had ended, the capital gains inclusion rate was 
reduced in the Income Tax Act from 75% to 66%; then, in October 2000, it was changed back 
to the “half-inclusion rate” of 50%. Although the capital gains tax exemption pilot had been 
scheduled to close on December 31, 2001, on October 12 of that year, the government made 
the donation incentive permanent (Interview no. 22, May 14, 2015). The decision to make the 
donation incentive permanent was partly based on the Ministry of Finance’s report on the 
effectiveness of the capital gains tax exemption pilot, published shortly before the trial period 
was scheduled to end, but not released until 2002. The report claimed that donations of publicly 
traded securities had tripled between 1997 and 2000. Results showed that the donations had 
been directed toward all types of charities but in particular had profited larger charities. As 
well, greater fundraising capacity and sophistication were evident, and both public foundations 
and the education sector reaped the benefits (Canada 2002). According to the federal 
government’s official communication, the decision to release the report was made because the 
expectations from the original pilot had been met. Gifts of listed securities to private 
foundations were, however, still ineligible. 
 There was some criticism of the data and methods used in the Department of Finance’s 
report. As well, other studies have contested the outcome of the policy change. Burrows 
suggests the change “prompted unprecedented large gifts and increasing overall giving by 
140% between 1995 and 2007, from $3.6 billion to $8.7 billion” (2009, 5). Duff, on the other 
hand, states, “It is difficult to determine whether this incentive has increased aggregate 
donations, or merely induced donors to substitute gifts of publicly traded securities for other 
gifts” (2004, 183). Some scrutinized whether one of the two original policy objectives of the 
pilot was met: 
The distributive biases noted in the report toward certain types of charities 
are in fact quite extreme. For example, while educational charities received 
only 15.8 percent of total reported gifts in 1997, they received 42.2 percent 
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of the value of donations of public securities, which is far more than any of 
the other categories of charity reviewed in the report. (The closest was 
welfare charities, at 30.5 percent, followed by religious charities, at 11.9 
percent.) Likewise, large charities received 36 percent of total gifts [of 
publicly listed securities] by comparison with smaller charities, but 56.4 
percent of gifts of public securities. As between charitable organizations and 
public foundations, the latter received only 15 percent of total gifts, but 60 
percent of the value of public securities donated in 1997. (Philipps, L. 2003, 
922-3) 
There was also critique of the data and methods used in the 2002 report of the Department of 
Finance, which had informed the decision to make the tax incentive permanent. Farber 
conducted a retrospective analysis of the correlation between the donation incentive and 
indirect expenses for the federal government and found that, for “each forgone $10 of federal 
capital gains tax revenue, the result was over $130 of donations, or a factor of 13” (Farber 
2015, 5). There have also been several critiques of the limited amount of information the 
federal government released on the donation of listed securities. Either way, the capital gains 
tax exemption was a significant change to the Canadian income tax regime governing 
charitable contributions, and more particularly for foundations and the third sector in Canada 
(Innes 2003, 909; Interview no. 22, May 14, 2015), which is the more well-known part of this 
story. What follows is even more important, but less well known, for understanding the policy 
roles of foundations in this case. 
5.5 Policy Reformulation  
Private foundations were not considered eligible recipients under the legislation. In response, in 
1998–99, the Muttart Foundation, Maytree Foundation, McConnell Foundation, and Max Bell 
Foundation started “getting together to talk about the issues” (Interview no. 13, April 23, 
2015). Private Foundations Canada was the result of these conversations.  
The first few years of the organization’s overall efforts were focused primarily on 
public advocacy to protest discrimination toward private foundations in the capital gains tax 
exemption. The foundations policy community knew inherently (not because of any research 
on the topic, which provides evidence that this is indeed an effective strategy) that to influence 
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decision makers in government, they needed insider knowledge to access the closed Canadian 
fiscal policy regime. Hilary Pearson was recruited from the Department of Finance and hired as 
president and CEO of PFC in 2001. The PFC board had been looking specifically for an 
advocate with knowledge of government and public policy. Her first directive was to get the 
capital gains tax legislation changed to include private foundations. Efforts continued in 
alignment with the ministry-focused lobbying for a number of years.  
After a while, it became evident that the strategy was not producing the desired effect. 
In 2005, on behalf of its members, PFC launched a campaign to address the legitimacy problem 
facing private foundations. One of the lead participants described this stage of the process: 
What we decided to say is “we’re going to make one last push on this 
because otherwise, we can’t – we’ve been dragging this around for 10 
years getting nowhere with it – amidst the Department of Finance. We’re 
going to make a last push to try and get it; we’re going to do it in a different 
way, and we’re going to mobilize the very significant resources and focus 
resources and get this done.” And we did it. (Interview no.23 May 1, 2015) 
On behalf of its members, PFC basically explored “every possible avenue that we could think 
of to draw on in terms of support for the change” (Interview no. 21, April 12, 2015). In these 
later years of the campaign, PFC hired Hill and Knowlton Strategies as consultants to assist 
with the work and also held legal consultations in preparation for presenting their case. These 
presentations were more or less made to whomever would listen. The tactics included standard 
lobbying techniques such as writing letters to the minister of finance; submitting briefs in pre-
budget consultations and to the Standing Committee on Finance; meeting with public officials, 
and members of the opposition (Interviews no. 21, April 12, 2015; no.13, April 23, 2015; no. 
24, March 6, 2015).  
From 2002 to 2006, the PFC continued its lobbying efforts to get private foundations 
exempted. Every year, letters were sent to Liberal and Conservative ministers of finance, and 
briefings were submitted as part of the budget consultation process. The letters reinforced the 
recommendation of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance “that the federal 
government amend the Income Tax Act to eliminate the capital gains inclusion rate applied to 
donations of publicly listed securities, including private foundations” (Interview no. 21, April 
12, 2015). Every year between 2002 and 2007, the Department of Finance introduced changes 
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to the Income Tax Act pertaining to the charitable sector. Many of these legislative decisions 
were consolidated in Bill C-33 in November 2006 (Income Tax Act subsections 248(30) to 
(41)). The amendments represented the most importance changes for the operation and 
oversight of charities in Canada since the introduction of required registration of charities. Also 
included were measures to prevent tax shelters, revisions to the definition of charities and 
public foundations, and increased public reporting and accountability measures (Carters, Jan 
15, 2007). 
In 2004, the Senate Standing Committee on Banking, Trade, and Commerce was 
authorized to review and report on issues relating to Canadian charities. The Standing 
Committee’s mandate, among other somewhat lofty goals, was to address “the current federal 
policy measures on charitable giving; new or enhanced federal policy measures, with an 
emphasis on tax policy; and, the impact of current and proposed policy measures on the federal 
treasury” (Senate 2004, 3). From December 1–8, 2004, the Standing Committee heard 
presentations from witnesses including the PFC, the Department of Finance, the CRA, the 
AFP, the CAGP, the Canadian Council of Christian Charities, the Change Canada Charitable 
Foundation, the Canadian Centre for Philanthropy (now Imagine Canada), the Council for 
Business and the Arts in Canada, Ducks Unlimited, the Nature Conservancy of Canada, the 
Health Charities Coalition, and the National Arts Centre Foundation (Senate 2004, 14).  
All respondents supported and advocated for the extension of the capital gains tax 
exemption to private foundations. In 2004, the standing committee tabled an interim report 
entitled The Public Good and Private Funds: The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Giving 
by Individuals and Corporations.4 With respect to donations to private foundations, the Senate 
committee declared its agreement with the witnesses’ allegations that: 
The discrimination that currently exists in the treatment of certain donations to 
private foundations and to public foundations must be ended, but on a 
temporary trial basis and subject to the resolution of governance and 
monitoring systems as well as self-dealing concerns; the capital gains tax [will] 
be applied to donations of selected asset classes, to both private and public 
foundations and other charities, must be eliminated. (Senate 2004, 11) 
                                               
 
4 There is no record of a final report from the Senate Committee having been submitted. 
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Furthermore, the committee recommended that, “if the appropriate governance and monitoring 
systems are in place to ensure that private foundations are clearly operating in the public 
interest and that self-dealing will not occur,” private foundations should be included as 
qualified recipients for the capital gains tax exemption for the donation of privately listed 
securities (Senate 2004). These caveats eventually proved significant and, in hindsight, perhaps 
should have been examined more closely by policy proponents in the third sector.  
 At that point, however, the implementation of the Standing Committee’s 
recommendation was delayed by a federal election that saw the Liberals re-elected to a 
minority government. After a decade of Chretien’s leadership (1993–2003), Martin, the 
original advocate of this policy, now led the party. Two years later, in 2006, the Conservative 
Party under Stephen Harper’s leadership formed a minority government and the Voluntary 
Sector Initiative (VSI) dissolved. It is unclear whether the VSI, which was a key Liberal policy 
agenda, simply petered out and logically ended with the CRA regulatory reform, or whether it 
happened for political reasons when the Harper government came into power.  
  In December 2006, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Finance presented 
its pre-budget consultation report, Canada: Competing to Win (Canada 2006). The report 
informed the new Conservative government’s first budget. Under the leadership of MP Brian 
Palliser, 400 consultations took place with groups and individuals across the country. Those 
consulted on the charitable sector included the PFC, CAGP, AFP, and Imagine Canada. The 
primary charitable tax policy proposal noted in the report was the extension of the capital gains 
tax incentive to private foundations. At the same time, the legislation “place[d] limits on the 
percentage of stock that they may hold in any single company” (Minton and Somers 2016, 8). 
Clearly, scepticism regarding tax shelters continued to inform the CRA’s treatment of private 
foundations.  
 Alternative policy options (for instance, the creation of National Philanthropy Day) 
were also presented to encourage charitable giving and the elimination of the $200 tax credit 
threshold, change the non-refundable tax credit to a tax deduction, and address the issues 
stemming from the increasing complexity of the new regulatory requirements for charities, 
including new self-dealing rules, rules regarding excess business holdings, and annual 
distribution quotas (Pallister 2006). (This final issue would become increasingly important in 
the coming years.) Ultimately, it was again recommended that the capital gains tax incentive be 
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extended to private foundations and that gifts of land and real estate also be considered eligible, 
but on a five-year trial basis. 
 As part of the new Conservative government’s first budget in 2006, “the capital gains 
inclusion rate [was reduced] to zero” (Canada 2006, 230; Interview no. 17, November 17, 2014 
interview), which meant that, “effective May 1, 2006, gifts to registered charities, other than to 
private foundations, of publicly listed securities [were] exempt to capital gains tax” (CRA 
2007, 6).7 The policy changes that followed, however, appeared to the third-sector policy 
community to be giving with one hand and taking with the other; the federal government’s 
policy makers, however, considered it “rebalancing.” In 2006, unrealized capital gains were 
estimated to comprise half of the total market value of Canadians’ stock holdings. This 
suggests that “the opportunity for many shareholders to donate stock and save tax is very 
significant” (Ryan 2006, 5). What it implies, though, is that along with the adoption of the tax 
incentive, there would be an equivalent movement of decision-making responsibility for 
investments into the public good to the amount of forgone tax revenue. 
 In keeping with recommendations from the Senate and Parliamentary standing 
committees, the new minority government’s March 2006 federal budget included a 
commitment to consult with private foundations to support the development of new self-
dealing rules (Payne and Zhao 2007). In 2007, the government introduced additional 
restrictions on private foundations, including: 
• excess business holding rules to ensure persons connected with the foundation could 
not personally benefit;  
• increased reporting and monitoring: investments in the same class over 2%, and 
“material transactions” would need to be reported to the CRA annually;  
• required divestments: if the board of a foundation together holds >20% of the shares in 
a class of assets, penalties would be incurred if divestment did not occur in the CRA’s 
prescribed timeframe;  
• New non-arm’s length rules applicable after March 2007, with penalties for non-
compliance (Demczur 2007).  
                                               
 
7 Gifts of ecologically sensitive land were also exempt from the donation incentive from 1997–2006, but are 
beyond the scope of this study. 
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The CRA also issued stern warnings regarding tax shelters in June and August of 2007; any 
taxpayer or charity appearing to be exploiting charitable tax or receipting incentives, personally 
benefiting, or allocating resources to activities deemed illegitimate under the charitable tax 
legislations could expect to be audited (Demczur 2007, 25). The government warned that any 
participation in tax shelters would result in the revocation of charitable status, a comment that 
was targeted in particular at private foundations. This penalty was to be levied despite there 
being no overwhelming evidence of misdealing. These concerns appeared to be derived from a 
few isolated incidents, as well as from the lingering perception about the self-serving 
motivations of private foundations that has pervaded both Canadian and US discourse on 
foundations. 
A new CRA regime was also entrenched in the Income Tax Act legislation in 2007. As 
one interviewee with the federal government noted, regulatory reform for the third sector was 
the “big issue.” As a result of the VSI, the Charities Directorate of the CRA was bringing 
forward some of the consequent administrative challenges of the “current regime to influence 
broader policy development” (Interview no. 12, November 21, 2014). Four new measures were 
introduced in 2007: “education, either general publication or a letter to the charity 
understanding its obligations under the Income Tax Act; compliance agreement with the 
charity; position of an interim sanction or penalty, or revocation of charitable status” (Demczur 
2007, 22). As an example of the magnitude of the changes, prior to these reforms, the only 
course of action the Charities Directorate could pursue if it uncovered evidence of violation of 
CRA policies was to revoke charitable status. Intermediary penalties provided a more efficient 
and timely oversight mechanism for the CRA than simply revocation.  
Finally, with the passing of the federal budget on March 19, 2007, and of Bill C-28, 
private foundations were at last considered eligible recipients for the tax incentive for 
donations of publicly listed securities (CRA 2007, 7; Farber 2015). Also, in the 2007 budget, 
the same capital inclusion rates were applied for private foundations as for any other charity. 
The inclusion of private foundations as qualified recipients for the donation incentive was a 
welcome development. That said, it came at a price:  
It is disappointing the government used this as an opportunity to propose such 
far-reaching and complex rules which completely change the regulatory regime 
for existing private foundations. The excess business holdings rules penalize 
 85 
existing private foundations and add the compliance burden of monitoring the 
shareholdings of both the foundation and of non-arm’s length persons. Private 
foundations holding more than 2% of a class of private or public shares should 
seek legal advice immediately. (Ryan 2007, 16) 
The additional regulations that were introduced for private foundations reinforced and 
perpetuated the perception that foundations were not necessarily legitimate or accountable 
actors in the third sector. Although one interviewee noted, “The intention is not specifically to 
regulate private foundations per se, it’s an anti-avoidance tax mechanism to ensure that the 
same people that are donating their shares are not taking advantage of the fact that they control 
the charity” (Interview no. 18 June 6, 2015). Excess business holdings, self-dealing, political 
activities, and disbursement quotas were intended to stymie tax abuses. The timing seemed a 
bit more than coincidental, and was noted in several of the interviews (Interviews no. 26, Nov. 
21, 2014; no. 25, Mar. 6, 2016; no. 18, June 6, 2015; no. 20, Apr. 15, 2015).  
5.6 Analysis 
The government’s policy amendments and refinements to this proposed tax incentive under the 
Income Tax Act were made over a period of ten years (1996/97–2006/07). As previously noted, 
these changes represented a philosophical shift in the treatment of charitable tax incentives in 
Canada, from an income-based “tithing model” to one that encouraged larger gifts of 
accumulated wealth (Burrows 2009). The policy shift was driven both by influential 
individuals and by foundation policy entrepreneurs in the third sector. Originally unsuccessful 
at extending the exemption to private foundations, they adjusted their strategies: focusing on 
regular policy windows and key politicians, using non-partisan lobbying tactics, seeking to 
influence key policy officials within government, and increasing their legitimacy overall.  
 Within these activities, two strategies can be teased out: first, foundations focused on 
regular openings in policy processes in attempts to influence the agendas, re-evaluations, and 
policy reformulations; second, foundations organized themselves in order to bring more 
coherence to their policy efforts, and to legitimize their voices. Case in point, and a revelation 
from this research in particular (although it is well known in the policy circles, but has not yet 
been documented empirically) is that PFC was formed as a result of this case. As one 
interviewee noted: 
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The PFC was started largely for public policy reasons. It was started almost 
entirely because of the foundations that created it. There were about 25 
private foundations that got together to do it. They were quite angry about the 
perceived discrimination against private foundations and donors to private 
foundations that came about because of the capital gains changes that Paul 
Martin made back in 1997. (Interview no. 20 April 14, 2015) 
 These efforts proved fruitful, but did not come without consequence. The prevailing 
perception amongst Canadian policy makers was that foundations, in particular private 
foundations, are akin to “tax shelters” and that they are ripe for abuse. In Canada, compared to 
the US, there is also a reluctance to cede social policy direction (via tax policy for the third 
sector) to the “private” business sector, which tends to be synonymous with private 
foundations.       
In the US and in Canada, the growth of the number and assets of private foundations 
has been attributed to more favourable tax treatment of foundations, and specifically to the 
creation of tax incentives for the donation of capital assets. In 1984, the US Deficit Reduction 
Act introduced the equivalent to the Canadian capital gains tax exemption. The legislation 
“permitted contributors to deduct the full fair market, rather than a reduced value, for donations 
of certain appreciated stock to non-operating private foundations” (Arnsberger, Ludlum, Riley, 
and Stanton 2008, 114). It was made permanent under the Tax and Trade Extension Act of 
1998. In 1999, the US recorded the highest growth in the number of new foundations, 11% 
from the prior year. Assets also grew by 15% year-over-year between 1995 and 1999. Between 
1996 and 2000, the US also saw the largest grants paid by private foundations from the period 
of 1984–2004. The growth has been attributed generally to the economic growth of the late 
1990s, but also to this tax exemption (Arnsberger, Ludlum, Riley, and Stanton 2008, 114-5). 
 That said, reporting on the outputs of this donation have been sporadic and 
unsystematic in Canada. In 2011, Statistics Canada reported to the Standing Committee on 
Finance that donations of publicly listed securities were projected to cost the federal 
government $217 million in foregone revenue in the form of an indirect tax expense. This 
represented about 7% of the overall projected federal cost of donation incentives of $2.94 
billion (Canada 2013, 10). The estimated annual cost of eliminating the capital gains on 
donations of private shares would add between $42 million and $101 million to that number, 
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and for real estate, $61 million to $169 million to the existing federal indirect expenses for 
these tax exemptions. On the other hand, Donald K. Johnson suggested that the projected 
annual federal cost for both incentives would be closer to $50 million and $65 million, and that 
annual donations would increase to $200 million, a much more significant potential return on 
investment (Canada 2013, 16). The standing committee in turn made recommendations to the 
federal government to “explore the feasibility and cost” of these tax incentives, but only 
“subject to the government’s stated intention to balance the budget in the medium term” 
(Canada 2013, 25).  
At the same time that the philanthropic community was lobbying for this specific tax 
incentive, government was also receiving recommendations for the general tax treatment of 
capital gains in order to put more money back into the system (the Canadian economy), or 
simply back into the hands of Canadians. In a report prepared by the federal Ministry of 
Finance in 1995/96, it was noted that: 
By exhibiting such fiscal generosity, the federal government is sacrificing 
revenue, even though sources of revenue are becoming scarcer. At a time 
when the government is reviewing all its programs, withdrawing from some 
of its activities and even going so far as to abandon the production and 
provision of some public goods and services completely, it must not allow 
the tax expenditure associated with charitable organizations to escape public 
scrutiny. (Domingue 1996, 2) 
At that time, it was reported that Canadians gave $3.2 and $3.5 billion in 1992 and 1993 
respectively, for which tax credits resulted in approximately $870 million and $893 million in 
lost revenue for the government of Canada. Third sector advocates, though, argue that the 
benefit the public (and the government) receive from such investments into the sector (as 
opposed to costs or losses) are greater than the tax expenses (Domingue 1996, 3). In 1996/97 
when the capital gains tax exemption was introduced, federal coffers were in a surplus position, 
and many organizations were making recommendations to the government about how to 
reinvest those dollars. The Fraser Institute recommended reducing the capital gains tax 
altogether in order to put more capital into the economy (Lammam and Clemens 2014). This 
lined up well with the proposal to eliminate those taxes on gifts of securities.  
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 It is also noteworthy that the Fraser Institute is often considered Canada’s foremost 
right-wing think tank. It has come under scrutiny for receiving donations from large American 
foundations, including pharmaceutical companies (Fleisch 2012). The Fraser Institute, along 
with the C.D. Howe Institute were key policy entrepreneurs in advocating for reductions to 
capital gains taxes, or elimination of capital gains taxes at approximately the same times as the 
proposed donation incentives considered herein were being pursued by other third sector 
organizations such as the PFC. The C.D. Howe institute is also considered one of Canada’s 
more influential public policy think tanks. (In 2017, 39% of funding to the C.D. Howe Institute 
was raised from donations, including major gifts from ten private philanthropic foundations.8) 
These spikes in lobbying activity around capital gains tax have also tended to coincide with 
economic growth or recovery, or at least forecasted returns to growth (Lammam and Clemens 
2014; Milligan, Mintz, and Wilson 1999; Mintz and Wilson 2000; Robson and Laurin 2017; 
Aptowitzer 2017; Mintz and Wilson 2006; Burrows 2009).  
 Lobbying efforts in support of further revisions have since been ongoing, with the most 
recent proposed change to the capital gains tax exemptions legislation put forward in the 2015 
federal budget. The definition of “qualifying capital” was broadened to include private assets, 
including shares of private corporations, and real estate measures were intended to provide a 
more equitable distribution of charitable tax incentives across different demographics, since 
capital gains for listed securities tend to attract the largest gifts from the wealthiest. Again, the 
federal government proposed increased restrictions on limited partnerships concurrent with the 
new incentives (Minton and Somers 2016; Aptowitzwer 2017). 
 For foundations, the policy problem was to increase the number and quantity of “tax 
assistance” for large donations to registered charities to entice major giving in Canada 
(Department of Finance 2002, 15). From the beginning of the 1990s, the third sector 
increasingly coalesced around the need for enhanced donation incentives. There was strong 
support within it for a capital gains tax exemption applicable for all registered charities. 
                                               
 
8 The lines are blurred in terms of who is advocating for whom in this case. Think tanks and foundations both have 
been advocating for related changes to capital gains taxes since at least 1997, when the pilot for the capital gains 
tax exemption of publicly listed securities. In 2017, for instance, major donors to the C.D. Howe Institute 
included: the Aurea Foundation; the Crabtree Foundation; the Lotte and John Hetch Memorial Foundation; the 
Hal Jackman Foundation; the Munk Charitable Foundation; the John Dobson Foundation; Donner Canadian 
Foundation; Max Bell Foundation; the W. Garfield Weston Foundation; and the (W. Brett) Wilson Foundation 
(C.D. Howe 2017). 
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However, civil service staff in the CRA was opposed to the idea because of the potential loss of 
tax revenue and devolution of policy influence to foundations. The CRA also wanted to have 
appropriate oversight and accountability processes in place to ensure that no undue benefit 
would accrue to foundations (Interview no.17, November 21, 2014; Interview no. 18, June 6, 
2015).  
 At the same time, and most probably through the Program Review process, the 
Canadian government identified another policy problem from the public perspective: efficiency 
and effectiveness in the third sector. The underlying value judgement made by the Ministry of 
Finance officials was that foundation donors were economically motivated, and that it was 
particularly true of those giving to private foundations (Interview no.17, November 21, 2014; 
Interview no. 18, June 6, 2015). It followed, then, that if tax incentives were to promote giving 
through these mechanisms, additional oversight would be required to dissuade potential abuses 
and to reprimand those who took inappropriate advantage of the measure:  
The Department of Finance focus is on avoiding any measures that cost the 
government any tax revenues. They’re in the mindset that government 
should decide where the money goes, not the donor, and they make 
recommendations to the Minister of Finance. It was to Paul Martin’s credit 
that he actually went against the advice of his department in 1997. He had a 
business background and understood what the benefits would be. (Interview 
no. 25, March 6, 2015) 
The Ministry of Finance, in attempting to counterbalance these new donation incentives, took 
the opportunity to tighten self-dealing and non-arm’s-length regulation for foundations, at the 
same time strengthening of the CRA’s oversight mandate (Burrows 2009, 11).  
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Figure 5-1. Capital Gains Tax Donation Incentives vs. Regulations for Foundations 
 
 
 There were inconsistent reports on the results of the capital gains tax exemption and of 
the impacts of these additional regulations. Figure 5-1 above shows the number of applicable 
major policy changes that incentivized donations of capital through this timeframe, juxtaposed 
with the number of increasing restrictions and regulations for foundations (a list of these 
policies is provided in Appendix D). The red lines indicate the dates of federal elections. With 
the exception of the 2011 election, the major policy changes happened at or around election 
time, which is consistent with Howlett’s research on policy entrepreneurs and “regular” policy 
windows in the Canadian parliamentary system (1997). This is illustrative of the double-edged 
sword of Canadian foundations’ narrow focus on capital gains tax exemptions at the time. It is 
also indicative of the clustering of policy amendments at “regular” policy windows occurring 
around budget cycles (Howlett 1997; 1998). 
 In the 2015 federal budget, the government announced that it was going to proceed as 
recommended by the third-sector proponents to extend the capital gains tax exemption to 
donations of private capital. However, the donation incentive came along, again with more 
anti-avoidance rules. Regarding the approach, Aptowitzer commented that, still, “the 
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Department of Finance seems to equate mischief with tax planning” (2016). There is some 
truth to this. The CRA has specifically noted the issues, regulations, and mechanisms for 
monitoring abuse of “tax shelters” (see Glossary) in its policies.  
  Tax shelters are ways to protect capital assets from high rates of taxation. However, 
when it comes to using charitable donations as vehicles for tax planning that evolves into “tax 
sheltering,” the CRA is not on side. In short, there is a violation if a donation receipt is issued 
to the donor for a greater amount than fair market value or the purchase price. Upon review by 
the CRA, “In all cases, the CRA has reassessed the participants and denied the donation tax 
credit as claimed” (Canada 2017). This is not without reason: historically in Canada, 
foundations have been commonly viewed as tax shelters.  
 In the 2016 federal budget, the Liberal government “quietly announced” that it was 
revoking the Conservative government’s commitment to extend the exemption of capital gains 
from sales of private company shares and real estate (Golombek 2016). In a report of the 
Standing Committee on Finance, it was noted that both the UK and US allow exemption of 
capital gains for private shares and real estate. The report noted the main point of contention, 
i.e., the project tax expense of the donation incentive: 
According to the Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, the estimated 
annual federal fiscal cost associated with eliminating the capital gains tax 
would be between $42 million and $101 million for donations of real property 
and between $61 million and $169 million for donations of shares of private 
corporations. Donald K. Johnson estimated that the combined annual federal 
fiscal cost for both measures would be between $50 million and $65 million, 
and predicted that annual donations would increase by $200 million. (2013, 25) 
It is difficult to assess the financial impacts of these policy changes because, until the 1970s, 
there was little quantitative information available on private foundations in Canada (as it 
wasn’t previously reported or required by the CRA). There were, however, many anecdotal 
accounts of major corporations or wealthy Canadian families using foundations for private 
benefit. Issues included loan-backs and manipulating the system to maintain control for 
corporate shares so as to prevent takeovers. Loan-backs are the process of making donations to 
the foundation that are then loaned back to someone (who is not at arm’s length) interest free or 
at a below market interest rate. They were also used as land-holdings, where land is used for 
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personal recreation by a family, but a receipt for the gift in-kind was issued for a personal or 
corporate tax break (McQuaig 1987).  
 For those advocating for the extension of the capital gains tax exemption to private 
shared and real estate, the Liberal government’s move away from the Conservative 
government’s prior commitment was a significant setback. The CEO of Imagine Canada, Bruce 
MacDonald, and Brian Emmett, the chief economist, expressed their disappointment in an 
interview with the Financial Post: the decision “sends a troubling message related to the 
creation of a regulatory environment that will enable charities to thrive, fulfill their missions, 
and continue to be a powerful contributor to the economic well-being of this country” (quoted 
in Golombek 2016). At the same time, the decision also reflects the persistence of the 
perceptions noted above with respect to the potential tax abuses enabled by private and family 
foundations. 
5.7 Discussion 
The discriminatory tax treatment of private foundations for this donation incentive was 
informed by the limited democratic legitimacy of foundations, particularly of private 
foundations, in Canadian public policy. In order to address the increasing requirements to 
demonstrate their legitimacy, accountability, and transparency, the foundations in this case 
banded together and created a new umbrella organization, the PFC, to enhance and coordinate 
their lobbying capacity and effectiveness with respect to this particular tax incentive. However, 
the decision makers were not convinced. The CRA’s primary interest in this case was in 
limiting loss or potential loss of tax revenues, and of ceding policy influence over the 
charitable sector, which it exercises through the Income Tax Act and enforces through the CRA 
Charities Directorate. As noted, significant changes were made to the regulatory regime for 
charities and foundations at critical junctures in 1997, 2004, and 2007 (Appendix D).  
 Foundations and foundation representatives in this case operated in ways characteristic 
of Kingdon’s concept of policy entrepreneurs (1995). They used their time, resources, and 
connections to influence government policy on the capital gains tax exemption. In addition, 
policy changes and policy advocacy activity tended to peak at regular intervals (or windows) 
that aligned with Canadian electoral and policy cycles, especially the annual budget cycle. This 
is consistent with Howlett’s (1997) research on policy windows in Canada. Many of the policy 
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proposals related to the capital gains taxes were enacted at budget time, with lobbying efforts 
peaking right before. This led the Department of Finance to also enact commensurate 
restrictions or regulations on foundations in order to protect against abuses.  
 While lobbying the Minister of Finance in particular, given the closed nature of the 
fiscal policy regime, it was also apparent that foundation entrepreneurs tried to gain influence 
in non-partisan ways, so as to protect against the possibility of losing ground with government 
turnover. This was a prudent strategy. In addition to having annual windows of opportunity 
around budget time, there were also regular intervals or opportunities around election times. 
Moreover, reversals in policy direction could be observed with changes in government. In 
1997, the federal Liberals under Chrétien took over from the Progressive Conservative (PC) 
government under Prime Minister Brian Mulroney. That year, under then-Minister of Finance 
Paul Martin’s watch, the five-year pilot for the capital gains tax exemption on publicly listed 
securities was implemented. This policy implementation followed years of unsuccessful 
lobbying with the previous government. When the Conservatives were elected in a minority 
government under Prime Minister Harper in 2006, their first budget reduced the capital gains 
tax exemption from 75% to 0%; in other words, the tax was eliminated. In 2016, the Liberals 
(under Justin Trudeau) replaced the Conservative government. This resulted in the reversal of 
the Conservative government’s commitment to extend the capital gains tax exemption to 
donations of private capital.  
 This case study provides evidence of the increasing coordination and organization of 
philanthropic foundations in Canada. In order for these policy entrepreneurs to establish their 
legitimacy, first as philanthropic organizations and second as policy actors, they undertook an 
increasingly formalized strategy of network building. The function of the PFC when it was first 
instituted was to advocate that the federal capital gains tax exemption be extended to private 
foundations as qualified recipients. The organization started with a specific policy function and 
sole objective. Only five foundations were represented in the membership originally, which 
grew to 25 within a couple of years. The PFC has now been in existence for over 25 years. It 
has not yet survived a generational shift (the President and CEO is still Hilary Pearson), 
although there has been turnover on the board. These are indicators of moderate organizational 
changes in response to the changing external environment.  
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 The foundations landscape has grown. There is an increasingly diverse number and 
array of foundations in Canada, with varying mandates, policy ambitions, and operating 
strategies. Since its inception, PFC has also become more complex, with over 130 members, 
representing large and small foundations, public and private foundations alike. The unified and 
solitary original policy mandate survived and evolved into a more sophisticated suite of policy 
objectives and advocacy activities, including annual conferences aimed at professional 
development, sharing best practices, and bringing together ideas to share with government. The 
functional boundary representing the internal coherence of the organization is the distinction 
between the role of Community Foundations Canada (CFC), Imagine Canada, which represents 
all charities and NPOs in Canada, and PFC.  
 The main obstacle to the policy engagement of foundations is their limited perceived 
legitimacy, which is a prerequisite to achieving their policy objectives. While there appears to 
be increasing coherence in the foundation sector, there are still significant differences between 
types of organizations, and strategies for resolving some of the issues faced by the sector. The 
addition of a representative umbrella organization is an important step, but PFC does not yet 
represent enough foundations to have resolved to address these disunities; fewer than 3% of 
private foundations are members of PFC. This is evident in recent developments. In 2014, the 
federal Standing Committee on Finance’s consultation process informed the Report on 
Charitable Tax Incentives and Giving in Canada. The individuals and organizations that went 
before the committee were the same as those who did so in the 1990s for the capital gains tax 
exemptions. The same policy approach is still the mainstay of the policy network’s activity, 
i.e., the extension of the tax incentive to private capital. The federal government will continue 
to weigh the economic advantages of putting more capital into the market through exemptions 
like this, to maintain control of policy direction related to charitable investment, and to ensure 
that the tax expenses it is writing off are worth the investment and are not being abused.  
 The decision to exempt capital gains from donations of listed securities in 1997 and its 
permanent adoption in 2000 was the result of significant lobbying on the part of several key 
individuals and organizations from the third sector – policy entrepreneurs. These included the 
soon to be members of the Voluntary Sector Roundtable (VSR). Although it is an 
unincorporated umbrella organization, the VSR received funding support from the McConnell 
Foundation to pursue favourable charitable legislation for the sector (Philipps, L. 2003). 
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Similarly, the decision to extend the capital gains tax exemption to private foundations in 2007 
was also the result of significant lobbying efforts of key individuals and organizations from the 
third sector – also policy entrepreneurs. Key among them was PFC. The original efforts of the 
policy community before the 1997–2000 tax changes were aimed at the policy agenda; the 
second round enacted in 2007 aimed at changes to policy review and amendments, the latter 
being a more challenging undertaking for foundations. In keeping with Kingdon’s assessment 
of the influence of policy entrepreneurs, it appeared easier for foundations to influence the 
government’s policy agenda to adopt the capital gains tax exemption than it did to amend it. 
 The adoption of the capital gains tax exemption policy took four years from idea to 
implementation, whereas it took 10 more years to get from implementation to amendment. 
Moreover, private foundations had to prove their “worthiness” of such special tax treatment. To 
do so, they employed standard lobbying efforts, such as letter writing campaigns and 
presentation to government committees. But they also felt the need to redouble these efforts. 
Organizing themselves into a formal organization arguably provided private foundations with 
more legitimacy. Even more so, they appointed a respected former analyst from the Ministry of 
Finance to the position of president. Pearson knew how to navigate the policy-making process. 
In a nutshell, the outsiders brought in an insider.  
 With respect to the policy result in 1997, then-Minister Paul Martin made the decision 
to change the tax policy. According to the interviewees, “The committees were open to it 
because they included it in their reports, the opposition critics were open to it, and the 
department officials never changed their minds” (Interview no. 20; 37th Parl., 2003). The 
eventual success of the donation incentive, introduced as a five-year pilot, along with the 
increased oversight role of the CRA that was introduced at the same time, was perhaps “a 
compromise between the bureaucrats and the politicians” (Interviews no. 17, 26, and 12, 
November 20 and 21, 2014; Downs 1957), in that the role of the CRA as the “watchdog” for 
Canadian charities was also solidified in 1997. The overhaul of the CRA’s mandate was 
completed in 2004 with Bill C-31 (Canada 2004; Interview no. 17, November 21, 2015).  
When it was introduced as a pilot program in 1997, the new capital gains tax exemption 
also “came with a stern warning” (Philipps 2003, 913) about the need to demonstrate financial 
returns in the level of donations and to “distribute the additional donations fairly among 
charities” (Canada 1997, 114). There is no data available on gifts of listed or traded securities 
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before 1997. As a result, measuring the impact of the tax measure on donation levels has 
proven difficult (Innes 2003, 908). In the published findings of the pilot program and in 
subsequent analyses, however, it is clear that donations of securities increased, but that large 
charities benefitted disproportionately. In spite of both this disparity and a failure to meet the 
goal of widening the distribution of benefits across organizations, the measure was made 
permanent in 2001.  
 In addition to private foundations being excluded as qualified recipients for tax 
exemptions of gifts of listed securities, enhanced political dealings rules were introduced in 
1997, disbursement quotas were changed, and self-dealing rules were tightened for foundations 
(Department of Finance 2002). Flaherty observes that:  
This [was] the same “cut-and-give” strategy that was employed by the 
Conservative government in 2006 when $1 billion in cuts to the voluntary 
sector were immediately followed by a tax change that allowed donations 
of publicly listed securities to registered charities to be fully exempt from 
capital gains tax. (2006, quoted in Elson 2011, 155) 
It was apparent from the interviews that perceptions of the motives and values of third-sector 
organizations, and of private foundations in particular, influenced the government’s policy 
amendments for the regulation of foundations; at the same time, the government obliged small 
requests for increased donation incentives such as the capital gains exemption. So, while the 
third-sector policy community, and foundations in particular, showed signs of growth and 
maturation during this timeframe, the policy focus on tax exemptions along with questions 
about foundations’ legitimacy and accountability resulted in significant blowback.  
 The relationship between foundations and the state in Canada is still shaped by the 
above-noted values, motives, and perceptions, all of which colour the judgments that are made 
regarding the legitimacy of the role of foundations in the delivery of public goods. In another 
study, Executive Director of the VSI Secretariat, Susan Carter, explored the “asymmetry” of 
the relationship between the government and the third sector, and the challenges posed by this 
hierarchical structure, saying, “I have heard public servants and politicians weigh the increase 
in expenditure on tax incentives with what they perceive to be a corresponding loss of control 
over spending. There is a fear is that more incentives will lead to a reduction in the ability of 
the state to influence public policy and the use of ‘public’ funds” (Burrows 2009, 8). In 
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Canada, this sentiment is not surprising and certainly had an impact on the government’s 
relationship with foundations in this case. For this case, the relationship between the state and 
the third sector was both closed and top-down (Interview no. 12, November 21, 2014).  
 Increased resources were provided in 1997 to ensure compliance with regulations and 
to ensure information remittance requirements were met. Since that time, the third sector has 
placed increased emphasis on self-regulating as a way to be more proactive in this policy arena 
(Department of Finance 2002; Dobkin Hall 2006; Interviews no. 18 and 20, November 21, 
2014).  
 The eventual extension of the capital gains tax exemption for the donation of publicly 
listed securities to private foundations shed light on some interesting trends in the involvement 
of Canadian foundations in public policy. It also came with some unintended consequences. As 
noted in one of the interviews, “Unfortunately, with the wise extension of the tax break to 
donations to private foundations came a series of anti-avoidance rules which will leave some 
private foundations” (Interview no. 42, May 17, 2017). What was particularly troubling was the 
lack of clarity regarding the excess business holdings and anti-avoidance rules. These 
accompanying policy changes reiterate and potentially reinforce the scepticism regarding the 
legitimacy, motives, and accountability of private foundations in Canada.  
The ethical or moral reservation about such a policy was that those who had benefitted 
most from, and potentially taken advantage of, the current capitalist system would also be the 
ones making decisions about the nature of the social safety net within the third sector. On the 
one hand, another interviewee commented on a sentiment heard in certain public and third-
sector policy circles, “that a lot of the people who are the wealthiest people in the world, are 
wealthy not because they’re awesome people but perhaps they’re wealthy because they are not 
such, such awesome people” (Anonymous interview 2015). On the other hand, according to 
another interviewee: 
So, they are wealthy? So, what? They have more to give…That they use a 
charity to direct them [funds] is actually to the benefit of the public because 
once the assets are in the charitable sector there are rules about how they can 
be spent. If [for instance] Mr. Gates were to own that money directly, not 
through his foundation, and still said look, “I like this small charity that’s 
targeting specifically an HIV/AIDS vaccine without anything else. I’m only 
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going to fund it a little bit at a time to make sure they don’t veer off course,” 
how different would that be from a practical perspective? But from a technical 
perspective, it’s much different because he can change his mind at any time 
and take all that money and you know, go home. Once it’s in the charitable 
sector, that money will stay within the charitable sector because that’s how the 
rules were designed. So, at the end of the day I think we’re probably better off. 
(Interview no. 20, June 6, 2016)  
This has clearly been a longstanding and polarizing debate, across sectors, across counties, 
documented in book after book, by government after government. The issue cannot be resolved 
in one case, by one ruling government, by one committee, or by one foundation. However, we 
can learn to appreciate these contrasting perspectives, and take both into account in order to 
better balance policy decisions at the outset. Considerable time and resources of public and 
philanthropic sector personnel were expended in the consideration of this policy.  
5.8 Summary  
 In this case, the policy agenda for the capital gains tax exemption emerged via policy 
transfer from the US from the efforts of an entrepreneurial individual philanthropist and third-
sector policy advocate. The government’s discriminatory approach to the treatment of 
foundations spurred reaction from the policy community that led to collaboration with in the 
third sector. The entrepreneurial roles of philanthropic foundations in this case advertently or 
inadvertently spurred significant policy changes: first, for the federal government’s policy 
regime for the oversight of charitable organizations, with foundations serving as policy 
entrepreneurs interested in tax legislation; second, a fundamental change to the nature of tax 
incentives embedded in the Income Tax Act, as administered by the CRA; and finally, to further 
develop the foundation sector in Canada through the creation of the PFC. That said, the 
foundation sector focused on encouraging revisions to the donation incentive structure 
embedded in the Income Tax Act to entice fewer, larger gifts from non-monetary sources of 
income. While foundations were focused on this minor policy issue, however, the government 
overhauled both the oversight system for registered charities and the role of the CRA. The 
changes particularly affected foundations (Elson 2011; McRae 2011; Phillips and Smith 2011). 
 99 
The advocacy process was protracted for the introduction and subsequent amendments 
related the capital gains tax exemption for securities donations. It required a legitimizing 
coalition and insider knowledge and contacts. It also took insider knowledge of the Department 
of Finance, adept lobbyists, professional legal and accounting advice, research and 
publications, and considerable outreach campaigns across a wide variety of networks. And, as 
noted, the debate regarding capital gains tax policy for charitable donations is ongoing. It 
appears that accountability or legitimacy of foundations continue to inform federal policy 
decisions and concerns, particularly around the potential loss of tax revenues, the desire to 
maintain more social policy direction by limiting such indirect expenses, or the underlying 
doubt regarding the motives. In comparison, the US capital gains tax exemption, upon which 
this idea is based, includes as eligible capital of private company shares, and real estate. For the 
third-sector advocates of the tax incentive, it won’t be until those extensions to the legislation 
are made that the potential for revenue transfer from private wealth and public coffers might be 
realized by the philanthropic sector. That being said, the government of Canada may not share 
this policy objective. 
6 UNIVERSITY CROWN FOUNDATIONS 
This chapter considers the establishment of university Crown foundations across Canada from 
1987 to 1998. It also considers the efforts of the policy entrepreneurs that pursued the policy 
agenda. In 1984, an opportunity was identified by a trust lawyer working with an individual 
donor in BC to increase the tax benefits of donating to post-secondary education (PSE) by 
giving through the Crown. The first university foundation was established in BC in 1987, with 
assurances from the federal government that these newly established PSE Crowns would 
benefit from the same tax incentives as the Crown. Thereafter, university Crown foundations 
were established across all the provinces except for Prince Edward Island (PEI). Through the 
pursuit of increased tax incentives by policy entrepreneurs in the third sector, Canadian 
foundations increased resources available to charities, although the advantage to universities 
was only temporary.  
 However, in the 1997 federal budget, the Liberal government changed the tax structures 
for Crown foundations, thereby removing the advantage that these provincial Crowns had over 
other public foundations. This was the same budget that introduced the capital gains exemption 
for the donation of publicly listed securities. It is also the same budget that increased 
restrictions and regulations for private foundations (both are discussed in Chapter 5). It is also 
the same federal budget that established a new federal Crown foundation, the Canadian 
Foundation for Innovation (CFI) (with an investment of $3.15 billion to 2002). The subsequent 
1998 budget established the Millennium Scholarship Foundation (with an investment of $2.5 
billion). Both have come under some scrutiny, but they have enabled the federal government to 
pursue its research and innovation agenda, as well as its economic development agendas 
through PSE scholarship funding (Aucoin 2003, 2). Through the establishment of these federal 
Crown foundations, the federal government is able to exert its influence on both research 
(innovation being a federal jurisdiction and an economic driver) and PSE policy (provincial 
jurisdiction, but the line between research and PSE is clearly quite fuzzy). 
 The information presented in this chapter is based on interview findings, archival 
research, freedom of information (FOI) requests, and secondary data. The chapter provides 
evidence of the emergence of a policy network for foundations in Canada as part of an effort to 
increase the availability of potential tax advantages to would-be donors to the PSE system. The 
case of the University of Saskatchewan’s (U of S) Crown foundation is given particular 
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consideration. Of the nine cases of provincial legislation for university Crown foundations, this 
one was selected because of my personal familiarity with the organization. (Given the 
resources and timeline for this project, and given the scope of this dissertation, it was not 
feasible to document what transpired in each of Canada’s other universities in a similar level of 
detail as the U of S.) 
 In the research that I had conducted on the capital gains tax exemption for the donation 
of publicly listed securities (Chapter 5), one of the interviewees spent quite a bit of time 
discussing another case involving Canada’s evolving tax legislation for foundations. The 
individual suggested that the growth in fundraising capacity and professionalization at 
universities and hospitals across the country could be traced (at least anecdotally) to the 
establishment of Crown foundations (Interview no. 17, November 21, 2014). Another 
interviewee noted, “there was this simultaneous sort of creation of infrastructure and 
professionalism starting in the 1990s” (Interview no. 16, November 11, 2014). Ostensibly, the 
motivation behind this Crown foundations trend was that a special tax advantage for limitations 
on lifetime giving was only available for donations to the Crown, and by extension, Crown 
foundations.  
 The literature is largely silent on Crown foundations in Canada (with the exception of 
Aucoin 2003; Bromley 1992; Minton and Somers 2016; Neely 1993; and Bird 2015 [but the 
last only makes passing references to Crown foundations]). This case presented an opportunity 
to shed light on a unique organizational type of foundation in the Canadian third sector, and the 
larger Canadian landscape for foundations. My investigation of the establishment of Crown 
foundations for universities reveals their differences from parallel foundations, although they 
are frequently confused. Furthermore, this case provides more evidence of networking, and 
coalition building amongst policy entrepreneurs, much like the other two cases considered in 
this dissertation.  
6.1 Background: Parallel Foundations and Crown Foundations 
The idea to establish parallel foundations and Crown foundations was introduced to attract 
more gifts to universities. It is important to make a clear distinction between Crown 
foundations and parallel foundations. A parallel foundation is public; it “is a foundation set up 
by an operating charity to raise funds and hold investments primarily for [that] operating 
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charity” (Bromley 1993, 37). A parallel foundation distributes funds only to its charitable 
organization. For example, in their current form, hospital foundations are commonly parallel 
foundations. Parallel foundations, both in the past and today, have enjoyed similar tax benefits 
as other public foundations (excluding Crown foundations) with one exception: until 1984, 
parallel foundations were allowed to exclude from their annual disbursement quotas gifts in 
trust or with the directive that it be “held by the foundation for a period of not less than ten 
years” (Bromley 1993, 3; this is more commonly known as an endowment). The         U of S’s 
parallel foundation, for example, was established in 1957 for precisely this purpose. In 1984, 
however, this “exclusion” from the 80% annual disbursement quota was extended to all other 
charities, removing the advantage. Prior to this legislative change, registered charities were 
essentially required to have a parallel foundation to hold endowments (Bromley 1992, 31).  
 Why bother with the parallel foundations after 1984? Despite the legislative change, 
endowments or bequests to a recipient charity remained more attractive than annual 
contributions on earned income because they are easier to make. Giving through parallel 
foundations also ensured the terms that donors prescribed were followed into perpetuity. 
Giving through a foundation provides a level of separation from the charity’s administration, 
and the foundation’s role is primarily to ensure the wishes of the donor are respected. In this 
situation, these foundations serve as valuable marketing tools for estate planning in that they 
allow donors to better direct their gifts while eliminating the administrative overload of having 
to establish one’s own private foundation. Community foundations perform a similar function, 
but the donations ought not be directed at a single NPO (Bromley 1992, 5; Hoffstein 2007; 
Minton and Somers 2016). It is important to note, however, that parallel foundations were not 
entitled to the same privileged tax treatment as the Crown at that time.  
 Under the Income Tax Act, “agents of the Crown are able to provide donors with special 
tax treatment for their gifts” (Neely 1994, 31). Thus, the advantage of Crown foundations was 
that donations to the Crown could be credited in a given year up to 100% of the donor’s annual 
income, “if the gift [was] to an Agent of the Crown” (Bromley 1993, 7). In contrast, up until 
1996/97, donations toward all other charities (including public and private foundations) were 
only eligible for tax credits up to 20% of the donor’s annual income. Donations to the Crown, 
therefore, substantially reduced the tax burden paid by the donor in a given year. This tax break 
would therefore be advantageous to donors particularly, for instance, in years when an 
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individual’s income was exceptionally high (Bowman 1996; Bromley 1993). This rule applied 
to the year of death and the prior year, making it an attractive planned giving incentive to be 
carried out via bequests. Like the capital gains tax exemption for publicly listed securities 
discussed in Chapter 5, the Crown foundation tax incentive was targeted at wealthier donors 
and was meant to encourage larger gifts. 
6.2 The Policy Agenda 
As noted, historically, Crown foundations (and the Crown) have had more tax advantages than 
all other types of charitable organizations, including public and parallel foundations. In 
Canada, 100% of donations to foundations are eligible for tax credit, but only up to a threshold 
of 20% of the donor’s annual income. Whatever tax benefits exceed those amounts may be 
carried forward for up to five years. Historically, the same tax benefits applied whether a donor 
gave to a charitable organization, a public foundation, or a private foundation. But the Income 
Tax Act contained an overlooked clause, described above, that created a potentially significant 
advantage to donating to an “Agent of the Crown,” as opposed to another form of charity 
(Bromley 1992). Thus, there was no annual limit on tax credits to Crown foundations, and they 
still had carry-forward privileges. 
 Blake Bromley, president of Benefic Group and an expert in charity law, uncovered this 
tax incentive for agents of the Crown in the early 1980s. Bromley had been working to steward 
a potential gift from a major donor to the University of British Columbia (UBC) when he 
uncovered that donations to Crowns offered better tax incentives than did registered charities 
(Bromley 1992; Interview no. 16, November 17, 2015). The finding was of considerable 
importance to the donor, who was interested in donating to PSE. One interviewee described 
Bromley as the “smart tax lawyer” (Interview no. 16, November 17, 2015) who found this tax 
incentive that was unique to Crown agencies, which by extension, universities and hospitals 
might also qualify for. Quickly, Bromley requested that the premier of British Columbia “pass 
legislation to create a Province of British Columbia Endowment Agency” (the precursor to the 
Crown foundation formulation of the policy) for universities and hospitals in the province 
(Bromley 1992, 8).  
The first university Crown foundation in Canada was created in British Columbia in 
1987 (Neely 1994, 34). Bromley acted not only as the main policy proponent, but also as an 
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architect in the background of the draft legislation. Still, since the first request to the province 
had been submitted in 1984, the policy process was protracted. But, according to Bromley, it 
was important to provide some distance between the “agent of the Crown,” i.e., the ministry 
responsible, and the donor; this position has since been criticized. As a result, it was 
recommended to establish parallel Crown foundations (Bromley 1992). The public, parallel 
foundation therefore, would also be an “agent of the Crown” (Bromley 1992, 7).  
It is important to note that at the same time, in order to provide all the necessary 
guarantees, Bromley submitted a request to the CRA to ensure that “British Columbia [would] 
receive approval from federal Finance and acquired an advance ruling from Revenue Canada 
that donations made to Crown foundations would be considered gifts to the Crown for tax 
purposes” (U of S, 1994). Subsequent to the endorsement by the BC cabinet committee 
responsible for exploring the opportunity, Bromley was asked to write a first draft of the 
proposed legislation (Bromley 1992).  
6.3 Policy Implementation: Inter-Provincial Policy Transfer 
The creation of university Crown foundations swept the country following the establishment of 
the UBC Crown foundation in 1987.9 In an article presented to the Canadian Association of 
Gift Planners (CAGP) in 1994, Sara P. Neely documented this pan-Canadian trend of 
establishing Crown foundations. Accompanying her summary is the data I retrieved directly 
from the governments of Québec, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland. Table 6-2 summarizes the 
findings and updates the data. 
Prior to the establishment of these Crown foundations for universities across the 
provinces in the late 1980s and 1990s, through the professional networks and contacts of 
Bromley, Minton, Sommers, and Neely (all influential experts on estate planning and 
philanthropy in the United States and Canada, as noted above) advocated for the policy agenda. 
A policy network was spurred on as a result of these efforts. According to the interviews 
conducted for this case, Minton was hosting educational sessions on planned giving, through 
the Council for the Advancement of Education (CASE) in the United States. Minton, who was 
                                               
 
9 Colleges in BC, as in other provinces, including Saskatchewan, were already agents of the Crown and therefore 
were not contemplated in the draft legislation (Bromley 1992; Interview no. 41, April 19, 2017). 
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from Seattle, also had connections in Vancouver. Individuals in Canada heard about these 
educational seminars and were interested in offering them for Canadians. The policy advocates 
shared information on the Crown foundation opportunity with others across the country 
between 1987 and 1993.  
Table 6-2. Establishment of university Crown foundations across Canada 
Province Year University Crown Foundation Structure 
British Columbia (BC) 1987 University Foundation Act – umbrella legislation 
allowed for Crown foundations for each university 
Alberta (AB) 1991 Universities Foundations Act – umbrella, allowed 
for Crown foundations for each university 
Saskatchewan (SK)  1994 Crown Foundations Act – established a foundation 
for each U of S and the University of Regina  
Manitoba (MB) 1993 The Manitoba Foundation Act – umbrella for any 
university or college established under MB 
legislation; also included hospitals and cultural 
organizations 
Ontario (ON) 1992 An Act Respecting University Foundations, 1992 – 
created Crown foundations for each ON university 
(Bill 68) 
Québec (QC) 1998 Enacted following the 1997 federal budget with the 
75% contribution limit10 
Nova Scotia (NS) 1993 University Foundations Act – umbrella, allowed for 
Crowns for each of NS’s 13 universities (although 
none were established) 
New Brunswick (NB) 1993 Higher Education Foundation Act – allowed for the 
establishment of Crowns for each university, 
college, and education institution 
PEI  
 
NA No legislation. 
Newfoundland (NF) 1994 Lobbied to establish a Crown for Memorial 
University of Newfoundland. Not completed. 
Sources: Neely 1994; Bromley 1992, 12; Sask. 1994; Minton and Somers 2016. 
 
                                               
 
10 What is also interesting, though unfortunate and likely coincidental, is that Québec’s university Crown 
foundations were established in 1997, after the 1996 announcement (discussed below) that levelled the playing 
field for this donation incentive. By 1997, additional restrictions on foundations had been enacted, thereby 
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A CASE three-day planned giving seminar was held in Banff in March 1990 to discuss the idea 
of establishing Crown foundations. As outlined in Table 6-2, the establishment of university 
Crowns across the provinces took off shortly thereafter. In each province, the nature of the 
legislation varied with respect to the structures of the governing boards, and how autonomous 
Crown foundations were vis-à-vis their provincial governments and the universities. 
Nevertheless, the purposes of the university foundations (like hospital foundations) in all the 
provinces were similar: “to solicit, receive, manage and distribute money and other property” 
in support of the education, research, and outreach missions of the organizations (Neely 1994, 
30). This is evidence of the growth of the foundation sector in Canada, which resulted from the 
pursuit of third sector policy actors’ agendas.  
The Banff conference noted above was sponsored by the Canadian Association of 
Educational Development Officers (now the Canadian Council for the Advancement of 
Education) and was attended by chief development officers and, in a few cases, directors of 
planned giving from across the country (Minton and Somers 2016, 5; Interview no. 41, April 
16, 2017). At the time, planned giving was a burgeoning professional field; it has since grown 
from 10 or so members in 1992 to approximately 1,300 members today. The Banff Centre 
conference was an opportunity to promote the Crown foundations policy, and it also offered a 
chance for collaboration within the foundation sector and for planned-giving professionals in 
Canada (Minton and Somers 2016). 
In 1992/93, this country-wide network of gift planners (i.e., fundraising professionals, 
estate and trust lawyers, bankers, trust officers, accountants, investment advisors, and sector 
advocates) began working together. As a result of these developments, the next case of network 
building in the sector was the creation of the CAGP in 1992. In 1994, Minton and Somers 
noted the transformation of the sector: 
In 1993, the newly formed Canadian Association of Gift Planners encouraged 
Lorna Somers and me to produce a basic reference to serve the growing 
                                               
 
eliminating the tax advantages that had until then been unique to foundations. In this, Québec lost an important 
opportunity. It is not clear whether Québec continued to pursue this policy agenda due to a lack of knowledge of 
the legislative changes or whether they knew, but they nevertheless pursued the policy agenda. Some thought that 
Crown foundations were still a good marketing tool for will and estate planning. Or perhaps the universities 
continued pursuit of this policy agenda is evidence of the incrementalism that is associated with 
institutionalization. 
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number of individuals and charities interested in planned giving. The result 
was the first edition of Planned Giving for Canadians, published in 1994. 
(2016, xix) 
The formalization of the planned giving policy network (through the creation of new umbrella 
organizations) in Canada occurred under the auspices of the CAGP (Bromely, 1993; Interview 
no. 38, September 9, 2016; Interview no. 41, April 17, 2017). This group continues to lead 
conversations with government regarding tax legislation for major and planned giving (Minton 
and Somers 2016, 9). The CAGP held its first annual conference in 1994. It was the first 
Canadian umbrella fundraising organization to include professions other than fundraisers (e.g., 
lawyers, financial advisors, estate planners, accountants) and included accountants or tax 
lawyers, even those from the private sector, which speaks to the development of the policy 
network. (The Association of Fundraising Professionals, by way of contrast, is only for 
fundraisers.) The nexus of these burgeoning policy networks was the Crown foundation policy 
agenda, in addition to other common interests and learning opportunities (Interview no. 41, 
April 19, 2017).  
 Before the policy was implemented in Saskatchewan in 1994, Somers and Minton had 
been spreading the word at their educational seminars and professional networks about the tax 
advantages of giving to universities through Crown foundations. Given that the professional 
fundraising sector was only then beginning to grow, it was a close-knit group of people who 
often shared success stories, lessons learned, and other opportunities with one another.11 
According to the interviews conducted for this case, the conversations between members of 
this policy network at the time focused on understanding and advocating for better tax 
incentives for giving.12 They were of a different nature than the conversations in the 
professional community today, where the focus is more broadly on understanding motivations 
for giving, not just tax incentives (Interview no. 35, Aug. 19, 2016; Interview no. 41, Apr. 
2017). Thus, through this policy network, and spurred by the Crown foundations, knowledge 
about the Crown foundation opportunity for universities spread across the provinces.  
                                               
 
11 This group eventually became a regional members’ association of the CAGP. 
12 This is different than the nature of the conversations in the professional community today, where the focus is 
now more on understanding motivations for giving, an interesting corollary to this research. (Interview no. 35, 
August 19, 2016; Interview no. 41, April 2017). 
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6.4 The University of Saskatchewan Crown Foundation  
The U of S established a parallel foundation in 1957; the university was not at that time 
considered a registered charity. In order for donors to receive the same tax benefits as they 
would with other charities, they could donate to the parallel foundation – the U of S Foundation 
– rather than the university proper. In the intervening period between the establishment of the 
U of S Foundation and the U of S Crown Foundation, however, the U of S became a registered 
charity. This followed the establishment of the 1966 legislation requiring the registration of 
charities in order to qualify for distributing tax receipts. This organization stayed intact until 
1996/97.  
Conversations with the government of Saskatchewan to establish a Crown foundation 
for the U of S began as early as 1992. Just a few individuals at the U of S and in the 
government of Saskatchewan can be identified as the key players in this example. One such 
individual suggested, that with regard to the process, that “it was motivated by the tax 
advantages” (Interview no. 35 August 30, 2016). The first of these was Director of 
Development (a term that means professional fundraising) at the U of S, who had come in 
contact with Somers through this informal network of planned giving professionals. The trusts 
officer at the U of S was a second key policy actor in this case. Both worked with a liaison in 
the province’s Ministry of Advanced Education. They worked together to see if there was any 
interest in pursuing the idea of establishing a Crown foundation for the university. Finally, in 
January 1994, then-president of the U of S, George Ivany, presented a request to the Board of 
Governors to approve in principle the establishment of a U of S–affiliated Crown foundation 
and to support management’s conversations with the government of Saskatchewan to do so. In 
the cases of both UBC and the U of S, the endorsement of the university presidents and the 
boards were required to move the policy proposals for Crown foundations forward with the 
provincial governments. 
The U of S’s board documents stated that the policy objective was to create foundations 
for each of Saskatchewan’s two universities, i.e., the U of S in Saskatoon and the University of 
Regina (U of R). However, interviews indicated that the policy idea was initially proposed just 
for the U of S. Apparently, once it got onto the policy agenda, the U of R, the province, or both 
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suggested that the legislation be pursued for both the U of S and the U of R (Interviews no. 35 
and 37, August 30 and September 5, 2016). It is possible that tensions between the two 
universities over base operating funding from the province had the effect of changing the scope 
of the policy. It would have been reasonable that both have equal opportunity to access to other 
potential revenue streams, such as philanthropic funds.  
The benefits to donors of donating through Crown foundations, as described to the U of S 
Board of Governors in the request to establish the U of S Crown foundation, was that it would 
help donors to “obtain immediate and considerable tax relief; make significant gifts to the 
university of their choice; maximize flexibility in their charitable giving; provide the donor or a 
loved one with recognition; [and] create, maintain or enhance those university programs which 
the donor supports” (CA Magazine 1993 quoted in U of S 1992). This reasoning was 
convincing and, in 1994, the University of Saskatchewan Foundation Act established the 
University of Saskatchewan’s Parallel Foundation as a Crown corporation of the Province of 
Saskatchewan (Act, 1998, chapter U-7, 3).  
 The U of S parallel foundation, like its Crown foundation, was governed separately 
from the university. Both were governed through a board of trustees made up of the Chief 
Justice of Saskatchewan, the university chancellor, president, and chair of the board, as well as 
the president of the U of S Alumni Association. The one difference between the two 
foundations was that the parallel foundation, established four decades earlier, also required 
three to five elected or appointed trustees (Saskatchewan 1957). The more limited board 
membership made the Crown foundation a more manageable organization in terms of being 
able to ensure that the gifts were directed according to the donors’ wishes, minimizing the 
potential for government interference. Unfortunately for these policy entrepreneurs, the Crown 
foundations policy was amended with the 1997 federal budget, levelling the playing field for 
all types of charitable organizations in Canada, except private foundations with respect to the 
capital gains tax exemption. 
6.5 Policy Evaluation 
Bromley anticipated that there might be increased scrutiny by the CRA on these new 
foundation types. In his 1993 article on this policy process in British Columbia, Bromley 
states, “It is important that Crown foundations be managed responsibly so that the privileges 
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which result from their creation will not be attacked and withdrawn by Revenue Canada” (14). 
Indeed, the 1997 Federal budget eliminated disparities between tax treatment of Crown 
foundations and other foundations. The budget indicated that the policy would: 
…adopt a common limit of 75% of net income for donations to all charities 
by individuals and corporations for the 1997 and subsequent taxation years – 
raising the limit for most charities from 50%, and lowering the limit for 
donations to the Crown and Crown foundations from 100%. With this 
proposal, all charities would be able to attract donations on a level playing 
field…. For donations to charities other than the Crown, these proposals 
would result in the limit being raised from 20% prior to the 1996 budget to 
75%. (Canada 1997, 112) 
It is interesting that in the same budget, the Liberal government also established a new federal 
Crown foundation, the CFI, with an investment of $3.15 billion to 2002. The following year, in 
the 1998 budget, the Millennium Scholarship Foundation was established with an endowment 
of $2.5 billion (Aucoin 2003; Minton and Somers 2016).  
 Other than inferring that the policy changes would “level the playing field” of tax 
incentives available to all charities, there were no official statements from the federal 
government regarding the rationale for the above-noted changes. Anecdotally, in referring back 
to the federal government’s 1996/97 stated policy objectives in the legislation for the capital 
gains tax exemption (as discussed in Chapter 5), the establishment of Crown foundations for 
universities both contradicted and complied with the Ministry of Finance’s policy directives on 
charitable tax structures. One stated expectation of the capital gains charitable tax incentive 
was that it would increase contributions to Canadian charities, but in an equitable way across 
both organizational types and across policy domains (e.g. health vs. education vs. poverty 
relief), which might have been a consideration for the Crown foundation policy too.  
 The second stated policy objective for the capital gains tax incentive, which might also 
have applied to the Crowns, was to increase major giving, i.e., entice fewer but larger capital 
donations. Within the structures of the Crown foundations, major giving was incentivized by 
the receipt of tax benefits for donating 100% of annual earned income. Unfortunately, the 
window of opportunity did not last. One of the interviewees stated: 
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Turns out, unfortunately for us, Paul Martin, a year or two after that changed 
the federal legislation and tax laws to give everybody the same breaks as a 
foundation so the thing we’d worked like seven years to create became 
useless two years later and we’d just begun to run gifts [through the Crown 
foundation]. (Interview no. 35 August 30, 2016) 
The Crown foundations would increase major gifts to universities. But at the same time, it gave 
PSEs an advantage over other types of charities, creating a sort of unfair competition in the 
philanthropic sector. In short, the proliferation of Crown foundations favoured hospitals and 
universities. In addition, because these policy domains are so heavily funded by government, 
such tax incentives would essentially allow lost tax revenues to be directed by donors, moving 
decision-making control away from the democratic locus of power, as well as from the federal 
government to the provincial governments. 
6.6 Analysis  
Crown foundations gave universities an advantage over other charitable organizations because 
they could attract more gifts from individuals and other donors through added tax advantages 
to prospective donors. It would help them to solicit more wills, bequests, and estates (it is a 
planned giving strategy, and the Crowns were a great marketing tool) (Minton and Somers 
2016). For instance, Crown foundations, as public foundations, are at “arm’s length” from 
government, and therefore from democratic processes (Aucoin 2003, 2). This gives them more 
flexibility in terms of advocating for particular positions that may not align with the views of 
the government of the day. As one interviewee noted, “That’s why people set up or give to 
foundations as opposed to directly to charities – [when at] arm’s length [then] we use existing 
resources, leverage existing resources, enhance existing resources to accomplish this new 
purpose or broader purpose” (Interview no. 41, April 30, 2016). This individual went on to 
indicate that the network of donors who advocated for these Crown foundations was well 
connected to local community in a way that (they believed) fostered better direction of major 
gifts.  
According to interviews conducted for this research (e.g. Interview no. 41, April 19, 
2017; Interview no. 17, November 17, 2014), policy transfer across the provinces led to a 
“tremendous influx of activity and dollars generated within the sector across the country” 
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(Interview no. 17, November 17, 2014). In Saskatchewan, though, the progress toward 
implementation was protracted by provincial politics. This stymied the potential for 
exponential philanthropic revenue growth for the U of S. In 1991, the Progressive Conservative 
government under Premier Grant Devine was defeated by Roy Romanow’s NDP. According to 
one interview: 
It took six or seven years to actually get it [a Crown foundation for the U of 
S] done because it took an act of the Legislature… It turned into a giant 
mess because I had it 90% of the way through the Conservative government 
and all my connections there, and then Devine lost the election and the NDP 
took over. Everything that was in the works that related to the previous 
government was basically trashed… it took two or three years to convince 
the NDP that it wasn’t some kind of capitalist “whatever.” (Interview no. 
41, April 19, 2017) 
This points to the importance of the political decision-makers in moving policy agendas 
forward related to foundations, even when they are low-risk public Crown foundations, enacted 
only through provincial legislation. A review of the timing of these changes (albeit only at a 
high-level level) provides another indication of the relation between regular election cycles and 
policy innovations for foundations.  
 It is also documented that the BC case took at least three or four years from idea to 
implementation (Bromley 1997). The protracted timelines in Saskatchewan and BC are 
indications of just how much commitment is required to push such an innovative policy idea to 
implementation. In addition to convincing the provincial governments of the value these new 
foundations could bring, in hindsight, the policy advocates might also have paid heed to the 
federal view on the proliferation of provincial Crown foundations for universities and hospitals, 
which involved a devolution of power over the policies and investment in both the education 
and health sectors: from the federal government to the provinces, and from the provinces and 
universities, to private donors. This is important because “provincial governments continue to 
be the largest source of government revenue for non-profits by a wide margin, due to their 
jurisdictional responsibility for health, social welfare, and education” (Elson 2016, 16). Before 
Crown foundations could really have had an impact, one interviewee commented, “the role of 
the Crown foundation might well have been very extensive and very important if it had 
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continued” (Interview no. 41, April 19, 2017). Establishing the correlation between legislation 
and this “influx of dollars” and the timelines from idea to implementation across the other 
seven provinces requires further research and is beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
Alongside the establishment of Crown foundations for university, between 1990 and 
1994, other umbrella organizations also emerged around gift planning in the education sector. 
The policy entrepreneurs in the small policy networks noted above realized the potential 
advantages of being more organized. For example, Bromley published an article sharing 
information about the potential of Crown foundations for fundraising in 1992. Neely, then a 
practising professional fundraiser at the Vancouver Hospital Foundation, wrote an article about 
this Canadian policy trend in 1992, which she presented to the CAGP in 1993 and published in 
Philanthropist in 1994. In 1994, Somers and Minton also published the first edition of Planned 
Giving for Canadians. Figure 6-2 below illustrates the high-level connections between efforts 
with the third sector in support of or in alignment with the Crown foundation policy agenda for 
universities.  
 
Figure 6-2. Establishment of PSE Crown foundations’ and regulations for foundations 
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The Crown foundation tax incentive opportunity that was first enacted in 1987 at UBC, and 
was followed by inter-provincial policy transfer. The policy transfer was spurred by the 
informal, personal connections between the growing cadres of tax experts for charitable giving, 
and planned giving professionals at universities and other third-sector organizations, especially 
hospitals (where there were also Crown foundations). The data indicates that in just under a 
decade, 12 more developments in the third sector took place alongside these important policy 
changes for Crown foundations. These growth in the number of university Crown foundations 
were happening in parallel from 1987 to 1994. Then, after the 1997 election when the Liberal 
Party took power, swift shifts were made to the federal policies relating to Crown foundations 
– including the introduction of the lifetime limit of 75%, which lowered the limit for Crowns 
from 100% and increased the limit for other charities, including non-Crown public foundations 
and private foundations, from 20% to 75%, thereby leveling the playing field.  
With respect to the policy entrepreneurship, while the PSE sector benefitted from this 
tax incentive for a short while (1987–1997), the policy environment for foundations changed in 
Canada. The idea of Crown foundations for universities was a potential solution to an ever-
present, systemic policy “problem” – resource scarcity. The “deep and widespread resource 
crunch” in the third sector (Reed 2003, 5) was compounded by the fact that, in the 1996/97 
federal budget, the government was also “offloading” public services, creating increased 
demand for philanthropic dollars, i.e., alternative revenue sources for charities. Crown 
foundations were nonetheless provincial entities that created tax expenditures at the federal 
level, but they left decision authority and influence in the hands of foundation donors and 
directors at the provincial level (Howard 1999; Laforest 2009; Phillips 2003). 
With respect to the increasing policy engagement, the small network of individuals who 
were participants in this Crown foundation policy agenda eventually formed a chapter of the 
Canadian Association of Gift Planners (CAGP) (Interview no. 41, April 19, 2017). In addition, 
a Canadian arm of the Council for the Advancement of Education (CAE) was also established 
(Interview no. 35, August 19, 2016; Minton, Somers 2016, 6). The establishment of umbrella 
organizations (like the establishment of the PFC in the capital gains tax exemption for publicly 
listed securities, discussed in Chapter 5) thus enabled the policy transfer of the Crown 
foundation tax incentive across the provinces. The effect was also to further institutionalize the 
foundation sector in Canada and the third sector advocates for such organizations. 
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The 1998 legislation extended additional tax advantages to other foundations (non-
Crowns) by raising the lifetime contribution limits to 75%. The government of Canada 
eliminated the unique advantage provided to universities and hospitals through Crown 
foundations by lowering the previous lifetime limit from 100% to 75%. Thereafter, all 
registered charities, including Crowns, qualified for tax benefits for donating up to 75% of 
annual earned income, including private foundations. Interestingly, the capital gains tax 
exemption (discussed in Chapter 5) was also introduced as a pilot project in the 1997 federal 
budget. 
6.7 Discussion  
The policy entrepreneurship in this case was closely connected to the expansion of the third 
sector in Canada in the early 1990s. Evidence is available on the policy transfer of this 
innovative agenda across the provinces. Evidence is lacking, however, with respect to the 
actual policy outcomes or outputs that result from the creation of Crown foundations for 
universities across nine provinces. Anecdotally, and according to the interviews conducted for 
this research, the combination of the capital gains tax exemption for donations of publicly 
listed securities, along with the proliferation of Crown foundations for universities led to an 
inequitable distribution of donations geographically and by charitable cause. Hospitals have 
been registered as charities in Canada since 1973. There were 263 registered hospital 
foundations in 2016.  
As of 2017, there are no foundations registered with the CRA for Canada’s provincial 
universities. Several exist at the following organizations: University of Victoria (first registered 
PSE foundation in 1967); Royal University Hospital in Saskatoon (1983); Mount Royal 
University (1991); Vancouver Island University (1994); York University (2002); and, the 
University of Winnipeg (2002). In total, there are 26 foundations associated with universities in 
Canada, six of which are noted above. The idea of establishing Crown foundations for 
provincial universities in order to access the incentive for the Crown was novel, although short-
lived. The window of opportunity really only lasted for seven years, from 1987–1994. In 1997, 
the federal government levelled the playing field by enacting the 75%-of-lifetime-earnings 
rule.  
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The policy entrepreneurs were effective in this case at setting the policy agenda and 
transferring it from province to province in a relatively short period of time. In addition to the 
provincial university Crown foundations, 19 of the 26 (currently registered) PSE foundations 
were established between 1981 and 2005. However, like the case presented in Chapter 5, they 
did not have their eye on the ball. While the policy community was focused on a single tax 
incentive, the federal government changed the playing field. This is further illustrated by the 
immediate establishment of the Millennium Scholarship Foundation in 1998.  
In that respect, this case has some similarities with the exclusion of private foundations 
from the capital gains tax exemption for the donation of publicly listed securities, presented in 
Chapter 5. In the case of Crown foundations, in 1996/97, the policy entrepreneurs for the 
Crown foundation policy agenda were surprised that the tax advantage for these organizations 
was suppressed in the federal budget. In spite of assurances Bromley had received in 1988, the 
federal Department of Finance made significant changes to the fundraising landscape in the 
Income Tax Act in 1996/97, eliminating the advantage that would have otherwise continued to 
have been bestowed on hospitals and universities across the provinces.  
The potential for a corresponding increase in foundations’ policy influence in this case 
was accordingly observed. Conversations between colleagues turned into conferences, 
conferences turned into articles, articles turned into books, and informal networks and 
connections turned into professional umbrella organizations. The development of the sector 
was in its infancy when Crown foundations were being established across the provinces. This 
policy transfer sparked the CAGP and the CASE chapter for western Canada. The CAGP was 
started in 1993 and held their first annual conference in 1994. Neely (1995) and Bromley 
(1993) wrote articles and made conference presentations about the Crown foundation 
opportunity. Somers and Minton brought together the learnings from a number of such 
occasions, along with their research and Minton’s US experience into the first edition of the 
Guide to Planned Giving for Canadians (2016).  
These efforts quickly moved from a focus on tax planning to a broader focus on the 
professionalization and development of individuals working in the foundation and 
philanthropic sectors. For the first time, there was an umbrella organization representing more 
than a single related profession in the CAGP. However, the legitimacy of the foundation sector, 
and apprehensions about their driving motive prompted blowback from the federal 
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government. These findings are consistent with observations about the role of the government 
vis-à-vis the third sector in Canada: 
Critics have also observed that the charitable tax credit transfers decision-
making power over what services are funded from elected governments to 
individual philanthropists, and especially to a small group of very wealthy 
donors. Besides raising concerns about democratic control of public services, 
this system is likely to result in disparate levels of funding to different 
services depending, not on the needs of citizens, but on the preferences and 
wealth of those who make charitable gifts. (Philipps, L. 2003, 916) 
The rollback to 75% and equalization to all charities for the lifetime giving tax incentives 
effectively put the decision power for spending in these fields back at the federal level. In spite 
of the setback when the Crown foundation opportunity was quashed, the collaborative efforts 
persisted.  
Relations between the third sector and the state had previously been loosely coupled 
and multilateral. In this case, evidence of these relations now becoming increasingly 
formalized, hierarchical, and unilateral is presented. Previous research has pointed to the closed 
nature of policy processes in the federal Department of Finance (Elson 2011; Interviews no. 18, 
19, 22, 25, 26; McRae 2011; Phillips and Smith 2011. See also Appendices A and B). These 
were reaffirmed in the research conducted for this case study, and through the interviews with 
policy participants in this case. This reflects the ongoing assumptions about state-third sector 
subordinate relationships that have underpinned developments in the sector since the Carter 
Commission (1969).  
6.8 Summary  
In this case, Crown foundations were an instrument of policy entrepreneurship coming from 
the third sector. The objective of the proliferation of these foundations was to increase financial 
resources available to universities. This policy entrepreneurship that was mobilized again 
around a tax incentive for foundations further precipitated organizational networking across the 
country. Informal personal and professional networks created channels to share information 
about this potential tax incentive for universities. In short order, those networks became formal 
umbrella organizations: the CAGP and the Canadian Council for the Advancement and Support 
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of Education (CASE). This is similar to the establishment of the PFC in the case study 
presented in Chapter 5.  
 The establishment of the university Crown foundations from 1987 until 1998 is a clear 
example of the opportunities and constraints facing foundations’ policy engagement in 
Canadian public policy. It illustrates potential limitations to the influence of foundations for 
social policy, and PSE policy especially. The policy transfer was driven at the provincial level 
and by third sector policy entrepreneurs, right up until the 1997 federal budget. At that point, 
the federal government’s policy agenda superseded these efforts. The provinces can 
incorporate as many Crown foundations as they like, but the federal Department of Finance can 
also eliminate the advantage of doing so with the stroke of a pen by amending the Income Tax 
Act. It did just that in 1997 with extension of the 75% maximum lifetime contributions to all 
charities, not just the Crown, and lowered the 100% advantage of donating to the Crown down 
to 75% (while in that same federal budget establishing a new federal Crown foundation). 
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7 HEALTH-RESEARCH POLICY 
The Gates Foundation and the government of Canada entered into MOUs for the Canadian 
HIV Vaccine Initiative (CHVI) in 2006 and 2010. When the Gates Foundations’ predetermined 
vaccine policy solution failed in 2008, it generated a good deal of controversy for the partners. 
In spite of the failure of the vaccine trials, the government and the foundation revised and 
renewed the MOU in 2010. The MOU continued through to 2014, with funding ending in 
2016. In this official partnership, the policy entrepreneurs facilitated the expansion of the role 
of the Gates Foundation in Canadian public policy for HIV/AIDS research. The Gates 
Foundation and its advocates encouraged the establishment the Canadian version (CHVI) of 
the international scientific policy network, the Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise (GHVE). This 
was an extraordinary formal partnership between an international foundation and the Canadian 
government.13 Post hoc assessment might conclude, however, that improved collaboration, and 
research contributions were the main results of partnership, whereas the original goals were 
much more ambitious (Canada PHAC, 2017).  
Looking generally at the role of foundations in public-policy making, one would think 
that an organization with as much influence and clout as the Gates Foundation, with as many 
resources at its disposal, would have been more successful than this case indicates. However, 
the policy direction changed course mid-track, and the CHVI pilot-scale facility project for 
HIV/AIDS vaccine manufacturing was cancelled in 2009/10. I selected this case because it 
seemed inconsistent with what I had been reading about the extent of the Gates Foundation’s 
influence for health-research policy internationally (Brison 2005; Ashton 2011; Rushton and 
Williams 2011; Ulbert 2011; Hewa and Stapleton 2005).  
As with the previous two cases examined in this dissertation, the research and readings 
that I consulted for this case showed that public discourse on the role of the Gates Foundation 
was polarized. People were either in favour of amplified roles for foundations in policy 
                                               
 
13 Other records of extraordinary donations from large, private American foundations include several reported in 
the early 20th century. In 1951, the Massey Commission reported that the Carnegie Corporation had invested 
approximately $7.4 million in Canada since 1911. The Rockefeller Foundation had invested $11.8 million since 
1914. These contributions were in keeping with the Carnegie Corporation’s mission to “facilitate the diffusion of 
knowledge,” and the Rockefeller Foundation’s mission to “promote the well-being of mankind” (Brison 2005, 
19). These early efforts reportedly implied “how the industrialists and their advisers extended their power and 
influence beyond the world of production and into the broader realm of social and cultural relations of civil 
society” – in other words, institutionalization (20). 
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making, or suspicious of their motivations and/or their legitimacy (e.g., Elson 2011; Lindquist 
1989; Stewart 1996; Stone and Garnett 1998). For this case in particular, the rhetoric about 
how much impact the Gates Foundation had on government policy processes internationally, 
with the World Health Organization (WHO), and in other counties, suggested that a similar 
level of influence might be expected when it came to its policy role in Canada.  
 When considering the policy role of foundations, this is an important example of a 
partnership between the largest philanthropic foundation in the world and the government of 
Canada to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic, “one of the most complex policy problems of our 
time” (Esparza 2000). Among other obstacles, the partnership seemed to have prevailed when 
it was renewed in 2010 despite the cancellation of the capital project. However, in 2014, to the 
chagrin of the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) contributors, the CHVI partnership 
between the Gates Foundation and the Canadian government was up not renewed again. A final 
report was completed in October 2016 and released in 2017 (Canada 2016).  
7.1 Background: The Gates Foundation  
The William H. Gates foundation was established in 1994 by Bill Gates, Sr. It evolved into the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in 1999 (and is referred to in this text as the Gates 
Foundation), through a merger with Bill Gates, Jr.’s Gates Learning Foundation (Ashton 2011; 
McCoy and McGoey 2011). The foundation is the largest in the world, and as of 2006 (when 
the partnership with the Canadian government was instituted), it had approximately $60 billion 
in assets. As of 2016, the foundation had $40 billion in assets. This amount includes the 
donation of the majority of Warren Buffet’s wealth to the Bill and Melinda Gates Trust, which 
is the holding body for the charitable foundation (KPMG 2017). The Gates Foundation has two 
areas of funding priority: the global health program and a US education program. In keeping 
with the foundation’s priorities, about 20–25% of the foundation’s annual spending goes 
toward global health funding. Much of this capital is provided through intermediary 
arrangements such as global health partnerships or public private partnerships (Ashton 2011). 
Since its establishment, the Gates Foundation has been an influential policy actor in 
international development, especially in global health (Ulbert 2011). This foundation has an 
international policy role, which it spurs on by partnering with international government 
organizations (IGO) like the WHO, or directly with countries, especially in low and middle-
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income countries, to fund health projects and programs. The Gates Foundation is both lauded 
and criticized for its public policy role. McCoy et al. (2009) capture the legitimacy challenges 
faced by the foundation in an article entitled, “What Has the Gates Foundation Done for Global 
Health?” The authors reviewed over 1,000 global health grants the Gates Foundation awarded 
between 1998 and 2007, concluding it should take measures “to improve systems of [self-] 
governance; to be more transparent in decision-making; to devise a grant plan that better 
reflects the global burden of disease; to invest more in low-income country recipients;” and to 
actively engage allies of the foundation in decision-making (McCoy and McGoey 2011). 
Proponents of the Gates Foundation responded that the foundation represented a relevant and 
effective way to address global health problems; that its work was altruistic; that the foundation 
was a private organization operating in a capitalist economy and should be allowed a certain 
amount of autonomy; and, (contrary to McCoy et al., among others) that the foundation is 
apolitical in its approach (McCoy and McGoey 2011; Ulbert 2011).  
7.2 Policy Agenda 
In 2003, an article co-authored by leaders in the scientific policy community appeared in 
Science. It argued strongly in favour of increasing international vaccine manufacturing capacity 
to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic (Klausner et al. 2003)14. Shortly thereafter, in 2004, the 
first author of the article and then-president of Global Health at the Gates Foundation, Dr. 
Richard Klaussner, spearheaded the creation of the Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise (GHVE, 
pronounced “GHVE”). In 2003, GHVE developed its first Scientific Strategic Plan and 
published it in 2005. The plan was authored by the coordinating committee of GHVE and was 
created with the collaboration of policy makers, funders, advocates, and over 400 scientists and 
researchers. The primary objective of the strategy was to “accelerate HIV vaccine research and 
development” (GHVE 2005). The plan identified vaccine-manufacturing capacity as a critical 
                                               
 
14 The specific policy entrepreneurs within the scientific policy community for this case included R.D. Klauser 
and H. Gayle of the Gates Foundation; A.S. Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Infection Disease, and 
other staff of that organization; S. Berkley with the IAVI; José Esparza of the WHO HIV Vaccine Initiative; 
researchers from the University of Washington, Duke University, University of Oxford, University of Natal, and 
University of Lausanne; as well as representatives from the Vaccine Advocacy Coalition, the Centres for Disease 
Control and Prevention, VaxGen Inc., the Agence Nationale de Recherches sur le SIDA (ANRS), UNAIDS, and 
the National Centre for AIDS/STD Prevention. 
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roadblock to the research and development of an HIV vaccine. The article represented 
consensus in the policy network. 
 The Gates Foundation has advocated for and funded a number of initiatives dedicated to 
the development of an HIV vaccine, including the Collaboration for AIDS Vaccine Discovery, 
International AIDS Vaccine Initiative (IAVI), and GHVE. The Gates Foundation released its 
HIV strategy in 2005 as part of its broader global strategy directed at immunization programs. 
This HIV strategy stated that vaccine development was a priority. Bill Gates stated, “Even a 
modestly efficacious first-generation vaccine could have a profound effect on the AIDS 
pandemic. It is estimated that a vaccine with just 50 per cent efficacy provided to 30 per cent of 
the population would prevent an estimated 17 million infections over 15 years and result in 
substantial financial savings” (Gates 2009). In this 2005 strategy, the Gates Foundation 
confirmed its commitment to implementing the recommendations of GHVE’s scientific 
strategic plan.  
Around the same time, in 2004, the Canadian federal government established the 
Federal Initiative to Address HIV/AIDS, an intra-government umbrella organization made up 
of all of the government-funded programs dealing with the disease. The Canadian Public 
Health Association (CPHA), with funding from the PHAC and in consultation with federal, 
provincial, and non-governmental stakeholders concerned with the policy issue, authored a 
document entitled, Leading Together: Canada Takes Action on HIV/AIDS (2005–2010) 
(CPHA 2013). The initiative articulated the policy goal of “contributing to the global effort to 
reduce the spread of HIV/AIDS” (PHAC 2011b). The initiative focused on domestic responses 
to HIV and solidified the government’s intention of developing a strategy to prevent infection 
and ensure access to care, both of which were described as critical elements in fighting 
HIV/AIDS. The Canadian strategy contrasted the narrower vaccine-development focus of the 
international scientific policy community and the Gates Foundation. At the same time as the 
international scientific community for HIV/AIDs research was building consensus regarding 
the need for increased vaccine manufacturing capacity, the Gates Foundation was also 
developing its scientific strategic plan. All of these are evidence of network building (i.e., the 
creation of the GHVE, CHVE, and CHVI). 
 In 2006, the Gates Foundation and the government of Canada formed a partnership, 
formalized through an MOU, called the Canadian HIV Vaccine Initiative (CHVI) with the 
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stated purpose of constructing a vaccine manufacturing facility. The project was budgeted at 
$139 million, with the Gates Foundation pledging $28 million and the government of Canada 
bringing $85 million in new contributions. The requirement for “new” government investment 
was a stipulation from the Gates Foundation. The key events, as depicted in Figure 7-3, below, 
provide a sense of the evolution of the partnership between the Canadian government and the 
Gates Foundation from 2006 to 2010.  
 
Figure 7-3. HIV/AIDS vaccine developments and the Gates Foundation case study  
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WHO HIV Vaccine Initiative15 led the partnership in its plan for the construction of an 
affordable and accessible international vaccine-manufacturing facility, bringing together 
members of the international scientific policy community, key researchers and influencers 
within the federal government, and prominent scientists and representatives of the Gates 
Foundation. Key policy entrepreneurs included R.D. Klauser, and H. Gayle of the Gates 
Foundation; A.S. Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Infectious Disease, and other staff 
of that organization; S. Berkley with the IAVI; researchers from the University of Washington, 
Duke University, University of Oxford, University of Natal, and University of Lausanne; as 
well as representatives from the Vaccine Advocacy Coalition, the Centres for Disease Control 
and Prevention, VaxGen Inc., the Agence Nationale de Recherches sur le SIDA (ANRS), 
UNAIDS, and the National Centre for AIDS/STD Prevention.  
 Despite a change in the Canadian government in January 2006 (from a Liberal minority 
government under Paul Martin to a Conservative minority government under Stephen Harper), 
the pursuit of this official partnership continued. In spring/summer 2006, a critical and 
confidential meeting to discuss the CHVI partnership took place between the Gates Foundation 
and Canadian ministers (Interview no.1, November 20, 2014). Participants from various 
stakeholder groups refer to this critical event as “the infamous meeting.” It was followed 
immediately by the equally infamous “photo op” between Prime Minister Harper and Bill 
Gates when the partnership was announced at the 2006 International AIDS Summit Hosted in 
Toronto (Interviews no. 4 & 5, May 1 & 15, 2015). That is, a press conference was held to 
make the public announcement about the MOU between the Gates Foundation and the 
Canadian government. Gates and Harper’s announcement was held at a high-profile media 
event organized during the conference and was greeted with resounding cheers and positive 
press. 
                                               
 
15 Understanding the phases of research development in the scientific community is an important backdrop for this 
case study on foundation engagement in public policy. According to Esparza, there are three distinct phases in the 
history of HIV/AIDS vaccine development. In 1983, HIV was discovered as the cause of AIDS, at which point a 
majority of the scientific community began focusing on vaccine development. The three phases of vaccine 
development Esparza describes are aimed at (1) the simulation of neutralizing antibodies (1988–2003); (2) 
building cell immunity (1995–2007); and (3) uncovering new or combination approaches to HIV and AIDS 
(2007–present) (Esparza 2013, 1).  
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At the time of the announcement, the partnership positioned Canada internationally as a 
model participant in the global fight against HIV and AIDS (CHVI June 29, 2009). This 2006 
MOU established the Canadian HIV Vaccine Initiative (CHVI, pronounced “chive”), which 
was seen as Canada’s contribution to the GHVE (Canada 2006). The CHVI brought together 
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Industry Canada, PHAC, the 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), and Health Canada. The stated objective of the 
2006 agreement was to “contribute to the achievement of the GHVI’s Scientific Strategic Plan 
and to accelerate the development of HIV vaccines” (Canada 2010). The policy agenda was 
supported by the general momentum and optimism for finding a viable vaccine for HIV/AIDS 
in the scientific community at the time (Canada 2006). The partners made combined 
commitments of $139 million toward the CHVI.16 The original intent was for the government 
to allocate funding to approved projects over a period of five years; the timeframe was 
extended to nine years due to delays in the application process (Goss Gilroy 2010).  
7.4  Policy Environment  
After the 2006 MOU was signed, initial consultations took place within CHVI’s participating 
departments, including CIDA, PHAC, CIHR, and Industry Canada. The purpose of the 
consultations was to establish the official evaluation process for choosing a non-profit 
organization to build and operate the CHVI pilot-scale vaccine manufacturing facility. Once 
the facility was up and running, the vaccines produced were to be earmarked for low-to-
middle-income countries (LMICs), where the burden of HIV/AIDS was the greatest. The 
facility was supposed to ensure global access to a vaccine, develop partnerships, situate 
operating funding, attract in-kind support, and enter into agreements with select HIV vaccine 
developers (CHVI Jan 28, 2009). 
                                               
 
16 The government's contribution was $26 million in existing funding in the priority areas of discovery and 
research capacity, production capacity, policy and regulation, and community and social dimensions (PHAC 
funding was re-dedicated to the project). Additional funding totalling $85 million was also provided (MOU 2006), 
$28 million of which was the Gates Foundation’s contribution. In total, $88 million of CHVI funding was to be 
directed to the establishment of the pilot scale facility (SCH 2010).  
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 However, also in 2006, the results of the Thai RV144 trials17 were announced to be 
unsatisfactory.18 Preliminary results showed that using the vaccine was not only ineffective, but 
that it might, in fact, increase the risk of contracting HIV. In addition, in 2007, the Merck 
STEP19 vaccine trials failed. The failure of the Thai and STEP trials “came as a surprise to the 
scientific community who had high expectations” (Esparza 2013, 9). These developments led 
to a paradigm shift in the international scientific community regarding the approach to HIV 
vaccine development (Cairns 2009; Esparza 2013, 1), and led researchers back to the drawing 
board.  
In February 2008, navigating between the pharmaceutical industry, the HIV/AIDS 
scientific community, the international policy community (GHVE), and the Canadian policy 
community (CHVI), the Gates Foundation brought forward this discouraging information to 
the CHVI partners (Interview no. 6, May 12, 2015). Later that month, the cancellation of the 
pilot-scale HIV vaccine development facility was announced, but not without raising 
significant controversy. The failure of these vaccine trials meant there was no trial-ready HIV 
vaccine and, as a result, ensuring immediate manufacturing capacity was less urgent. In March 
2008, a scientific summit that included the Canadian government and representatives of the 
CHVI was held in Mexico City. Participants called for a “return to basic science” (Esparza 
2013, 10). 
 Though the status of a potential vaccine was uncertain and the mood in the scientific 
community was dampened the partners proceeded in accordance with the terms of the MOU. In 
the spring of 2008, the CHVI secretariat announced its call for letters of intent from qualified 
NPOs. They received five letters of intent; four were accepted. After primary evaluation, four 
                                               
 
17 “RV144 trial [Thai trials] reported some degree of efficacy in September 2009, the first vaccine efficacy trial 
ever to do so. However, the result hovered tantalisingly close to the boundary of statistical insignificance, and 
exactly how the vaccine exerted its effect is still the subject of study. RV144 compared vaccine to placebo in 
16,402 adults, starting in 2003 and ending in 2006. It recruited adults aged 18 to 30 in two provinces of Thailand 
with high HIV prevalence but did not specifically target people at high risk of HIV infection” (Cairns, circa 2009). 
18 In 2009, the Gates Foundation presented new information to the Canadian government about a Thai CT vaccine 
called RV144. At first, RV144 clinical trials had been found to offer 31% protection among study participants, 
thereby offering “new hope in the search for an HIV vaccine,” according to the Gates Foundation (CHVI Sept. 28, 
2009). 
19 The trials had begun in 2004, when 3,000 participants were recruited to conduct the “proof-of-concept” vaccine 
study. Participants had been recruited from Canada, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Peru, Puerto Rico, 
and the United States, all countries where the particular strain of HIV that the vaccine was intended to effect was 
prevalent (Esparza 2013, 9). 
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NPOs were invited to submit applications “consisting of comprehensive business plans to 
design, build and operate a pilot-scale HIV vaccine manufacturing facility” (Oliver Wyman 
2009). These included Trent University, Laval University, University of Western Ontario, and 
the International Centre for Infectious Diseases in Winnipeg (Elliott 2010). An expert panel 
conducted an evaluation of each application, as well as in-person meetings with 
representatives. 
7.5 Policy Re-evaluation: Cancellation of the CHVI Pilot-Scale Facility  
In March 2009, one year after this major setback and just before the review of applications got 
underway, the Gates Foundation hired Oliver Wyman, a private management consulting firm 
with specialized industry knowledge in vaccine manufacturing, to review international global 
vaccine manufacturing capacity and demand. The goal of the review was to conduct “an 
analysis of the current vaccine manufacturing capacity in North America and Europe as part of 
their internal review process” (Canada January 31, 2011). As indicated above, the review was 
initiated in the context of “several important developments since 2003/04 with regard to HIV 
vaccine pipeline and platform technologies” (Oliver Wyman 2009), including the policy 
community’s return to “basic science.” 
Over the spring and summer of 2009, the Gates Foundation and the Canadian 
government considered new developments in HIV/AIDS vaccine research, including the results 
of the independent reviews each had commissioned. In June 2009, the Gates Foundation shared 
the preliminary results of the Oliver Wyman report with PHAC. The results of the report were 
released to all of the CHVI participants, including the offices of the Minister of Industry and 
the Minister of International Cooperation, in July 2009 (Canada, 2011), five months before the 
official review process of applications to construct the facility concluded in January 2010.  
In August 2009, the PHAC received the preliminary findings of the mid-term 
evaluation they had commissioned earlier in the year from Goss Gilroy, a consulting firm with 
expertise in program evaluation (Goss Gilroy 2009). The report marked a turning point in the 
fate of the CHVI pilot-scale facility. The evaluation found that the CHVE and CHVI continued 
to be aligned with the original intent of the GHVE, an intent that would enhance Canada’s 
ability to increase global capacity for HIV vaccine production. However, the report also noted 
that the external policy environment had changed and that, given the failed trials and the 
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development of additional capacity in the public and private sectors, there was no longer a 
supply issue for vaccine manufacturing.  
Other challenges noted in the report included implementation progress, collaboration 
with internal and external stakeholders, governance, and performance measurements. The 
report also found disproportionate effort placed on the physical facility in comparison to that 
directed to other objectives of the partnership. In particular, it appeared that the regulatory 
environment for vaccine trials in Canada was being ignored. The Goss Gilroy report 
recommended (1) not proceeding with the construction of pilot-scale manufacturing facility (as 
opposed to the solicitation of letters of interest) and (2) re-examining the “nature and scope” of 
the initiative and of the partnership with the Gates Foundation (Goss Gilroy 2009). 
7.6 Policy Re-Formulation  
From April 2008 to January 2010, the government was searching for an NPO to construct and 
operate the CHVI facility. The CHVI secretariat (whose members were also part of the federal 
initiative described above) was responsible for oversight of the process to select the builders 
and operators of the facility, for the partnership with the Gates Foundation, and for the policy 
agenda.  
By December 2008, the selection process for the construction and operation of the 
CHVI pilot-scale facility was four months behind schedule. At that point, the Gates Foundation 
noticed that its government partners might be on a path to nowhere, since the failed trials 
indicated that a viable vaccine may not even be ready. Thus, there was no longer a need to 
increase manufacturing capacity. The foundation indicated to their government partners that if 
a successful candidate had not been named by September 2009, the funding would be deferred 
to 2010 (CHVI June 1, 2009). In December 2009, individuals the CHVI had selected to serve 
as external reviewers were contacted. (Their names are protected under federal privacy 
legislation.) Reviews of the applications took place between April 2009 and January 2010. 
By December 2009, the official selection process had concluded, the successful 
applicants had presumably been selected, and announcements had been drafted. On January 22, 
2010, the selection announcements based on the four NPO applications were erroneously 
posted on the PHAC website. The Minister of Health’s office (the Minister of Health at that 
time was Leona Aglukkaq) shifted to damage-control mode and the notice was quickly pulled, 
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but not until after it had been read by at least one of the applicants. That same day, “Canada’s 
Chief Public Health Officer notified the [four invited] applicants” by telephone and told them 
that they had not been not successful (HESA April 4, 2011). On February 19, 2010, the Gates 
Foundation and the government officially announced that they were not proceeding with the 
pilot-scale HIV vaccine facility (Canada Jan. 31, 2011). The MOU remained intact, but the 
policy solution had changed.  
Five months after the CHVI pilot-scale facility was cancelled, at the 18th Annual 
International AIDS Conference in Vienna in July 2010, the Gates Foundation and the 
government of Canada renewed their partnership for the CHVI, maintaining their commitment 
to the recommendations of the GHVE’s Scientific Strategic Plan and asserting that “the 
primary objective of the collaboration is to accelerate the development of a safe and effective 
HIV vaccine,” thereby expanding the scope of the partnership beyond the construction of the 
vaccine development facility (GHVE 2005). The secondary objective (the previous policy 
solution) was to increase global vaccine manufacturing capacity. The tertiary objective, to 
focus on the prevention of mother-to-child transition of HIV in LMICs, was a priority for the 
Harper government and was added to the agreement (MOU 2010, 3).  
After significant discussion in the House of Commons, “The Standing Committee on 
Health passed a motion [in March 2011] to conduct a review of the Government of Canada’s 
decision to cancel the establishment of a pilot-scale HIV Vaccine Manufacturing Facility” 
(HESA 2011). The review recommended that any future HIV research and capital initiatives 
should be conducted through the arm’s-length tri-agency granting councils; that independent 
assessments of HIV initiatives should continue to be part of the regular process; and that a 
broader policy scope should be considered in future HIV/AIDS programs and partnerships 
(Parliament of Canada April 14, 2010). This signalled emerging doubts about the policy role of 
the Gates Foundation for HIV/AIDS vaccine research in Canada, despite the MOU. It is also 
evidence of the contested legitimacy of the partnership and of the foundation’s role, despite the 
more open nature of the partnership with the Canadian government facilitated through PHAC. 
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7.7 Analysis  
Opportunities for policy change with respect to the CHVI pilot-scale vaccine manufacturing 
facility presented themselves between 2004 and 2014. The first MOU included the construction 
of a CHVI pilot-scale facility, but that was removed in the second MOU. This case sheds light 
on the strategies employed by this entrepreneurial private philanthropic foundation: scientific 
philanthropy and organizational collaboration. The focus on the development of a vaccine for 
HIV/AIDS is an example of a “scientific” approach to philanthropy. Today, the more popular 
terms are public–private partnership, venture philanthropy, and philanthropreneurship. The 
strategy is to use donations to leverage other private, third sector, or public investments. It also 
applies private-sector operating principles to public problems such as specialization. This 
partnership focused on a narrow area for development: vaccines. Key to the successful 
partnership (if not the development of a vaccine) was the entrenchment of the relationships 
between policy participants internationally, between the Gates Foundation (in the US) and the 
GHVE (in Canada), and within Canada through the CHVI. However, in Canada, the shifting 
policy agenda, questions of effectiveness horizontally across federal departments, and public 
and policy scrutiny of the motives of both the political and philanthropic players detracted from 
the legitimization of partnership.  
 In 2008/09, the failures of two clinical trials, and the results of the two independent 
reviews of the CHVI project led to waning agreement in the policy community about the 
potential for an HIV/AIDS vaccine that would be ready for production, and the need for a 
manufacturing facility. The failures of the two human trials caused the policy community to re-
examine its original forecasts of future demand for vaccine manufacturing that had been 
identified in the 2003 Science article. Still, finding an HIV/AIDS vaccine remained a key 
policy priority for the Gates Foundation. The foundation sought professional and expert 
opinions on the demand for the facility and brought that information back to the government in 
order to inform the next stages of the partnership. On the other hand, in an example of path 
dependency (Collier and Collier 2002; see Glossary), or of limited communication between 
different department agencies, the federal government continued to review applications for the 
construction of the facility (CBC News, April 11, 2011).  
 By 2010, political issues and changes in the economic climate compounded the 
challenges facing the pilot scale facility project. As evidenced in the reviews conducted by the 
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Gates Foundation, the government of Canada, and the Standing Committee on Health, and in 
the interviews conducted for this research, many speculated that the vaccine failures may not 
have been the real reason for the cancellation of the facility. It was suggested that the 
cancellation may have been tied to a political decision on the part of the Conservative 
government, or a privately interested economic decision on the part of the Gates Foundation 
(Interview no. 4, May 1, 2015). It was rumoured that the application from the University of 
Manitoba’s International Centre for Vaccines and Infectious Diseases was the preferred 
candidate for the construction of the pilot scale facility. However, this was misaligned with the 
Conservative Party’s political interests. 
 Perhaps coincidentally, but certainly fodder for the rumour mill, was the July 2009 
announcement of an investment partnership between the Canadian government ($40 million), 
GlaxoSmithKline ($30 million), and the Québec government ($20 million) for “the expansion 
and updating of vaccine filling capacity at the [Sainte]-Foy plant” in the federal riding of 
Louis-Hébert (Canada 2012, 1), a riding in which Harper’s Conservative minority government 
lost a seat in 2008 to the Bloc Québécois. The ministers of health and industry were present for 
the joint announcement of the funding. Both were also ministers (along with the minister of 
international cooperation) responsible for the CHVI partnership with the Gates Foundation.20 
The Gates Foundation’s director of global health at the time was Dr. Tachi Yamada, a former 
executive at GlaxoSmithKline, owner of the plant at Sainte-Foy since 2005 (Muller 2009). 
Around the same time, the Gates Foundation was also under scrutiny for appointing the former 
chairman of research and development at GlaxoSmithKline to the post in 2006 (Gates 
Foundation 2006; Wilhelm 2010).  
 In June 2009, the Gates Foundation had warned the government that if the contractor 
for the construction of the HIV manufacturing facility was not selected by September 2009, 
funding would be deferred to 2010 (knowing that the government was at least four months 
behind schedule). On July 16, 2009, the expansion of the federal government’s vaccine 
manufacturing policy interest from HIV/AIDS vaccines to “consideration [of] the potential 
demand related to other diseases affecting the developing world, such as Ebola” was 
questioned in the minutes of a joint teleconference meeting between the CHVI Inter-
                                               
 
20 Either way, the NDP won the seat from the Bloc Québécois in the Louis-Hébert riding in 2011.  
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Department Steering Committee (facility) and the Gates Foundation. The minutes also note that 
although the scope of the Oliver Wyman report “was limited to an analysis of the supply and 
demand specifically for HIV vaccines, the nature of the existing supply identified during the 
review revealed the capacity to address a wide range of potential vaccine products” (Canada 
2009a, 1). On July 30, 2009, the minutes of the CHVI steering committee, which includes the 
ministers (or their delegates) of health, industry, and international cooperation, indicated that 
they “agreed with the Oliver Wyman report’s findings [that] demonstrate a reduced need for 
the CHVI facility (due to increased private sector supply of pilot scale manufacturing capacity 
since 2006” (Canada 2009a, 1). In July 2009, the ministers of health, industry, economic 
development, and employment announced an enhanced and increased vaccine manufacturing 
capacity at Sainte-Foy. Preparation for the announcement of the cancellation of the HIV-
specific facility began as early as September 2009. The minutes of the CHVI steering 
committee note: 
Public disclosure of the rationale not to proceed with the facility: the GoC 
[Government of Canada] suggested that the communication focus on the 
BMGF [the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation] assessment that the supply of 
pilot scale manufacturing now exists, that the GoC is in agreement with this 
assessment, and that both parties will continue to work together to renew the 
partnership. (Canada 2009a, 2) 
The timing of this Sainte-Foy announcement thus coincided with the announcement of the 
cancellation of the CHVI pilot scale vaccine manufacturing facility in January 2010. 
Furthermore, the shift in policy to a maternal health focus was more in line with the social 
conservative platform of the party. The federal interest in the maternal health policy agenda is 
evidenced in that the Gates Foundation provided no funding support for this part of the 
program.  
Others suggested it was a financial decision on the part of the Gates Foundation, which at 
that time was divesting from some of its projects following the recent global economic 
downturn and associated decreases in investment returns (Interview no.7, May 14, 2014). 
Based on information arising from first-hand interviews with participants in the case, there 
were five possible reasons for the cancellation of the CHVI pilot-scale vaccine manufacturing 
facility (Interviews no. 1-7, 2014-15). Although an interesting and contentious question for 
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participants, the purpose of this study is not to determine the “real” reason that the facility was 
cancelled. Rather, it is to understand the policy role of the Gates Foundation. The consideration 
of the potential rationale for the cancellation of the pilot-scale facility are still relevant, though, 
as they suggest differing views on the motivations of both the government and the foundation, 
which according to the secondary research, would have had implications for the perceptions of 
legitimacy and accountability of both actors: 
1) The first of the possible reasons is that the decision was a rational outcome of the policy 
process. Official communications from the partners stated that none of the applicants to 
construct the facility had been successful in meeting the pre-existing criteria.  
2) Private actors in the policy community, in particular the pharmaceutical industry, 
influenced the decision. This is supported by the fact that the Gates Foundation’s 
external review indicated there was sufficient private-sector vaccine-manufacturing 
capacity in North America and Europe to meet the international demand, which implied 
increasing reliance on the private sector rather than the public sector for vaccine 
manufacturing.  
3) The cancellation was a political decision by the Conservative government. The politics 
of procurement and the political leadership in the Canadian HIV/AIDS research policy 
community were not aligned with the objectives of the governing Conservative party, 
which had political-electoral objectives in Sainte-Foy. For instance, Terry Duguid, 
Liberal MP in Winnipeg South, the founding president of the International Centre for 
Vaccine and Infectious Diseases, led one of the applications to construct the facility. 
Two factors could have been at play: potentially, the cancellation was a decision on the 
part of the Conservative government to move toward maternal health as the policy 
agenda, which was more fitting with their political ideology; or the successful applicant 
was not the one from the particular riding where the Party needed to capture more votes 
(Interview no.4, May 1, 2015).  
4) The cancellation might have just been a mutual decision based on the importance of 
innovation in finding an HIV vaccine, and the appropriate policy direction. The policy 
solution changed and the support from the international scientific community waned.  
5) A final consideration is that cancellation was an economic decision on the part of the 
Gates Foundation. Endowments for all North American foundations “took a hit” 
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following the economic crash of 2008, including the Gates Foundation (Interview no.9, 
Sept. 3, 2015), which at that time was divesting from some of its projects (Interview 
no.7, May 14, 2014).  
I had originally anticipated that the policy role of the Gates Foundation in this case must have 
been a result of the particularities of the Canadian institutional context or politics. The 
research, and especially the interviews, revealed five other possibilities to explain why the 
CHVI vaccine development pilot-scale facility project was cancelled. What I actually found 
was that there were a few highly influential policy entrepreneurs in the third sector who 
leveraged the expertise of the scientific community and the weight of the Gates Foundation in 
order to move their agendas forward. The Gates Foundation and influential actors representing 
it also acted as policy entrepreneurs to access the government agenda. In this case, however, 
the policy network, including the foundation, the policy entrepreneurs, and private sector’s 
approach to innovation for the public good was moving more quickly than the science. This 
presented both a challenge and an opportunity for the foundation’s potential contributions to 
policy solutions.  
As noted, Canada’s Chief Public Health Officer announced the cancellation of the CHVI 
pilot-scale facility in January 2010. Critics referred to the timing of reports from external 
consultants (which were commissioned while the official application process was still 
underway) when discussing the cancelling of the facility, suggesting that ultimately the 
cancellation was a bilateral decision by both the Gates Foundation and the government of 
Canada (Interview no. 7, May 14, 2014; Interview 2, November 20, 2014). The evidence 
indicates the role of the Gates Foundation in this decision was more than just advisory. In 
contrast to the policy roles and engagement of foundations in the decision processes for the 
capital gains tax exemption and Crown foundations, the Gates Foundation was a decision-
making partner in the cancellation of the CHVI pilot-scale vaccine manufacturing facility 
(Interview no. 2, November 11, 2014).  
7.8 Discussion  
While governments may not be the locus of innovative policy solutions, partnership with 
foundations can generate better policy solutions, and more expedient, timely decision-making 
(Rich 2004). Government partnership with foundations may bring new ideas to the table and 
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make government more efficient and innovative than it would be on its own. In the Gates 
Foundation case, the foundation brought forward developments in the policy community in a 
timely way, and then prevented them from going forward when it was no longer in their own 
economic interests or the government’s political interest (the motives, as discussed, are 
debatable). It is difficult to assess whether the Government of Canada would have spent scarce 
public and private resources on such a narrow policy focus without the involvement of the 
Gates Foundation or an ostensibly simple solution to such a complex international public health 
issue as an HIV/AIDS vaccine that was not yet ready for production. Even so, the partnership 
between the government and the Gates Foundation continued to 2014.21  
 Working off of the strength of its pre-existing partnerships with the scientific 
community for HIV/AIDS research, the Gates Foundation brought forward the policy solution 
of a vaccine and mobilized international government insider contacts for the signing of the 
MOU. This role is typical of a policy entrepreneur according to Kingdon’s definition (1995). 
By bringing forward developments in the policy community in a timely way, the foundation 
brought an innovative policy solution to the government agenda, to which the government 
agreed (likely given the financial incentive and positive reputational implications).  
 This case study on the Gates Foundation-led CHVI initiative was a unique partnership 
with the Canadian government. It is one of the highest-profile private foundation donations and 
formal partnerships in recent history. The last US philanthropic-public partnerships in Canada 
that received as much attention were the Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie contributions to 
the arts and letters from 1910 to 1951 (Brison 2005), to which several parallels can be drawn.  
 From the outset, the Gates Foundation was highly influential in this policy process. 
Like Carnegie and Rockefeller, it has the resources and connections to influence policy 
development across the globe and in Canada (as noted in Chapter 2). The Gates Foundation has 
formal partnerships and funding arrangements with many IGOs and NGOs, and it contributes 
more financially more than the WHO’s annual budget in a given year. It is also a highly 
complex organization. As of 2016, the Gates Foundation has about 1,400 employees and $40.3 
billion in assets, and has awarded grants of $4.6 billion. In addition to playing a major role in 
                                               
 
21 The CHVI MOU was under renegotiation in 2015, and at the time of the writing of this chapter had not been 
renewed. A final report was completed in October 2016 (Canada 2016).  
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the US, the foundation also supports grantees in over 100 other countries. It has offices in 
Seattle, Delhi, Beijing, London, and three in Africa. The Gates Foundation’s strategy has had a 
coherent emphasis on global health (especially vaccines) and education in the US for many 
years (Gates Foundation 2017).  
 Just as the industrial-age Rockefeller Foundation and Carnegie Corporation were 
established with the endowments from their benefactors, the Gates Foundation was established 
by a wealthy Silicon Valley benefactor in 2000. The legitimacy of all three of these 
foundation’s contributions to the public good in Canada have been contested. The challenge to 
their place in Canadian public policy is rooted in questions about their motivations, the 
(hegemonic or imperialist) scale of their impact, and their undemocratic processes and 
structures. For their contributions to society, they have been viewed as elite, although 
sometimes reputable, organizations. While their high-flying connections attract attention, they 
also highlight conflicts of interest. For instance, both former heads of the Gates Foundation’s 
Global Health Program, Klausner and Yamada, went on to pursue venture capitalist 
opportunities following their tenures at the Gates Foundation (2002–2005 and 2006–2011, 
respectively) (Wilhelm, 2010). Both came under scrutiny for their connections with the 
pharmaceutical industry prior to and during their terms at the Gates Foundation.  
 The focus of the Gates Foundation on HIV/AIDS vaccine development is an example of 
the influence of the “venture philanthropy” strategy for giving (Bishop and Green 2010; 
Fleishman 2007; Pallotta 2008; Lagemann 1992, 1999; Arnove 1980, 2007). This is akin to the 
Rockefeller and Carnegie’s “scientific” approaches to philanthropy. Some private sector 
philanthropic enthusiasts suggest that applying market principles to public problems will make 
the third sector more successful. However, the application of market principles assumes we are 
operating in a situation of market failure, as opposed to government failure or voluntary failure. 
In addition, a good deal of research (Olstrom 1990; Olson 1970) highlights the issues of 
applying rational choice theory, even theories of bounded rationality, to problems of collective 
choice/goods. In philanthropy and foundation circles, the trendy new terms are now “venture 
philanthropy” and “philanthrocapitalism” (Bishop and Green 2008). It appears to have had 
limited impact on the fight against HIV/AIDS in terms of both time and private and public 
money invested. That said, the Gates Foundation’s approach was backed by the scientific 
policy community as represented in the GHVE.  
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 In hindsight, perhaps the government of Canada and its private philanthropic partner, 
the Gates Foundation, should have waited until a successful vaccine had actually been 
developed before jumping in. If not for the involvement of the Gates Foundation, the 
government might not have allocated public resources to HIV/AIDS vaccine development. 
However, “An investment of $139M (federal government – $111M from existing resources; 
the Gates Foundation – $28M) was made to support CHVI activities since 2007, a small 
investment considering that, in 2009, the total costs of HIV in Canada (loss of quality of life, 
health care costs, and productivity loss) was estimated at just over $4 billion”
 
(Canada 2016, 
2). So perhaps in the grand scheme of things, it was worth the risk. On the other hand, there are 
domestic policy problems for HIV/AIDS in Canada, where these tax dollars might have been 
put to use. For instance, there was no mention of Indigenous peoples as a specific target 
population in either of the MOUs or the final report of the initiative, whereas the Indigenous 
population in Canada now has HIV infection rates comparable to those in the developing world 
(Canada 2014; CATIE 2014; Bellegarde 2016).  
Figure 7-4 below plots the major milestones for the development of the early GHVI 
developments from 2000 to 2003, which led to the CHVI partnership between the government 
of Canada and the Gates Foundation from 2006 to 2014. The number of instances by year is 
indicated in the blue stacked bars. Federal elections are marked with red lines. Between 1997 
and 2006, the Liberals were in office; then from 2006 to 2015, the Conservative party was in 
office; in 2015, the Liberals were elected. Prior to 2006, these trends took place primarily in the 
international policy community. Around the time of the 2006 election, policy changes in 
Canada started to track closely with elections. Although less significant, and despite the 
setbacks, in 2010 the MOU was renewed but with a very different mandate just before the 2011 
election.  
 138 
Figure 7-4. Federal elections and the development of the CHVI partnerships (2000–2017) 
 
 
In this case, the innovative ideas developed in the policy community, brought forward 
by the Gates Foundation, were adopted as public policy solutions by government. From a 
public policy perspective, this is a key development for understanding the roles of major 
foundations in generating ideas that inform public policy. Whereas government may not be the 
generator of innovative policy solutions, partnership with the third sector (and perhaps also 
with the private sector) can perhaps generate better policy solutions and more expedient 
decision-making (Rich 2004). Government partnership with private organizations may bring 
new ideas to the table and make government more efficient and innovative than it would be on 
its own.  
7.9 Summary 
The case laid out a unique example of a foundation (currently the largest in the world) in a 
partnership with the Government of Canada. Health-research policy appeared to be a more 
open policy network than fiscal policy as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. It appeared that 
government, academics, and foundation actors were all influencing the policy agenda in 
meaningful ways. The policy entrepreneurs facilitated the formation of a Canadian iteration of 
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an international policy network in the GHVI. In partnership with the Canadian government, the 
Gates Foundation established the CHVI. This is evidence of network building, in that informal, 
personal, and professional networks of the Gates Foundation were essentially reconstituted as a 
Canadian version of an IGO for the same policy issue.  
 In terms of its significance for third-sector studies, the case reveals an important 
opportunity for and the potential impact (currently underestimated and possibly undervalued 
given the extent of negative attention regarding the policy roles of private foundations in 
Canada) of private philanthropic foundations’ engagement in public policy making in Canada. 
In 2010, after the failure of the vaccine trials (obviously precipitated by external events beyond 
the foundation’s control), the MOU was renewed, but with a focus on maternal health and 
HIV/AIDS. This policy approach was more palatable to the Conservative party and is more 
appealing to a socially conservative voter base in a minority government.  
 Similarly, to the cases presented in Chapters 5 and 6, and when considering both the 
political and economic interests of the partners, the shift in policy direction around election 
cycles resulted in the waning influence of the foundation at implementation. The policy change 
from a capital project to a focus on basic research, project management, and improved 
collaboration would prove more challenging in terms of demonstrating the impact of this 
partnership in a transparent and meaningful way to the public.  
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8 CONCLUSION 
The overarching purpose of this study was to bring better understanding of the roles of 
foundations in Canadian public policy, but beyond just handing out grants to non-profit 
organizations. Three cases were selected where there was evidence that foundations were 
engaged in federal or provincial government policy processes. The theoretical framework for 
this research was rooted in the policy-cycles framework and the concept of policy 
entrepreneurs borrowed from Kingdon (1995), which was applied across the whole policy 
cycle. There are striking similarities between the foundations’ roles in policy entrepreneurship 
and approaches to influencing public policy across these cases. In spite of differences in 
organizational size, policy domain, organizational type, or timeframe, each case revealed 
similar strategies aimed at increasing the perceived legitimacy of foundations as policy actors 
in Canada, both with the federal and provincial governments.  
Based on the literature review I conducted and the conceptual framework I developed, I 
anticipated that foundations could be described using Kingdon’s (1995) concept of policy 
entrepreneurs, and that it would help to elucidate these foundations’ relative influence. Pairing 
this concept with the policy-cycles framework, rather than limiting the analysis to the agenda-
setting stage as per Kingdon’s original multiple streams framework, allowed for a more 
comprehensive and systematic analysis of how foundations affected government decisions at 
different stages of the policy process.  
As anticipated, foundations, in their roles as policy entrepreneurs, were effective at 
accessing government agendas. In fact, based solely on the comparative literature across the 
different policy domains, and considering their varying organizational types, these foundations 
employed more similar strategies than might have been expected. Consistent with the 
theoretical and comparative research, the third sector and the public sector both shaped and 
constrained the institutional contexts within which foundations operated in these cases. One 
interview participant commented on the particularities of the Canadian institutional framework 
for foundations: 
First of all, the constitutional framework in which we’re operating is different 
than that in the United States. The government can’t legislate anything that’s 
not reasonably connected to the imposition of an income tax. Now that 
arguably means some of the things on the books now are unconstitutional, but 
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hopefully they keep that in mind (or they did in the past when they drafted 
some of these rules). So, whereas you might see in another context the 
foundations lobbying to say “look, we need to be able to engage in political 
activities,” as an example, my personal belief and those of others is that the 
federal government has no power to legislate on a charity’s involvement in 
political activities. (Interview no. 20, June 6, 2015) 
The Canadian approach to philanthropy is different in its ethos from that of the US. Under the 
Carter Commission, the commitment to the statist vision of ensuring the welfare of Canadians 
was reaffirmed. This is in stark contrast to the American approach to philanthropy, which 
focuses on the limited role of the state, the value-add of pluralism, scientific philanthropy, 
strategic philanthropy, philanthrocapitalism, and the latest trend – venture philanthropy. What 
was unanticipated in these three cases was that their institutional environments were also 
shaped by the participating foundations.  
Based on the empirical research on policy making in Canada, it also was reasonable to 
expect that the nature of the Canadian democratic system might give rise to coalition building 
in the foundation sector in order to access the highly centralized decision processes, in 
particular, the closed policy regimes where the Ministry of Finance was concerned (Aucoin 
2006; Philipps, L. date; Philips, J. 2000; Philips S.D., 2009; Elson, 2010b). A noteworthy 
finding was the extent of coalition-building strategy and how consistently it was employed by 
these foundations and across policy domains.  
 An analysis of these insights and the outstanding issues are presented and considered in 
this chapter. The chapter is organized into the following sections: a discussion of my findings 
on foundations for each of the research questions; an analysis of my observations through the 
conceptual framework of entrepreneurship and the activity of foundations across the policy 
cycle; policy recommendations; and a summary of the research limitations and potential areas 
for future research.  
8.1 Discussion  
The research questions presented in Chapter 1 guided the examination of the strategies of these 
policy actors, their influence, and their effectiveness vis-à-vis government and their stated 
policy objectives in relation to these cases. I was interested in the makeup of Canadian 
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foundations; why they were engaged in these policy processes; which resources and strategies 
they employed in these cases; how receptive governments were to their influence on policy 
making; and what factors enabled or hampered their success.  
8.2 Who are Canadian foundations? 
As discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2, Canadian foundations are either public or 
private foundations, and are registered charities under the Income Tax Act. There are various 
and diverse organizational forms of foundations: Crown, parallel, public, private, corporate, 
family, and Indigenous foundations. As one foundation executive was careful to point out, 
“The first thing to remember is when you’ve met one foundation you’ve met one foundation. 
There is no consistency across foundations either in terms of their interest or in terms of their 
methods of operation” (Interview no. 15, April 23, 2015). The unique organizational forms of 
foundations in Canada include the university and hospital Crown foundations (compared to the 
more common parallel foundation), Indigenous foundations, and federal Crown foundations 
such as the Millennium Scholarship Foundation (Aucoin 2006). While not covered in detail, 
the latter two are noteworthy areas for future research, especially considering that federal 
Crown foundations have come under considerable scrutiny.  
 When they have been involved in policy making in Canada, both historically and 
currently, foundations have occupied contentious and contested roles in Canada as they have in 
other western developed nations (Prewitt 2006). Comparative studies of foundations note that 
“moral legitimacy is often interlinked with political legitimacy” (Anheier and Daly 2006, 61; 
note this study excludes Canada). This was affirmed in my research. The sentiment was evident 
in the comments of those interviewed. For example, one participant stated:  
 A lot of the people who are the wealthiest people in the world are wealthy 
not because they’re awesome people, but perhaps they’re wealthy because 
they are not such awesome people. I guess that’s the cynical part of it but 
the positive part of it is that there are also huge numbers of people in the 
world who are really absolutely devoted their lives and their efforts to make 
massive differences with people, and you meet those people as well and 
those are the people that inspire you to the end, amazingly creative people 
who work. (2015 interview anonymous statement) 
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This tension presents a challenge for foundations in their roles as policy actors, as perceptions 
can be reality for some. This is important because foundations are spending more of their time 
on professionalization, communication, and networking. They report on inputs in order to 
grapple with perceptions of limited democratic legitimacy, and lack of transparency and 
accountability. Meanwhile, it is difficult to assess the outcomes of their policy engagement 
efforts.  
As this dissertation has shown, foundations are both policy entrepreneurs and political 
organizations. They wield influence and power, are well connected in policy communities, and 
have resources (money, time, and energy). As one interviewee noted, “foundations have a lot 
of power and they can do a lot of things” (Interview no. 9, September 3, 2015). However, it 
does not follow that foundations are, or could even strive to be, apolitical. It would not be 
possible for foundations to contribute to the social good, either as operating foundations, grant-
makers, or innovators, if the expectation was that there would not be any political implications 
or objectives related to their efforts. Moreover, one of their deliberate strategies is to leverage 
their investments with government. Another interviewee noted: 
We are really small as compared to government and what governments can 
do, but we are trying to play a catalytic role in partnerships and bringing 
spotlights to their end, areas that are neglected or underfunded, or not seen 
as high priority, where it should be. And that is really where it works. 
(Anonymous interview, 2015) 
Efforts at improving the social good are inevitably political efforts. They presume that current 
structures create disparities in social outcomes and positions. The act of foundations investing 
money into social causes (at their discretion) is also inherently political, and is the source of 
some of their legitimacy and accountability challenges, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. Yet, 
governments are also responsible for setting the parameters within which third-sector 
organizations like foundations work.  
8.3 Why did these foundations engage in policy processes? 
It appeared from the research, including the interviews, that foundations’ engagement in these 
cases was motivated by their desire to contribute to the social good. For instance, one 
foundation executive commented that: 
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“It’s a play of continuous leveraging to scale up our program and momentum, 
but also bring people under the umbrella for they all feel like they are working 
together on something that’s really large and meaningful. It’s more than just 
through the resources and the money, it gives people a sense of purpose or a 
feeling that they are part of this movement, this momentum.” (Interview no. 
27, August 30, 2016) 
However, that is not to say that this was reflective of the outside perception of their motives. In 
each of the cases, interviewees point to other possible motivations, as follows: 
• With respect to the Gates Foundation: “You have to remember the genesis of the 
foundation. The Gates Foundation was created at a time when Microsoft was 
[under legal scrutiny]. The foundation was created really as a communication 
network to change public opinion of the Gates [family] and Microsoft” 
(anonymous interview, 2015).  
• Regarding the Crown foundations case, a tax advisor noted, “If you give to this 
agency it qualifies for 100% claim limit or contribution limit. So, you can claim 
much more of your gift and shelter much more of your taxes. In ’96, what 
happened was the government said “Hmm, this is getting kind of out of hand” 
(Interview no. 16, Nov. 14, 2017)? The Department of Finance and the Charities 
Directorate of the CRA are highly suspicious of tax “shelters”. Any that have been 
investigated have had the donation receipts rescinded (Canada 2017).  
• Regarding the capital gains tax: “Essentially, in the United States, for decades, its 
gifts of appreciated capital property are exempt from capital gains taxes and 
appreciated capital property includes three main assets, one is listed securities 
listed in the stock exchange, another is private company shares and the third one 
is real estate, commercial real estate… And so all three are exempt in the United 
States but in Canada it’s just gifts of listed securities that are exempt and the 
reason it’s restricted to listed securities is because as it concerned about valuation 
abuse with gifts of private company shares real estate.” (Interview no. 25, March 
6, 2015)  
In each of these cases, there two motivations of the foundations could reasonably be drawn. 
The first would be altruistic. The second, which entails jumping to a conclusion (albeit one 
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based on historical experience), is that foundations were motivated to change the regulatory 
environment for themselves for personal or corporate gain. Therefore, these policy efforts of 
foundations directed at changing the tax incentives for giving, and those particular to 
foundations, might have actually reinforced the widely discussed (if not widely held) 
perception that foundations are simply tax shelters for the rich (in other words, vehicles for tax 
fraud) (McQuaig 1987).   
8.4 Foundation strategies 
Policy entrepreneurship was evident in foundations’ efforts in all of the cases considered in this 
dissertation. More than just funders of NPOs or operating foundations, the foundation sector 
contributed in real and meaningful ways to the policy processes for these cases. For the most 
part, foundations used standard lobbying techniques to bring their policy ideas to the fore. 
There was interesting similarity between their approaches to policy engagement in spite of 
differences in organizational size, policy domain, resources available, or level of government. 
In addition, though, each case study presented in this dissertation pointed to growth of different 
kinds of organizations in the foundation sector over about a 30-year period from 1983 to 2017.  
 While this strategy was successful for gaining access to policy agendas, it was less so 
for policy implementation, evaluation, and reformulation. The efforts of policy reformulation 
were protracted by 10 years; the provincial university Crown foundation agenda was 
essentially quashed by the federal government shortly after implementation across nine 
provinces; and, it is not clear what the policy outcomes of the Gates Foundation partnership 
with the federal government for the CHVI were, other than resulting in some published 
research and improving collaboration between stakeholders and governments, costing over 
$100 million over about 10 years.  
Examples of different forms of organizational developments came up in offhand 
comments in the interviews. For example, in an unrelated interview about the PSE sector and 
the Crown foundations initiatives, the individual noted in regard to the capital gains tax 
exemption: “The association [the CAGP] started in 1992/93. The first conference was in 1994, 
[but] the publicly listed securities initiative, all of that led to a tremendous influx of activity and 
dollars generated within the sector and across the country” (Interview no. 41, April 17, 2017). 
These strategies were common knowledge amongst the policy participants but unbeknownst to 
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me as a researcher. The policy participant was referring to the case presented in Chapter 6, but 
did not have any direct connection to it, only knowledge of the changes that it provoked. As 
such, the capital gains tax exemption case (Chapter 5) and the Crowns case (Chapter 6) provide 
evidence of the types of policy engagement strategies used by policy entrepreneurs in the third 
sector in Canada. While I knew about the existence of the PFC and the CAGP, there had been 
no previous public documentation regarding the inceptions of these organizations being 
connected directly to the pursuit of those policies.  
8.5 How Receptive are Governments? 
Foundations are not representative of a citizenry or electorate (that doesn’t mean that the 
boards of foundations don’t vote on decisions, though). An interviewee stated: 
The government has a tremendous amount of control over the types of 
charities that exist, their capacity to organize funds and their capacity to 
do work. So…while the government has definitely been influenced by 
the foundations, charity on the other hand can be negatively influenced 
by government’s use of their power to act with charity. (Anonymous 
interview, 2015) 
Thus, there is an inherent tension both the public discourse and in the literature about the 
appropriate roles of foundations in public policy. Roelofs (2003) suggests that, despite the 
progressive role of foundations, they are perceived to “have a depoliticizing effect, one that 
preserves the hegemony of neoliberal institutions” (quoted in Fazekas 2004). Lagemann (1999) 
similarly suggests that foundations are instruments for governments to achieve their political 
objectives. 
 Furthermore, there was evidence of conflicting policy preferences at the federal and 
provincial levels of governments, which either undercut or supported the foundations’ efforts, 
depending on the case – a key insight regarding the place of federal and inter-provincial 
relations for foundations’ participation in policy processes. That said, the federal policy 
directions prevailed at implementation or reformulation in every case due to the power of the 
purse in the Income Tax Act and the reinforcement (not necessarily authority) of that 
responsibility exercised through the CRA. One policy entrepreneur shared a key lesson for 
engaging with government on policy: 
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I’ve learned in the process that it’s essential to get the support of all members 
of Parliament. The minister of finance and the prime minister ultimately make 
the decision, and only do so if they really have the support of the caucus. To 
get the support of members of Parliament – members of Parliament listen to 
people in their constituency. (Interview no. 25, March 3, 2015) 
This strategy also enabled policy efforts to survive changes in government in many instances 
(although not recently in the case of the proposal for the extension of the capital gains tax 
incentive to the donation of private capital). In addition, ministers listen to their staff when it 
comes to the appropriate level of engagement or consultation with outside stakeholders on any 
given issue, so policy entrepreneurs also learned to navigate the inner workings of provincial 
and federal governments, building relationships with the public service.  
 The Ministry of Finance and the CRA are key players in these cases, and acted 
primarily in the role of gatekeepers to foundations’ involvement in public policy processes in 
Canada. Following the regulatory reforms in the late 1990s, the agencies’ roles were 
strengthened. A federal public employee explained, “When we did the charities regulatory 
reform, of course, the policy function for all of this really sits with the Department of Finance. 
The CRA is their administrative arm, but there’s a lot of small ‘p’ policy that happens in that 
space” (Interview no. 22, May 14, 2015). The CRA’s main role was to bring the appropriate 
levels of revenue into the federal coffers in order to resource the government’s priorities, and to 
patrol for abuses. This is inconsistent with a mandate to provide tax incentives in order to 
increase philanthropic donations for the benefit of the public. Moreover, these indirect 
expenses delegate policy power either to the provinces, e.g. through the university Crown 
foundations, or even to the donors. Therefore, there is a heightened emphasis on not losing 
control of these policies through excessive tax expenses. Such an approach is consistent with 
the values enshrined in the Carter Commission, in that the public and social good are the 
responsibility of government. The receptivity of the other ministries like health and innovation 
was one of collaboration and partnership. This treatment is not unique to foundations (Aucoin 
2006; Phillips 2009). 
 148 
8.6 What are the Barriers and Enablers? 
Coherence, connections, and persistence were key for foundations’ engagement in Canadian 
public policy. Foundations increasingly built policy networks to push their agendas forward, 
built umbrella organizations, and persisted until governments adopted their specific policy 
preferences. However, it appeared as though the very strategies that made foundations 
successful in accessing government agendas for these purposes brought only negligible value at 
the implementation stages, and inadvertently prompted enhancement of oversights and 
regulations for foundations. 
 The CRA has parallel policy mandates: it is responsible for the regulation and oversight 
of foundations, as well as for developing the incentive structures for charitable giving in the 
Income Tax Act. In the first two case studies presented, foundations’ strategies were aimed at 
very specific policies in the Income Tax Act that would enhance their fundraising capacity. 
Foundations’ narrow policy focus on sections of Income Tax Act seemed to undermine their 
ability to see the bigger picture. While it accepted specific policy proposals from foundations, 
the CRA also increased reporting requirements and other restrictions on foundations, without 
foundations’ meaningful engagement in those policy discussions at the agenda-setting stage.  
 In her study of foundations, Lagemann postulates that the professionalization of 
foundations has actually decreased their effectiveness. They are increasingly bureaucratized 
amidst pressures to demonstrate their legitimacy, and improve their transparency and 
accountability to the public and to government. It takes too much time and effort to simply 
establish their legitimacy. In each case considered herein, there was considerable focus on 
building up new organization in order to assert foundations’ legitimacy in the policy domains. 
In the Gates case in particular, there was significant investment in the professional 
communications planning. For example, there was a media release, a speech, and a photo op at 
the annual HIV/AIDS conference in Toronto during the month that Canada was hosting the G8 
summit. But these media efforts tend to focus on inputs rather than outcomes. They touted the 
fact that the investment from the Canadian government was $111 million, and $28 million from 
the Gates Foundation, for a total of $139 million. This is only a minor investment in light of the 
fact that in 2014, according to the WHO, 37 million people were living with HIV, and 26 
million of those people living in sub-Saharan Africa. The final report, however, was quietly 
posted on the PHAC website. 
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 In each of these cases, laser focus on a single policy solution diverted the attention of 
these tightknit policy networks away from the macro level changes taking place nationally, 
even internationally. In the tax case, the whole regulatory regime for foundations was 
overhauled whilst they were lobbying for private foundations to be included as qualified 
recipients. In the PSE case, while university and provincial government policy entrepreneurs 
were pursuing the establishment of Crown foundations for provincial universities, the federal 
government changed the rules. In the Gates Foundation case, while the partners were focused 
on constructing a vaccine-manufacturing facility, promising scientific developments took a few 
steps backward.  
8.7 Analysis: Policy Cycles and Entrepreneurs 
Even before I undertook this research on foundations, it was almost self-evident that they could 
be described as policy entrepreneurs. Therefore, I had originally planned to focus on policy 
agendas as an appropriate framework for the study of foundations’ policy roles in Canada. 
However, upon commencing document review and some preliminary interviews, it became 
clear that foundations were involved throughout the policy cycle, although to varying degrees. 
Reassessing my research observations in accordance with the policy-cycles framework, and 
focusing on the concept of policy entrepreneurs proved a more effective analytical approach for 
describing my research findings. These constructs, therefore, formed (and re-formed and re-
drafted) on the basis of the theoretical and conceptual frameworks presented in Chapter 3. The 
main finding of this research is that Howlett’s (1997) insight into the regularity of policy 
opportunities (or windows, according to Kingdon) in Canada holds true for foundations’ 
engagement in these policy processes. Annual budget cycles and federal and provincial 
elections provided either impetus or roadblocks to foundations’ pursuits of their preferred 
policy agendas. This is an important insight for policy makers as well as foundation staffs, 
board members and executives looking to engage meaningfully in Canadian public policy.  
  The current literature on policy entrepreneurship and the comparative literature on 
foundations led me to have high expectations of the extent of foundations’ policy engagement 
in each of these case studies. Given what I knew going into this project, and the variations 
amongst and between foundations cross-nationally, I anticipated finding significant differences 
across policy domains based on the characteristics and strategies of the foundations. I expected 
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that, together, these factors would determine foundations’ effectiveness in the policy processes 
I examined. Moreover, I expected to affirm that they wielded significant public-policy 
influence as elite policy entrepreneurs. Based on popular discourse about foundations, I 
thought that foundations would have a highly influential role in the policy processes for these 
case studies.  
 Overall, I found that foundations struggled somewhat to see their policy ideas shape 
policy implementation and evaluation. This was consistent across all three cases. Elson (2003) 
suggests, in reference Mazmanian and Sabatier (1983), that there are seven structural variables 
that influence policy implementation: 
1) Clear and consistent objectives; 2) Incorporation of adequate causal 
theory; 3) Hierarchical integration within and among implementing 
institutions; 4) Decision rules of implementing agencies; 5) Recruitment of 
implementing agencies; 6) Formal access by outsiders; and 7) The initial 
allocation of financial resources. (Elson 2006, 5) 
Policy entrepreneurs were skilled at getting the attention of policy makers at the early stages of 
the policy cycle for their specific policy objectives. This should be expected given their 
emphasis on professional communications in order to convey their commitment to transparency 
and accountability, thereby enhancing their perceived legitimacy as policy participants. In 
addition, foundations’ strategies for influencing policy processes, as in their approaches to 
giving, were all informed by scientific approaches to philanthropy. (Today, the trendier terms 
are “venture philanthropy” and “philanthrocapitalism.”) This resulted in narrow policy foci 
across each of the cases, with disadvantageous consequences for the foundation sector.  
 Moreover, across all of the cases, in the process of pursuing their policy ideas, policy 
entrepreneurs deliberately, by necessity, or fortuitously built policy networks in the third 
sector. Hill describes as a process by which, over time, “The organization creates authority 
relationships vis-à-vis the environmental actors” (2006, 3). Organizing into new structures 
proved an effective strategy for building coherence and accessing agendas. It was an effective 
way for policy entrepreneurs to increase their influence, but not far beyond the agenda-setting 
stage. 
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8.8 Foundations in Canada 
As noted in the conceptual framework presented in Chapter 3, and having established that 
foundations are political organizations, although not public organizations, it is appropriate to 
assess the influence of the foundation sector in the cases presented herein. Better coordination 
among these organizations improves their reputation. It provides stability, longevity, and 
continuity, as well as flexibility. Given the persistent legitimacy challenges facing foundations 
in Canada, it would be wise to note the following observations from these cases.  
 Internal factors of increasing institutionalization are coherence and complexity. In all of 
the cases, congruency around the problem definition and proposed solutions led to improved 
organizational coherence amongst foundations, between them, and with their partners. This 
agreement on policy direction provided a jumping off point for developing more formal 
structures, processes, and solutions. In turn, common messaging around policies provided 
legitimacy for foundations’ access to the government processes. By way of illustration, one 
interviewee advised: “Our board has been involved in policy level stuff for a very long time but 
our philosophy is we don’t speak out on every issue imaginable. We like to keep our powder 
dry so that when we do speak out publically, … it’s not just seen as on the latest topic of the 
day” (Interview no. 13, April 23, 2015). The establishment of PFC, the CHVI MOU, and the 
CAGP provided platforms and procedures (through governance structures, e.g. staff, boards, 
board committees, and formal agreements) by which to navigate different policy positions 
among members and/or partners in order come to common agreement. Moreover, these 
common policy objectives provided a rallying point for members.  
Formal incorporations of organizations in these cases included, for example, the PFC, 
which evolved from representing only private foundations to all foundations; the CASE chapter 
in western Canada; the ICID in Winnipeg; and the CHVI Secretariat housed at the PHAC in 
Ottawa. The umbrella organizational structure for foundations and registered charities in 
Canada is becoming increasingly complex. Throughout these cases there are examples of the 
emergence and proliferation of new conferences held by experts, researchers, lawyers, 
professionals, accountants, academics, fundraisers, civil servants, politicians, and foundation 
executives. The diversity of participation, and the complexity of the professional associations 
mean that the infrastructure for the foundation sector is becoming coordinated in Canada. In 
addition, partnerships like the VSI between government and the third sector and joint 
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roundtables, as well as the Voluntary Sector Accord (even if only in name, for now), provide 
further steps toward the legitimization for foundations and the third sector in Canada.  
 Foundations must also be able to adjust their policy objectives in order to stay relevant 
in a changing environment, and they are guided by the visions of their funders. However, 
foundations are enduring organizations. Working together has arguably improved their ability 
to access policy agendas in order to move their ideas forward. Yet, the umbrella organizations 
that improved their reputations and relationships with one another as well as with governments 
are only a few decades old. They have not yet gone through some generational changes like 
turnovers in board membership, expansions of membership, and broadening of policy 
objectives (e.g., just tax incentives or regulation of the foundation sector overall). Still, the 
increasing sophistication of the sector is also evident in the many publications, including 
conference presentations, articles, and books that have been published by professionals and 
experts in Canada (Minton and Somers 2016; Bromley 1997; Pearson 2010; Burrows 2009; 
Aptowitzer 2015).  
 As illustrated in each of these case studies, the focus on improving incentives for giving 
in the Income Tax Act came at a cost. While the capital gains tax exemption was extended to 
private foundations, much more stringent regulations and restrictions on the operations of 
foundations and the charitable sector overall were under development and enacted. While the 
provinces were focused on supporting the PSE sector through the establishment of provincial 
university Crown foundations, the federal government revoked the unique tax advantage and 
established their own PSE Crown foundations. While the federal government was busy 
reviewing applications for a proponent to construct a pilot scale vaccine manufacturing facility, 
the science, economy, and demand all shifted. The partnership lasted eight years, costing over 
$100 million in public and philanthropic dollars, with little to show for it than some improved 
partnerships and collaborations, article publications, and fanfare. 
The similarities across these three case studies is striking when considering all of the 
significant differences between the policy domains, political involvement, and organizational 
variations between them. It appears as though in spite of the emphasis in the literature on 
different types of foundations (whether an organization is a Crown, parallel, public, or private 
foundation, or if it is an umbrella organization), all foundations have a lot in common when it 
comes to their impact on Canadian public policy. At least for these cases, and at least in terms 
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of policy making in Canada, a foundation, no matter what kind it is, is still a foundation. This 
contrasts with one interviewee’s comment: “When you’ve met one foundation, you’ve met one 
foundation” (Interview no. 13, April 23, 2015). There were many more similarities in their 
policy engagement than anticipated. 
These cases demonstrated increasing coordination among foundations and other policy 
actors, and coalescing policy aims. Policy communities evolved into policy networks, and then 
into formal incorporated organizational structures. The policy entrepreneurs in Chapter 5 built 
an umbrella organization to enable foundations to bring the interests of private grant-making 
foundations to the forefront of the government’s agenda more effectively. Again, in Chapter 6, 
Public Crown foundations were established for universities motivated by the aim of 
philanthropy professionals creating more and better opportunities for donors interested in 
making investments in PSE. As well, in Chapter 7, policy actors working within the Gates 
Foundation with the Canadian government planned to move vaccine development capacity 
forward, in accordance with the direction of the scientific policy community. Their 
professional networks evolved into the Canadian iteration of the GHVE, i.e., CHVI. Canada’s 
Ministry of Finance and the CRA responded by re-examining and re-balancing the regulations, 
rules of operation, and oversight for foundations.  
8.9 Policy Recommendations 
This dissertation finds that, overall, public perceptions of foundations tend to drive the policy 
foci of the Canadian federal government in considering the “appropriate” roles of foundations, 
both in the legislation that regulates foundations and in “partnerships” with foundations. 
Whether the Income Tax Act is the appropriate policy instrument for overseeing the role of 
foundations in Canada is a policy matter that warrants ongoing consideration, as the Carter 
Commission, the Broadbent Report, and the VSI Report recommended, as well as countless 
other Canadian authors concerned with the oversight of the charitable sector writ large. 
 Foundations are important to policy processes in Canada. However, a more nuanced 
understanding of their current and potential policy roles is needed. Foundations add the 
following to the policy environment in the cases considered in this dissertation: 
1) They provided avenues for entrepreneurial approaches to policy development for fiscal 
policy, PSE policy, and health-research policy; 
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2) They contributed to the development of the foundation sector, but more broadly to the 
third sector as well, thereby enhancing their legitimacy; 
3)  Their close connections to policy elite, government officials, and expert (international) 
networks, and their weighty reputations added credibility to innovative policy; 
4) They provided critical, alternative perspectives to majoritarian concerns, which is an 
appropriate pluralist role.  
Limitations and challenges to foundations’ effectiveness in improving policy directions and 
outcomes are as follows: 
5) Their policy foci of individual funders are too narrow, regardless of the policy domain; 
6) The development of the sector is still in early stages. Regeneration and turnover of 
policy actors and key foundation representatives will be critical to their legitimacy; 
7) If they are to be effective policy actors, and their objectives align with government 
public policies, more effort is needed to ensure that foundations’ good ideas and 
resources are used not only on high-profile agenda setting, but to implement, evaluate, 
and improve policy efforts. Otherwise, it’s just a waste of taxpayer dollars, both directly 
and indirectly; 
8) Over-emphasis on professionalization and communications campaigns will only 
continue to detract from the actualization of foundations’ policy goals, perceived 
legitimacy, and blowback. 
From a government relations perspective, taken together, these cases point to the significant 
policy role of the federal government for the foundation sector, due to the “power of the purse” 
in the Income Tax Act. As responsibilities for the provision of social services and supports are 
devolved from the federal government to the provinces and the third sector, the Department of 
Finance’s ability to influence those policies (e.g. within the PSE and health sectors, which are 
provincial jurisdictions) through the Income Tax Act warrant scrutiny. Alternative funding 
sources are available to the third sector to help them meet this mandate, but efforts to increase 
those resources through charitable tax incentives, and to access to those resources (from 
foundations) are stymied through the interference of the CRA. At the same time, respect for the 
CRA’s role in ensuring that no undue personal benefits are accrued to donors or foundations is 
critical. In addition, reservations regarding the potential policy engagement of actors that are 
not democratically elected or accountable are appropriate. Charities and foundations need to 
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work better together (i.e. not just foundations amongst themselves) to improve these macro 
structures. This also requires that foundations improve the effectiveness of their policy efforts, 
and their perceived legitimacy with charities, governments, and the public.  
 There is a key lesson in these cases for the nature of the third sector in Canada. While 
provinces have authority over the charitable sector, the health sector, and the PSE and 
innovation sectors, the Department of Finance de facto makes policy through its authority 
vested the Income Tax Act (Elson 2011; McRae 2011). The oversight and regulatory role of the 
federal Ministry of Finance and the CRA ensure a balance between opportunities in the third 
sector across provinces and organizational types. These rules and structures can direct private 
dollars to particular policy domains and can ensure some equity across the provinces. However, 
the potentially competing policy perspectives (as highlighted in the Crown foundation case in 
particular) might suggest that there is a need for more formalized coordination between the 
federal government and the provinces in relation to charitable tax policy, similar to the Council 
of Ministers of Advanced Education, for instance. This would mean a more explicit 
reconciliation of federal and provincial social policy objectives. Alternatively, it might be 
helpful if ministers and departments with responsibilities for engaging with the third sector 
were to coordinate their efforts (for description of formal, informal and non-formal, see 
Glossary).  
In the two fiscal policy cases discussed here (i.e., the capital gains tax exemption and 
the university Crown foundations) foundations and foundation representatives addressed the 
regulations by which they themselves are governed. Foundations’ policy focus on chartable tax 
incentives, however, might have reinforced the idea that private foundations are simply tax 
havens. This narrow policy focus detracts from foundations’ efforts to convince members of 
the public, the third sector, and the public sector that they add value from a pluralist 
perspective by bringing resources to the table, or by supporting and stewarding innovative 
policy solutions.  
Moreover, the state should not be too quick to jump at the opportunity for flashy “photo 
ops” with international celebrities, or to take up foundation gifts without seriously 
contemplating the intended policy directions. Policy makers should consider whether the terms 
embedded in their agreements with donors aligns with the perspectives of their electoral 
constituencies. If not, is it still appropriate to spend public dollars in that way? In addition, has 
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sufficient policy evaluation been conducted (perhaps even in house), to assess whether the 
initiative is ripe for investment and implementation.  
8.10 Limitations 
Like any research project, this research has its limitations. The first limitation concerns the 
research method. This is a qualitative, comparative, multi-case study, focusing on foundations 
in Canada over a relatively recent period of time across only three policy domains. It is 
possible that by the time these results come available for broader dissemination, they will be 
outdated. It is possible that less-complex methodologies might produce research outcomes that 
can inform policy makers and policy actors in a timelier way.  
 However, in this investigation, the research specifications case studies require, which 
can be seen as inherent limitations of the approach, also correspond with the application of 
established empirical research on foundations and think tanks in other countries. In particular, 
the multi-national comparative literature on foundations reveals the importance of context for 
research related to the roles foundations can play in policy. Accordingly, in order to establish a 
sufficient information base regarding the Canadian context, and given the lack of research on 
foundations in Canada, it was necessary to limit the geographic, political, and economic scope 
of this research. 
 The other limitation of this research is that it employs and references the well-
established US and multi-national comparative, secondary data and interdisciplinary research 
on foundations, but focuses only on Canadian foundations. This, for instance, is opposed to 
having compared foundations in Canada to those in the United States, either quantitatively or 
from a macro perspective, or having compared the role of the Gates Foundation in a case 
covering both Canada and the United States. These latter approaches, however, are more suited 
to the popular literature on foundations, where the key issue is selection bias. Fiscal policy 
related to foundations in Canada tends to be biased negatively and is a result of an 
overemphasis in the discourse related to foundations in the US, despite the significant 
differences and evidence of much policy transfer from the UK.  
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8.11 Future Research 
Only a select few of the most noteworthy international multidisciplinary studies on foundations 
contemplate Canadian foundations (Anheier and Daly 2007; Laforest 2009; Phillips 2009; 
Salamon and Anheier 1997). This dissertation helps address the gap in the literature by using 
the findings of the established literature on foundations, along with an established theoretical 
public policy framework, to elucidate the role of foundations in Canada. The approach makes 
this dissertation’s research findings comparable to those of established works.  
 That said, a multi-case comparative approach might have compared Canadian 
foundations against foundations in the United States or other countries. In this regard, there are 
many other potential areas for future research. It would, for example, be instructive to apply the 
conclusions of this research to Indigenous and community foundations in Canada. Another area 
that requires further research is where third-sector actors, once formally organized, are equally 
or sometimes even more risk averse than public-sector actors. This prompts the question of 
whether foundations become path dependent, or not. Observers, practitioners, and scholars of 
the third sector often view foundations’ propensity for risk-seeking behaviour as a valuable 
contribution, but one that is more appropriate for private rather than public funding. Their 
potential innovations resulting from risk-seeking behaviour provides legitimacy to the place of 
foundations in policy making because they acknowledge undertaking projects that might fail. 
In fact, some argue that foundations should take on more entrepreneurial behaviour. 
  Most of the Canadian research on foundations (conducted primarily by professional 
associations, foundations themselves, and umbrella organizations like PFC) focuses on 
organizational strategies. These include governance (boards, mission statements, and decision 
structures), internal organizational structures, strategic planning, and available resources – all 
potentially limiting factors in the effectiveness of foundations. While these were not the focus 
of this thesis, they are another area ripe for future research in Canada. Indeed, the American 
literature and anecdotal findings in Canada point to the potential implications of these internal 
factors for foundations’ effectiveness in influencing public policy. Some research warns that 
with increasing bureaucratization comes decreased innovation and a tendency toward 
incrementalism (which may not be a bad thing when considered in light of the Gates 
Foundation case). This postulate requires further research for foundations in the Canadian 
policy-making context. 
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In the PSE policy domain, several instances of organizational proliferation by 
foundations for universities were uncovered. These were examples of foundations giving to 
universities to pursue the donors’ policy agendas. A review of the extent of foundation giving 
to universities across provincial jurisdictions would be a valuable empirical contribution to the 
research on foundations in Canada. In the case of the proliferation of Crown foundations across 
Canada, it was suggested that it led to a significant but disparate influx of resources into the 
PSE and health sectors. Moreover, that disparate distribution of resources might have been at 
the expense of particular geographic regions or other policy domains where foundations 
provide financial support. These would be interesting quantitative research undertakings that 
could contribute a great deal to the literature. They might also provide evidence to support or 
dispute Lagemann’s (1992) suggestion that foundations constitute a fourth sector in Canada. 
 In addition, the research method of requesting primary source data and documents from 
public organizations such as governments and universities is not well documented. Accessing 
information and regulations through provincial and federal privacy is not a simple or quick 
undertaking. The experiences requesting information at the federal and university levels were 
quite different. Further exploration of the different processes would be a meaningful 
contribution to the methodological literature and could assist other scholars in their research 
endeavours. The methodological approach and research findings presented here may provide a 
useful basis for such a project.  
 In terms of the significance of the present study for future research on foundations and 
public policy in Canada, these individual cases might be compared or contrasted to cases of 
similar policy efforts in other countries, or in similar policy domains, e.g. health, where 
foundation engagement has been evident. The overarching findings from this dissertation can 
be considered in light of similar research on US foundations’ engagement in public policy. The 
findings can also be considered as complementary to the existing comparative research on 
foundations, where data from Canada is lacking. Another interesting area for potential research 
inspired by this study is the role of international foundations on domestic policy in Canada. 
Quantitative analysis of international foundation funding for government, non-profit, and 
charitable organizations in Canada would provide interesting insights into foreign influence in 
domestic policy making.  
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 Existing studies of the third sector suggest that foundations are more successful in 
pushing their policy agendas forward when they have established their legitimacy with the 
state. It appeared that for these foundations, creating umbrella organizations, and finding 
influential policy actors to plead their cases improved their legitimacy. There is an interesting 
contrast when this is considered alongside another finding of Kryvoruchko’s quantitative 
research on Canadian foundations, which suggests that foundations bestow legitimacy onto 
their recipient organizations, giving indications to other donors where their resources are best 
invested (2013). 
8.12 Conclusion 
The findings of this study help us better understand the roles of foundations in Canadian public 
policy. The research demonstrated that that in each of these cases, philanthropic foundations 
operating in Canada acted as policy entrepreneurs; they used different strategies to gain access 
to policy makers, politicians, and policy agendas; moreover, these strategies were more 
successful at the earlier stages than they were at the later stages in the policy cycle. These 
foundations’ varying influence across the cycles is attributable to both the external 
environment, e.g. the uniquely Canadian context within which they operate or in the context of 
changing scientific developments, and the internal strategies that these organizations and 
individuals used in order to increase and solidify their legitimacy as policy actors in Canada. 
These findings were consistent across these Canadian cases of foundation engagement in 
public policy, regardless of policy domain, the open or closed nature of the policy regime, the 
type or size of foundation, amount of funding that was at stake, or the level of government 
involved. 
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APPENDIX A – Overview of Interviews  
Fifty-nine unique interviews were requested to support this research. Forty-two interviews 
were conducted over two years, from 2014–17. The response rate for requests for interviews 
was 70%. Forty-two individuals representing 39 different organizations (at relevant points in 
time for the selected cases) agreed to participate. Interview data is enumerated in Table A-3. 
Data regarding declined interviews is provided in Table A-4. 
 For the post-secondary education (PSE) policy case, 17 interviews were requested and 
14 were granted. For the health-research policy domain (Gates Foundation case), 14 interviews 
were requested and nine were granted.  
 For the fiscal policy case (the capital gains tax exemption for the donation of publicly 
listed securities) 14 interviews were requested and 13 were granted. In addition, 14 general 
interviews were requested, and six were granted.  
 Participants acted as board and committee members, executives, managers, directors, 
staff, authors, politicians, civil servants, donors, fundraisers, experts, lawyers, and volunteers. 
The names of individuals are hidden from the published data in order to protect the confidential 
nature of the research interviews.  
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Table A-3. Interviews Conducted 
# Case Role Affiliation Date  Method Location 
1 Gates Manager 
Government of Canada, 
Public Health Agency of 
Canada (PHAC); Canadian 
HIV Vaccine Initiative 
(CHVI) 20-11-14 In person Ottawa 
2 Gates Staff 
Government of Canada, 
Public Health Agency of 
Canada (PHAC) 20-11-14 In person Ottawa 
3 Gates 
Executive; 
Expert 
Global HIV Vaccine 
Initiative; Canadian 
Association for Advanced 
Research 15-04-15 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Toronto 
4 Gates 
Politician; 
Executive 
International Centre for 
Infectious Diseases; 
Government of Canada; 
Liberal Party of Canada 
15-05-15;  
01-05-15 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Winnipeg 
5 Gates 
Politician; 
Executive 
International Centre for 
Infectious Diseases; 
Government of Canada; 
Liberal Party of Canada 
01-05-15; 
15-05-15 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Winnipeg 
6 Gates 
Executive; 
Expert  
Gates Foundation; World 
Health Organization 
(WHO); Global HIV 
Vaccine Initiative (GHVI); 
CHVI 12-05-15 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Washington 
7 Gates Staff Gates Foundation; GHVI 14-05-14 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Washington 
8 Gates Executive  
Canadian Association for 
HIV Research   14-05-15 Telephone Saskatoon  
9 Gates Staff Gates Foundation 03-09-15 Telephone Saskatoon  
10 General  Manager Imagine Canada 20-11-14 In person Ottawa 
11 General  Manager Imagine Canada 21-11-14 In person Ottawa 
12 Tax Executive 
Government of Canada, 
Department of Finance 21-11-14 In person Ottawa 
13 General  Executive Muttart Foundation 23-04-15 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Edmonton 
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# Case Role Affiliation Date  Method Location 
14 General  
Politician; 
Expert 
Royal Commission, 
Government of Canada; 
Government of 
Saskatchewan 05-05-15 In person Saskatoon 
15 Tax 
Manager; 
Staff 
McConnell Foundation; 
Government of Canada 27-11-15 Skype  
Saskatoon - 
Ottawa 
16 Tax 
Board 
member; 
Expert 
Scotia Private Client Group; 
National Ballet of Canada; 
Canadian Association of 
Gift Planners 17-11-14 In person Toronto 
17 Tax Manager 
Government of Canada, 
Department of Finance 21-11-14 In person Ottawa 
18 Tax Lawyer Drache and Aptowitzer, LLP 06-06-15 In person Ottawa 
19 General  
Lawyer; 
Expert Drache and Aptowitzer, LLP   Email  Ottawa 
20 Tax 
Executive; 
Expert 
Philanthropic Foundations 
Canada (PFC) 14-04-15 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Montreal 
21 Tax 
Executive; 
Expert PFC 15-04-15 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Montreal 
22 Tax 
Expert; 
Staff 
Government of Canada, 
Department of Finance 14-05-15 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Ottawa 
23 Tax 
Expert; 
Donor 
Lupina Foundation; PFC; 
Government of Ontario 01-05-15 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Toronto 
24 Tax 
Expert; 
Donor 
Lupina Foundation; PFC; 
Government of Ontario 08-05-15 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Toronto 
25 Tax 
Donor; 
Volunteer 
National Ballet of Canada; 
Philanthropic Foundations 
Canada; Hospital 
Foundation  06-03-15 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Toronto 
26 Tax  Staff 
Government of Canada, 
Department of Finance 21-11-14 In person Ottawa 
27 Tax 
Executive; 
Board 
member 
Community Foundations 
Canada; Community Living 
London 30-08-16 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Ottawa 
28 PSE 
Executive; 
Board 
member 
University of Saskatchewan 
(U of S), Edwards School of 
Business; Cameco Corp. 13-04-15 In person Saskatoon 
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# Case Role Affiliation Date  Method Location 
29 PSE Executive The Calgary Foundation 04-04-16 Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Calgary 
30 PSE 
Donor; 
Board 
member 
Anluan Foundation; Hanlon 
Centre, U of S  In writing  Calgary  
31 PSE 
Board 
member; 
Volunteer 
The United Way of 
Saskatoon  17-08-16 In person Saskatoon  
32 PSE Staff 
Wilson Centre, Hanlon 
Centre, U of S 14-07-14 Phone Saskatoon 
33 General  
Board 
member; 
Volunteer 
The United Way of 
Saskatoon  
09-16-
2017 Phone Toronto 
34 PSE 
Expert; 
Board 
member 
Centres Sub-Committee of 
the Planning and Priorities 
Committee of University 
Council, U of S  17-08-16 In person  Saskatoon  
35 PSE 
Executive; 
Fundraiser 
University of Saskatchewan; 
DCG Philanthropic Services 
Inc. 30-08-16 In person Saskatoon 
36 PSE 
Expert; 
Staff 
Government of 
Saskatchewan, Ministry of 
Advanced Education; U of S 05-09-16 In person Saskatoon  
37 PSE 
Expert; 
Staff  
Government of 
Saskatchewan, Ministry of 
Advanced Education; U of S 05-09-16 In person Saskatoon  
38 PSE Staff 
Saskatoon Community 
Foundation  09-09-16 Phone  Saskatoon 
39 PSE Staff  
Wilson Centre, University of 
Saskatchewan 03-03-16 Telephone Saskatoon  
40 PSE Staff 
Wilson Centre for 
Entrepreneurial Excellence, 
Hanlon Centre, U of S 23-07-14 In person Saskatoon 
41 PSE 
Expert; 
Lawyer 
Victoria Foundation; 
Hospital Foundation 16-04-17 Telephone Victoria 
42 PSE 
Expert; 
Lawyer Consulting Firm 5-05-17 Telephone Vancouver 
 
  164 
Table A-4. Declined Interviews 
# Role Affiliation Response Request Location 
43 Expert Researcher CHVI facility  Denied Email  Winnipeg 
44 Expert; Executive  
Gates Foundation, Global 
Health Denied Email  Unknown 
45 Politician 
Conservative MP, Standing 
Committee on Health, 
CANADA Denied Email  Unknown 
46 Politician 
Liberal MP, Standing 
Committee on Health, 
Government of Canada Denied Email  Unknown 
47 Executive 
Philanthropic Foundations 
Canada (PFC); McConnell 
Foundation Denied Email  Unknown 
48 Author 
Author of 
"Philanthrocapitalism" Denied Email  Unknown 
49 Executive  McConnell Foundation No answer   Montreal 
49 Board member The Vancouver Foundation 
Not 
confirmed Telephone 
Saskatoon - 
Vancouver 
50 Executive  
Community Foundations 
Canada No answer Email  Ottawa 
51 Staff 
Anluan Foundation; Hanlon 
Centre, University of 
Saskatchewan  Declined Telephone Saskatoon  
52 Manager; Expert Gates Foundation; GHVI Delegated Email  Seattle 
53 Volunteer; Donor 
W. Brett Wilson Centre for 
Entrepreneurial Excellence 
Not 
confirmed Email Calgary  
54 Executive Max Bell Foundation  
Not 
confirmed Telephone Unknown 
  165 
# Role Affiliation Response Request Location 
55 
Board member; 
Expert Executive No answer Email  Saskatoon  
56 Executive 
Saskatoon Community 
Foundation  Delegated Email  Saskatoon 
57 Executive  The United Way of Saskatoon No-show Email  Saskatoon 
58 Executive  Max Bell Foundation No answer  Email  Calgary  
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APPENDIX B – Interview Methods and Data Collection 
In the section that follows, a sample of an email invitation is provided that would have been 
sent as a request to participate in a research interview. The dissertation abstract (see below) and 
the research ethics approval form were also attached. Next, a thematic sampling of research 
questions is provided. Before each of the interviews, I reviewed the general questions I had 
developed, identified the applicable questions specific to the case study, and identified any 
questions I had for the interview participant. A one-page summary of guiding questions was 
provided to the participant in advance of each conversation. Recall, as noted in the methods 
chapter, that interviews took place in person, or by phone, generally, but also once by Skype 
and a couple times via email or mail. 
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Sample Interview Invitation 
 
Dear _____________, 
 
I hope this email finds you well. I am writing to request a research interview with you 
regarding the role of foundations in Canadian public policy, given your 
involvement/experiences with____________.  
 
I am a PhD student at the University of Saskatchewan in Public Policy. My thesis supervisor is 
Dr. Daniel Béland, Canada Research Chair at the Johnson-Shoyama Graduate School of Public 
Policy. I am in the final stages of writing my dissertation and completing final interviews to 
complete my research as well as to affirm my findings. 
 
If you are available and interested, the interview should only take about 20–30 minutes, and 
can be arranged at a time most convenient for you. I will provide a list of questions in advance 
to inform our conversation. I have attached my research ethics approval and an abstract for 
your information. 
 
I look forward to hearing from you, and hopefully setting up a time to connect. 
 
Many thanks,  
Jacquie Thomarat, M.A., PhD Candidate (ABD) 
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Sample Research Abstract for Potential Interview Participants  
 
Dissertation: Philanthropic Foundations and Public Policy Agendas in Canada 
Jacquie Thomarat, MA, PhD Candidate (ABD) 
Excerpt from introduction  
 “The wealth, number, and apparent influence of philanthropic foundations in Canada is 
increasing. The dissertation, Philanthropic Foundations in Canada: An Application of the 
Multiple Streams Framework, will examine institutional processes that shape foundations’ 
engagement in public policy, their agenda-setting role, and their impact for public policy in 
Canada. Foundations play a prominent role in the formulation of public policy – contributing to 
social policy discourse, policy ideas, and solutions.  
 The research will assist policy makers, foundation executives, and scholars in clarifying 
the place of foundations as policy actors. As a first step in the study, this proposal will outline 
the research agenda, provide a background on philanthropic foundations, review the relevant 
literature, consider the appropriate conceptual framework, sketch the proposed methodology, 
and present a bibliography. 
 The dissertation will consider case studies in three different policy fields: health, tax, 
and post-secondary education, as follows: 1) a partnership between the Government of Canada 
and the Gates Foundation for a health research facility that would facilitate the potential 
development of an HIV vaccine (2003-2011); 2) the case of the elimination of capital gains tax 
on the donation of securities between (circa) 2006–2013; 3) the establishment of Crown 
foundations for universities across the country from 1987–1996. 
 Through research, analysis, and comparison of the selected case studies, this 
dissertation will shed light on the role of philanthropic foundations in the specified public 
policy areas in Canada. The knowledge generated from the study will prove useful 
to politicians, policy experts, practitioners, foundations, and scholars alike. This will enable 
more informed policy decision making and will also address a considerable lacuna in Canadian 
public policy literature.” 
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Sample Interview Questions 
General Questions 
• What is your role in this foundation or organization or case?  
• How do philanthropic foundations engage in public policy? 
• Does the foundation have a particular focus or vision in its community or public 
participation? 
• Why does this [philanthropic foundation] engage in agenda-setting policy discourse?  
• Does the foundation’s participation vary across policy areas? Why or why not? 
• What are the motivations for the foundation’s participation in this policy area? 
• How do foundations get issues onto the agenda? Are they effective in getting their policy 
issues or ideas onto the agenda? Why or why not? 
• Is a financial contribution (i.e., a donation or grant) a contributing factor to the perceived 
policy influence of the foundation? 
• Do they have more or less policy influence than other actors as a result of their financial 
contributions (or lack thereof)? Do agendas change as a result of their participation? 
• How do the internal characteristics of philanthropic foundations, such as organization size, 
history, and scope of giving, challenge or enable their contributions as policy actors? 
• How do external factors affecting philanthropic foundations, such as politics, institutional 
contexts, and policy networks, challenge or enable their contributions as policy actors?  
• Does the foundation have an affect (positive or negative) on policy outcomes? 
 
PSE Case Study Sample Questions 
• What was your role in the establishment of the research centre at the university?  
• What was the process for the establishment of the new centre/foundation? 
• How did the foundation, donor, or other actors engage in the process? 
• How did donors (or the foundation) engage in setting the research/teaching agenda? 
• Was a financial contribution (i.e., a donation or grant) a contributing factor to the perceived 
policy influence? 
• Did foundations have more or less policy influence than other actors as a result of their 
financial contributions (or lack thereof)? 
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• Who did the donor/foundation speak with regularly? 
• Did the nature of the policy change as a result of their participation? 
• Does the foundation or the donor participate in the operations or oversight of the centre? 
• Who were the other actors in this case? 
 
Health-Research Case Study Sample Questions 
• What was your role and the role of your organization in this case? 
• What was the role of the Gates Foundation in this case? What was the role of the 
government of Canada? And the ministry? 
• What was the role of the GHVE in setting or influencing the policy agenda? 
• What was the role of the Gates Foundation in setting or influencing the agenda for the 
Canadian HIV Vaccine Initiative? 
• Who were the key players in establishing the Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise? 
• What was the role of the government of Canada? 
• Is the partnership that resulted unique? If so, how? 
• Did the different partners involved in the project define the policy problem differently? 
 
Fiscal Policy Case Study Sample Questions 
• Did foundations play a role in influencing the policies that regulate foundations? 
• Does the extension of the capital gains tax exemption to foundations signal the delegation 
of responsibility for social welfare to the third sector and away from government? 
• Did any apparent biases permeate the policy discourse regarding the exemption? 
• What was the goal of the proposed policy to eliminate the capital gains tax exemption? 
• Why were foundations excluded from the original pilot? Did they or any other umbrella 
organization advocate to include foundations in the exemption? 
• Describe the role of the minister, the CRA, the Charities Directorate, and the Department of 
Finance in this case.  
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APPENDIX C – GLOSSARY   
Throughout the professional, academic, and popular literatures, and within our common 
vernacular. We cannot seriously contemplate the roles of foundations in public policy unless 
there is some established agreement about what it is that we are attempting to describe, and 
what exactly we are observing. If we cannot come to agreement, however (which seems to be 
our current state), we must at least establish the differences between our perspectives in order 
to put in place the parameters for building understanding based on such studies.  
Term Definition 
Advocacy   “Non-profits historically have played three distinct roles in relation 
to government: complementing, supplementing, and advocating change. 
Investing resources in advocacy to change public policy often appeals when 
existing policy and practice seem fundamentally misguided” (Sandfort 2008, 
542). According to the CRA, “A charity may take part in political activities 
if they are non-partisan and connected and subordinate to the charity’s 
purposes. [CRA] presumes an activity to be political if a charity: explicitly 
communicates a call to political action (that is, encourages the public to 
contact an elected representative or public official and urges them to retain, 
oppose, or change the law, policy, or decision of any level of government in 
Canada or a foreign country); explicitly communicates to the public that the 
law, policy, or decision of any level of government in Canada or a foreign 
country should be retained (if the retention of the law, policy or decision is 
being reconsidered by a government), opposed, or changed explicitly 
indicates in its materials (whether internal or external) that the intention of 
the activity is to incite, or organize to put pressure on, an elected 
representative or public official to retain, oppose, or change the law, policy, 
or decision of any level of government in Canada or a foreign country” 
(Canada, CRA 2003).  
Capital gains 
(losses) 
Income Tax Act Paragraph 40(1)(a) defines capital gains or losses as 
the monetary value “equal to the amount by which a taxpayer’s proceeds 
realized on a disposition of property” exceeds the cost of the property and 
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expenses from the sale (Edgar, Sandler, and Cockfield 2010, 559). 
According to this provision, “the disposition of all forms of capital property” 
will be taxed based on the tax rate for an individual’s earned income (2010, 
559). The purpose of the capital gains tax in the Income Tax Act is “to 
provide horizontal tax equity to different ways of earning money, either 
through playing stocks, or getting a paycheque, and vertical equity because 
more rich people play stock markets and capital gains” (Hogg, Magee, and 
Li 2012, 532). 
Charitable 
foundation  
“According to sub-section 149.1(1), a charitable foundation is 
defined as: a corporation or trust that is constituted and operated exclusively 
for charitable purposes, no part of the income of which is payable to, or is 
otherwise available for, the personal benefit of any proprietor, member, 
shareholder, trustee or settlor thereof, and that is not a charitable 
organization... Charitable foundations generally act as 
conduits for distributing funds to charitable organizations” (Hoffstein 2007, 
3).  
Charities “Briefly, a charitable organization is an organization, whether or not 
incorporated, that meets all of the following requirements: all of the 
organization’s resources are devoted exclusively to charitable activities 
carried on by it; no part of the income is payable to or otherwise available for 
the personal benefit of any proprietor, member, shareholder, trustee or settler 
thereof; and, it cannot be controlled by a group of related 
directors/officers/trustees” (Hoffstein 2007, 1, referring to Income Tax Act 
Subsection 149.1[1]). 
Closed policy 
regime 
With regard to fiscal policy, “Canadian governments have become 
less permeable, especially at the federal level, with few mechanisms for 
ongoing dialogue with civil society other than the annual budget 
consultations at which organizations get one shot to present new ideas. If 
federal departments are doing anything innovative to engage civil society, 
they are deliberately flying under the political radar because there is no 
interest in such engagement from the centre” (Phillips 2010, 69).  
  173 
Community 
foundation 
“Between these extremes [of private foundations and public 
foundations] lie community foundations, which, as the name suggests, seek 
to support charitable works in a particular municipality or region. A 
community foundation has a somewhat broader focus than a parallel 
foundation, but nevertheless maintains a direct link to people and programs 
in the local community” (Hoffstein 2007, 26). “An independent 
philanthropic organization working in a specific geographic area which, over 
time, builds up a permanent collection of endowed funds contributed from 
many donors, provides services to those donors, and makes grants and 
undertakes community leadership activities to address a wide variety of 
current and long-term needs in its service area. The foundation is governed 
by a board of citizens broadly reflective of the community its serves” (Feurt 
1999, 25). 
Crown 
foundation  
A Crown foundation is “created by statute which is stated to be ‘an 
Agent of the Crown in the right of the Province’ and has the purpose of 
providing funds to a particular institution or class of institutions” (Bromley 
1993, 37). 
Entrepreneur The conventional definition according to the business or economics 
literature is “An agent who enables or enacts a vision based on new ideas in 
order to create successful innovations” ([Schumpter 1950, 44] quoted in 
Dacin, Dacin, and Matear 2010, 44). New developments in the management 
literature build on this definition, and extend action beyond the private 
sector, to the public and third sectors as well (Drucker 1985).  
Family 
foundation 
“The classic family foundation... has a majority of family members 
on its board and has been funded by one person or a related group” 
(Hoffstein 2007, 3). It is generally a private, endowed, grant-making 
foundation.  
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Foundation “A charitable foundation is a corporation or trust that is constituted and 
operated exclusively for charitable purposes, subject to the restriction that no 
part of its income may be paid to or available for the personal benefit of any 
member, shareholder, trustee, etc., of the foundation, and that is not a 
charitable organization. Charitable foundations generally act as conduits for 
distributing funds to charitable organizations” (Hoffstein 2007, 3,  ITA 
149.1). 
Funding 
regime 
 A report by the Canadian Council on Social Development 
describes the funding regime for the third sector as “the practices and 
structures that shape the relationship between funders and the funded, and 
thus set the context for nonprofit activity” (Scott and Pike, 2005, 11). 
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Garbage-can 
theory  
In Rediscovering Institutions, March and Olsen (1984) grapple with 
the ambiguity inherent to public policy. They present “garbage-can theory,” 
within neo-institutionalism. Three themes are suggested: that the logic 
causality or consequentiality should be replaced with the logic of 
appropriateness; that social construction is more important than the realm of 
preferences and exogenous interests, and that the development of political 
institutions is historically constructed (1984, 3-10; see also Cohen, March, 
Olsen, 1972). There are four streams in garbage cans: problems, solutions, 
choice opportunities, and participants. The streams interact in a non-linear 
policy process, participation is fluid, and preferences unclear. March and 
Olsen’s (1947) garbage can theory purports that organizational choices are 
characterized by ambiguity, information problems, and uncertainty. 
Solutions seek out problems, and participants come and go from decision-
making processes. Within organizations, people employ bounded rationality 
to inform decision-making; informal relationships, personalities, politics, 
ideas, agendas, interests, and interest groups matter (Simon, 1947; Seibel, in 
Anheier and Seibel, 1990). 
Government 
failure  
The theoretical premise of government failures approaches to 
research on the third sector is that charities, non-profits, and foundations are 
subsidiary to the state. Authors in this area have used public choice theory to 
understand the rise of the third sector. Weisbrod, in 1977, originally 
purported that the third sector, or non-profit sector (as it was then described) 
may exist as a result of the failure of the state to provide collective goods 
effectively or efficiently to the population (Badelt, 56; Olson, 1965). This 
suggests that, as a result of the failure of the social contract (Rousseau, 
1920), the private sector and the state exist; “when demand is heterogeneous, 
citizens who want more or different goods than the state provides form 
NPOs to supplement public provision” (DiMaggio and Anheier, 1990, 140). 
Public policy approaches to studies of the third sector more often assume 
government failure. Markets fail, and governments are not always able to 
address all the resulting gaps, primarily related to the provision of collective 
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goods, or related to contract failures. Weisbrod noted that all NPOs generally 
provide collective goods, but government does not provide the full scope of 
these goods. 
Grant-making 
foundations  
Another term used to identify private or public philanthropic 
foundations that distribute funding to more than one NPO. Sometimes the 
use of the term “grant-making” excludes parallel foundations or government-
owned foundations. “A key feature of the foundation is a permanent 
endowment, not committed to a particular institution or activity, that 
provides a grant-making capacity reaching across multiple purposes into the 
indefinite future” (Prewitt 2006, 365). 
Informal 
regime type 
According to Elson, “Informal institutional structures reflect an ad-
hoc representational and reporting protocol that is also non-transferable 
across time and issues” (2008, 139). The third sector is considered an 
informal regime type in that there is no elected minister responsible for the 
charitable sector at the federal level, or at the provincial level.  
Information 
asymmetry 
Foundations have the potential to reduce information asymmetries 
between donors, volunteers, and charitable organizations (Kryvoruchko 
2013). This is the basis of the trustworthiness theory, or trust theory. “Trust 
theory [has been] tested using a measure of a country’s degree of trust in 
business, since this theory predicts that non-profits are likely to emerge 
where the non-profit-distribution constraint is needed to generate confidence 
that services will be provided adequately because information asymmetries 
give for-profit businesses an opportunity to take advantage of consumers” 
(Hansmann 1987, cited in Anheier and Salamon 2006, 104).  
Institutional 
change  
“Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time 
and hence is key to understanding historical change” (3). “Evolution of the 
common law [is] a form of institutional change” (North 1990, 96). 
“Improved understanding of institutional change requires greater 
understanding than we now possess of just want makes ideas and ideologies 
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catch hold. Therefore, we are still at something of a loss to define, in very 
precise terms, the interplay between changes in relative process, the ideas 
and ideologies that form people’s perceptions, and the roles that the two play 
in inducing changes in institutions” (86). “The difference between 
institutions and organizations and the interaction between them shapes the 
direction of institutional change” (7). In addition, “in the course of pursuing 
[their] objectives, organizations incrementally alter institutional structure” 
(73). 
Institutional 
choice 
Social origins theory purports that the existence and persistence of 
the third sector in the public-private dichotomy is an institutional choice 
rather than a failure of the market or the state (Rose-Ackerman, 1986; 
Weisbrod, 1988; Anheier and Seibel, 1990; Salamon, 1988).  
Institutional 
entrepreneurs  
“In a classic definition of institutional entrepreneurship, DiMaggio 
states, ‘new institutions arise when organized actors with sufficient resources 
(institutional entrepreneurs) see in them an opportunity to realize interests 
that they value highly’ (1988, p. 14)” (Quinn 952). “Scholars have 
investigated how some organizational forms gain legitimacy while others 
lose favour, finding that institutional entrepreneurs recombine cultural 
elements to frame preferred organizational forms as “necessary, valid, and 
appropriate” (Quinn, Tomkins-Stange, Meyerson 2012, 952). Institutional 
entrepreneurs “seek to create, erode, or alter existing institutional 
arrangements” (Dacin, Dacin and Matear 2010, 50). This overlaps with the 
definition of policy entrepreneurs, as policy pertains to institutions, and vice 
versa” (See also DiMaggio & Powell 1983).  
Institutional 
failure 
Institutional choice framework provides understanding the third 
sector as a way to deal with the three failures, in any combination of those 
theories, i.e., market, government, or voluntary failure. “Institutional failure 
can be defined as high transaction costs (including delay, vexation, 
dissipation of energy) of arriving at agreements, dealing with ‘holdouts,’ 
breaking deadlocks, making service provision difficult or impossible. It is 
often associated with externalities (spillover costs for which the actor(s) who 
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generate the costs cannot be obliged to pay, or spillover benefits which 
cannot be fully appropriated by those who create them)” (Hood and 
Schuppert 1990, 102). Salamon states that this role of the third sector is due 
to “the transaction costs involved in mobilizing government responses to 
shortages of collective goods tending to be much higher than the costs of 
mobilizing voluntary action” (1987, 39-42).  
Institutionalis
m  
The new institutionalist approaches to political studies (March and 
Olsen 1989) and public policy include: historical institutionalism, 
sociological institutionalism, and rational choice institutionalism (Wilson, 
1989; March and Olsen, 1989; Campbell, 2004). “New institutionalism 
argues that political analysis is best conducted through a focus on 
institutions, or more specifically, when starting off with institutions” 
(Lecours 2005, 6). Along these lines, Lecours notes, “Institutions shape 
policy making, including the mobilization of actors and the structuring of 
policy networks and interest groups” (2005, 223).  
Institutions  Traditionally, the “old” institutionalism defines institutions as 
material structures, including for example: bureaucracies, governments, 
courts, etc. Whereas, society-centered and normative definitions focus on 
rules, norms and values. New institutionalism grapples with these two 
contrasting definitions (Lecours 2005, 6-7). “Extending the notion of 
institutions beyond formal structures – and this is where the debate within 
new institutionalism becomes significant for political science – may serve to 
bridge the gap between [the aforementioned] institutionalist approaches… 
(2005, 8).  
Market failure  Assumes an institutional hierarchy of public or private organizations 
dominating third-sector organizations, which, as noted, is inconsistent with 
the literature on the third sector. Civil society perspectives posit that the third 
sector is the first line of response to market failures and that government 
responds only where the third sector fails to meet the demands for collective 
goods. Markets fail, and governments are not always able to address all the 
resulting gaps, primarily related to the provision of collective goods, or 
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related to contract failures. NPOs address contract failure through non-
distribution constraints, which reduces the race to the bottom for quality in 
the interest of profit; enhanced trustworthiness; and, NPOs are managed by 
“demand-side stakeholders” (Ben-Ner 1986) in that they are more concerned 
with the outcomes produced as they relate to the organization’s objectives, 
including quantity and quality (Steinberg 2006, 123-124).  
Multiple 
streams 
framework  
Kingdon’s framework assists in understanding how policy decisions 
are made and agendas are set; in organizing and understanding the 
complexities of the policy process; and sorts through key policy-making 
elements, called multiple streams, to provide an understanding of how 
agendas are set. The streams include problems, politics, policies, and 
participants (including policy entrepreneurs such as foundations) (1984, 
1995, 2003). 
New Public 
Management 
(NPM)  
“NPM movement is responsible for placing questions of governance 
of public sector restructuring… A distributive government framework that 
requires that the third sector invest resources, time and finances in building 
its own coordinative capacities in order to have impact on policy 
development” (Evans and Shields 2005, 150-151). 
Non-formal 
regime  
According to Elson, “The non-formal institutional structure type 
features [a] transitory representational and reporting system that is non-
transferable across time and issues” (2008, 139). The PSE sector is 
considered a non-formal organizational regime type. Evidence of the non-
formal nature of PSE policy is that at the federal level, no role for the 
minister of education exists, whereas there do exist federal ministerial 
positions for health and social welfare (Fisher and Jones 2006, 115).  
Non-profit 
entrepreneurs 
“Research on entrepreneurship within non-profit organizations has 
generally been approached under the broader guise of ‘social 
entrepreneurship,’ a concept which has a number of different connotations... 
For instance, Brooks and Morris (2005) refer to ‘new and novel mixes of 
opportunities, challenges, ideas, and resources in pursuit of potentially 
explosive (non-financial) rewards.’ It ‘transcends the non-profit context and 
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highlights any sort of bold social innovation. A more pragmatic perspective 
emphasizes non-profits engaged in for-profit ventures to cross-subsidize core 
non-profit activities” (Dees, et al., 2001). “Between these two interpretations 
is a conceptualization that focuses on entrepreneurial actions pursued by 
established non-profit organizations (Sullivan et al., 2003).” (Morris, 
Coombes, Schindehutte, and Allen 2007, 13). 
Non-profit 
organizations/ 
sector  
“Non-profit organizations are associations, clubs, or societies that are 
not charities and are organized and operated exclusively for social welfare, 
civic improvement, pleasure, recreation, or any other purpose except profit” 
… “Note: If you are operating as a charity, you cannot be considered a non-
profit organization, even if you are not registered or cannot be registered as a 
charity. You can only meet one definition, not both” (CRA, Canada, 2016).  
Non-
government 
sector/ 
organizations 
Reference to the non-government or government sector in the 
provision of public goods is explained by the theory of government failure 
(Rathgeb Smith and Gronbjerg 2006; Steinberg 2006). The main critique of 
these approaches is that they describe the sector by what it is not, which 
according to a pithy metaphor by Lohmann (1989) is akin to calling lettuce a 
“non-animal.” This and other critiques led to the development of theories of 
voluntary failure (Weisbrod 1988) and social origins, and preference among 
several scholars for the “third sector” typology (Anheier and Salamon 2006; 
Anheier and Seibel 1990). 
Organizations 
 
 
 
“A crucial distinction [is] between institutions and organizations. 
Like institutions, organizations provide a structure to human interaction…. 
When we examine the costs that arise as a consequence of the institutional 
framework we see they are a result not only of that framework, but also of 
the organizations that have developed in consequence of that framework.” 
Thus, North distinguishes the rules (institutions) from the players 
(organizations) (2009, 4). 
“Like institutions, organizations provide a structure to human 
interaction.... Organizations are ‘groups of individuals bound by some 
common purpose of achieve objectives… Both what organizations come into 
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existence and how they evolve are fundamentally influenced by the 
institutional framework. In turn, they influence how the institutional 
framework evolves” (4–5). According to North, organizations are agents of 
institutional change, and therefore, so too are the “entrepreneurs” of 
organizations (e.g., donors are the entrepreneurs of foundations, and both are 
agents of institutional change).  
Organizational 
choice 
“Although organizations can often be viewed conveniently as 
vehicles for solving well-defined problems or structures within which 
conflict is resolved through bargaining, they also provide sets of procedures 
through which participants arrive at an interpretation of what they are doing 
and what they have done while in the process of doing it. From this point of 
view, an organization is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues 
and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, 
solutions looking for issues to which they might answer, and decision 
makers looking for work” (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972, 2).  
Parallel 
foundations  
 “A parallel foundation is a foundation set up by an operating charity 
to raise funds and hold investments primarily for [that] operating charity” 
(Bromley 1993, 37). “Public foundations exist in a variety of forms. For 
example, the so called parallel foundation is established to act as a fund-
raising and fund administering entity for a particular operating charity, such 
as a hospital or art gallery” (Hoffstein 2007, 26). 
Path 
dependency 
“The consequence of small events and chance circumstances can 
determine solutions that, once prevail, lead one to a particular path” (North 
1990, 94). A pattern of “historically derived continuity” characterizing 
incrementalism in institutional change (97–98). “Once a development path is 
set on a particular course, the network externalities, the learning process of 
organizations, and the historically derived subjective modeling of the issues 
reinforce the course” (99).  
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Philanthropic 
foundation 
“A foundation has the following characteristics: It must be an asset-
based entity, financial or otherwise… It must be a private entity. Foundations 
are institutionally separate from government… and are outside direct 
majoritarian control… It must be a self-governing entity... It must be a 
nonprofit-distributing entity... It must serve a public purpose... Self-
understanding as a ‘foundation,’ i.e. as distinct from operating nonprofit, 
fund-raising organizations and other types of fund distributing 
organizations” (Anheier and Daly 2007, 8-9). 
Pluralism  According to pluralist perspectives, foundations compete alongside 
other policy actors for the attention of government and the public. The major 
role of foundations is their (1) contribution of ideas to policy agendas and (2) 
money to support good policy ideas and agendas. Authors examining this 
question focus largely on the contributions of foundations to open, 
democratic societies comprising educated citizenries (Fleishman, 2009; 
Lagemann, 1999; Adam, 2004; Béland, 2016). Stone and Garnett (1998) and 
Hojer (2009) assert that the increasing mediatization of policy, foundations’ 
access to resources also gives them an advantage in the marketplace of ideas.  
Policy agenda According to public-policy scholars, a policy agenda is set when a 
government decides that a systemic issue raised in the political community 
warrants government attention (Howlett 2009, 100). Howlett describes Cobb 
and Elder’s (1972) conceptualization of agenda setting as the “manner and 
form in which problems are recognized, if they are recognized at all, [which] 
are important determinants of whether and how they will ultimately be 
addressed by policy makers” (Howlett 2009, 92). There are two types of 
agendas: the public agenda, which is dominated by policy problems that are 
important to the public and have garnered media attention; and, the policy 
agenda, which are those issues which government has decided warrant 
consideration (Elson 2004 2015; Stone, 1996, 92-3; Howlett, 2009; Cobb 
and Elder 1972). The formal policy agenda, or according to Cobb and Elder 
(1972), the institutional agenda, comprises a list of problems to which 
decision-makers are giving active consideration and has been accepted by 
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government as something requiring action (Stone, 1996, 92-3; Howlett, 
2009).  
Policy 
communities  
“According to Kingdon, policy communities involve a wide array of 
specialists ranging from academics, researchers and think tanks to voluntary 
sector and private sector leaders to government committee staffers and 
budget analysts to program and policy officers. At any given time the 
specialists will be generating their own conceptions of policy problems, 
ideas, instruments and solutions. Just as molecules floated around in the 
‘primeval soup’ before life, so too the policy ideas and instruments being 
generated by these specialists float around, bumping into each other, forming 
and being reformed as they do so” (Brock, K. 2008, 3). 
Policy domain A policy domain is “socially constructed by political actors who 
mutually recognize that their preferences on policy events must be taken into 
consideration by other domain participants… defined as any political 
subsystem.” Examples are health, education, and fiscal policy. The policy 
domain is the system where policy networks are situated (Wu and Knoke 
2013, 155).  
Policy 
entrepreneurs  
Policy entrepreneurs couple the multiple streams in Kingdon’s 
multiple streams framework (Kingdon, 1995; Sabatier 2007). Policy 
entrepreneurs can mobilize support through letter-writing campaigns to 
ministers, to members of parliament, or to legislatures. Interest groups can 
send delegations to see government officials, provoke the attention of media, 
and bring resources to bear on their preferred policy issues (the louder, the 
better). Foundations as policy entrepreneurs bring together the otherwise 
independent problem stream with the policy (solutions) stream. Kingdon 
defines policy entrepreneurs as “advocates for proposals or for the 
prominence of an idea.” Their defining characteristic is their willingness to 
invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in 
the hope of future return (2002, 122, 204). Policy entrepreneurs are a subset 
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of public entrepreneurs. Public entrepreneurship “is the process of 
introducing innovation – the generation, translation, and implementation of 
new ideas – into the public sector” (Roberts and King 1991, 147). Private 
entrepreneurs, including individuals, groups, or organizations, all avoid 
collectives, whereas public entrepreneurs need a collective to succeed in the 
political realm (Schneider and Teske 1992, 741; Dees and Anderson 2006, 
11; Dacin, Dacin, Matear 2010; Drucker 1993; Dees 1998; Polsby 1984; 
Walker 1981). 
Policy 
entrepreneur- 
ship 
“Policy entrepreneurship takes many different forms, and is both 
organizational and individual. There is no ‘recipe’ or ‘toolkit’ for training on 
policy entrepreneurship. Instead, it rests on a delicate phronetic blend of 
‘softening-up’ actors in the political and policy stream through use of 
personal contacts, networking, media strategies and powerful policy 
narratives that simplify technical issues into manageable items of public 
policy. It is the management of expert discourse rather than the research that 
empowers think tanks in agenda setting. Policy entrepreneurship is an 
important social practice in negotiating, sometimes negating, the boundaries 
between experts and decision-makers. However, equally important is the 
scholarly credibility and intellectual authority of think tanks” (Stone 2007, 
24).  
Policy 
networks  
Within a social network, which is a set of connected actors, there are 
also political networks, which are primarily defined by relationships with 
unequal power relationships among the actors, and then policy networks 
within them. A policy networks is meso-level unit of analysis within a 
political network, useful for the study of policy-making processes. Policy 
networks are “comprised mainly of formal organizations engaged in 
collective efforts to influence public policy decisions within nation-states... a 
set of public and private corporate actors linked by communication ties for 
exchanging information, expertise, trust, and other political resources” (Wu 
and Knoke 2013, 154). 
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Policy problem  Problem definition is the starting point for conceptualizations of 
policy making. Problems are pre-determinants of policy agendas, but 
problem definition follows agenda setting. (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). 
Problems are issues or conditions that are of concern to citizens or 
governments. Different issues can be defined strategically by actors, or can 
be pre-determined by institutions, they can evolve with changing cultural 
norms and mores, and change temporally. “Different actors may promote 
different issue definitions, but having a sense of what the issues is about is an 
inherent stage in any decision-making process” (Jones and Baumgartner 
2005, 40; also, Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Zahariadis 2007, 70).  
Policy 
windows  
Policy windows focus more on the external circumstances in the 
environment, or events, such as focusing events (broadly defined), not just 
serendipity. There is a broad literature on focusing events as well (see 
Birkland and DeYoung). Policy windows are moments of opportunity during 
which policy change becomes more likely. This can be due to more 
favourable economic or political circumstances, for instance. Policy 
windows provide opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to combine the 
problem, policy, and political streams and bring issues and solutions to the 
policy agenda (Kingdon 2003; Sabatier 2007, 9).  
Political 
entrepreneurs  
“A political entrepreneur is a special kind of actor, embedded in the 
sociopolitical fabric, who is alerted to the emergence of opportunities and 
acts upon them; he or she amasses coalitions for the purpose of effecting 
change in a substantive policy sector, political rules, or in the provision of 
public goods... [they are] understood as state actors, are the owners of 
resources that have the absolute power to make decisions regarding the 
allocation of these resources, in an environment of uncertainty, towards 
production processes which would not otherwise have taken place. They 
define and reframe problems (Cobb and Elder 1983; Polsby 1984; Kingdon 
1984); specify policy alternatives (Cobb and Elder 1983; Kingdon 1984; 
Walker 1981); broker the ideas among the many policy actors (Cobb and 
Elder 1983; Eyestone 1978); mobilize public opinion (Kingdon 1984; Cobb 
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and Elder 1981); and help set the decision making agenda (Kingdon 1984; 
Walker 1981)” (Petridou, E., Narbutaite Aflaki, I., and Miles, L. 2015, 2). 
Private 
foundations  
“A private foundation may either carry out its own charitable 
activities or it may give funds to other qualified donees, usually other 
registered charities... A registered charity will be designated a private 
foundation if 50% or more of its directors or trustees do not deal with each 
other at arm's length, and/or more than 50% of the capital is contributed by a 
person or group of persons not dealing with each other at arm's length” 
(Imagine Canada PPT). “A private foundation is a charitable foundation that 
does not meet the criteria of a public foundation. Essentially, a private 
foundation is one with either a non-arm’s-length board or one that has 
received more than half of its capital from a single source... The existing 
‘contributions’ test provided that if more than 50'% of the capital of a charity 
was contributed by one donor or a donor group, the charity would be deemed 
to be a private foundation and thus subject to the more stringent 
disbursement requirements and restrictions on activities and investments to 
which private foundations are subject” (Hoffstein 2007, 3; Income Tax Act). 
Public 
foundations  
“The Act currently provides that, with respect to charitable 
organizations and public foundations, more than 50% of the directors or 
trustees must deal with each other at arm's length and not more than 50% of 
the capital may be contributed by one person or a group who do not deal 
with each other at arm’s length” (Hoffstein 2007, 3). “The control test 
provides that a charity can be designated as a charitable organization or 
public foundation even if a person or group of persons not dealing at arms’ 
length with each other has contributed more than 50% of the capital of the 
charity. However, such a person or group is not permitted to control the 
charity in any way nor may the person or the members of the group represent 
more than 50% of the directors/trustees/officers/ like officials of the charity.” 
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(Hoffstein 2007, 4). As compared to parallel foundations, “Public 
foundations exist in a variety of forms.... Other public foundations have a 
much broader focus, in many cases acting as a sort of umbrella organization 
for numerous operating charities on a national or an international scale” 
(Hoffstein 2007, 26). Public foundations include community foundations. 
Public Policy Different definitions of public policy have different foci, emphasize 
particular parts of the policy process, involve different actors, and include 
perspectives of actors. The definitions can also be quite simple; for example: 
“anything government choses to do or not to do” (Dye 1976, quoted in 
Aminu et. al 2012, 58). For this study, public policy is defined as: “A set of 
interrelated decisions taken by an actor or group of actors concerning the 
selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specific 
situation where those decisions, should, in principle, be within the power of 
those actors to achieve” (Jenkins 1978 quoted in Howlett 2009). The merit of 
Jenkins’ definition is that it illustrates the complexity of public policy and 
policy-making, without excluding actors from the private or third sectors or 
individual citizens, though it does not explicitly consider the factors of 
values, ideas, paradigms, or interests.  
Publicly listed 
securities 
Securities are defined as “a share of the capital stock of a corporation 
resident in Canada, a unit of mutual fund or trust, a bond, debenture, bill, 
note, mortgage, hypothecary or similar obligation” (Hogg, Magee, and Li 
2012, 353). Changes in the value of securities are always considered a 
capital gain (or loss) (2012, 351). Other types of capital assets include, for 
instance, private shares, and property, but their charitable tax treatment goes 
beyond the scope of this chapter as they are treated differently under the 
Income Tax Act.  
  
Regime Different government funding strategies for the charitable sector can 
be described as regimes. “The concept of a regime implies multiple actors 
who, both through formal and informal interactions, work collectively 
toward achieving some shared outcomes, in the process develop 
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relationships, norms and expectations that govern their own behaviour and 
that of others” (Phillips referencing Elson 2016, 4). 
Self-dealing Governments in Canada are particularly concerned with “self-
dealing” between a foundation, directors of foundations, and other non-arms-
length parties, “regardless of whether the dealings are advantageous to the 
charity and regardless of whether the arrangements comply with the 
provisions of the Income Tax Act that deals with investments made by a 
charity. This type of self-dealing commonly arises in the context of a director 
of a private foundation borrowing funds, typically at an interest rate that is 
higher than the prevailing interest rate” (Hoffstein and Bradley 2004, 26). 
“Non-arms-length relationship should not enter into transactions with the 
foundation as they may be deemed to be receiving an undue benefit. 
Examples of the kinds of transactions that could give rise to an undue benefit 
include: sale, exchange or lease of property; loans; extensions of credit; 
furnishing goods and services to a director; investments in a director’s 
companies” (PFC 2013, 22). 
Social 
economy  
“Private companies that… provide goods, services, insurance or 
finance, in which the distribution of surpluses and the decision-making 
processes are not directly linked to the share of capital of each member. As 
well as those economic agents, whose main function is to produce services 
not intended for sale, for particular groups of households, financed by the 
voluntary contributions of families” (Barea Tejeiro 1990, 400 quoted in 
Powell and Steinberg 2006, 3).  
Sociological 
Institution-
alism  
“Sociological institutionalism views institutions as the embodiment 
of ‘symbols, scripts, and routine’ which act as filters through which actors 
interpret their situation, their particular place in it, and the most appropriate 
course of action for whatever decision faces them” (Harty 2005, 54). 
“Sociological institutionalism theorizes about the raison-d'être for 
organizations and institutions in the third sector, thus posing the normative 
question. An array of literature is available describing the variety of forms of 
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public organization in the third sector including co-operatives, non-profits, 
foundations, and health, religious, and social service organizations” 
(Titmuss, 1971; see also Douglas 1992, and Arrow, 1972).  
State-owned 
enterprises 
Crown foundations are Crown corporations; they are firms created by 
statute of the federal or provincial governments. In Canada, state-owned 
enterprises are most often called Crown corporations (Aucoin 2003). 
Examples include the CN Railway, the CBC, and the Saskatchewan Liquor 
Board. In Canada, historically, they have been used as vehicles for 
significant investments in an area of government jurisdiction, for economic 
development in particular sectors or regions, or to adapt to the global 
marketplace. They have also “contributed to integrate and unify the territory, 
developing and promoting cultural and national unity” (Bozec, Breton, and 
Cote 2002, 386). 
Systemic 
Policy 
Agendas 
There are two types of agendas: (1) The ‘public agenda,’ which is 
dominated by problems that are important to the public and have garnered 
media attention, or the attention of interest groups. This 'informal agenda' is 
also referred to in policy studies as the ‘systemic agenda’; and, (2) The 
‘policy agenda,’ which are problems that the government decision-makers or 
civil service has determined warrant their attention and hopefully, resolution. 
This is the ‘formal agenda.’ It is also referred to in policy studies as the 
‘institutional agenda’ (Cobb and Elder 1972; Elson 2004, 2015; Howlett 
2009; Stone 1996, 92-93). 
Tax shelters “In very general terms, a tax shelter includes either a gifting 
arrangement or the acquisition of property, where it is represented to the 
purchaser or donor that the tax benefits and deductions arising from the 
arrangement or acquisition will equal or exceed the net costs of entering 
into the arrangement or the property. Also, a gifting arrangement where 
the donor incurs a limited recourse debt related to the gift will be a tax 
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shelter. Generally, a limited recourse debt is one where the borrower is 
not at risk for the repayment” (Canada 2017). 
Third sector  Institutional theory designates business and government as the first 
and second sectors and often refers to the rest as the “third sector,” a term 
coined by Etzioni (1973). The more prevalent use of the term “third sector” 
arose out of the United States government’s Filer Commission in 1973–75 
(Anheier and Seibel 1990, 7). Third-sector organizations are defined by their 
ownership structures, which preclude the distribution of profits to owners or 
governing members, known as the non-distribution constraint. The term third 
sector is sometimes used synonymously with the terms non-profit and 
voluntary sector. It is rooted in the “three failures theory” of the roles of such 
organizations (Powell and Steinberg 2006, 3).  
Venture 
philanthropy  
“Venture philanthropy begins with a ‘top-down’ approach to change, 
emphasizing big bets on novel and scalable solutions offered by bold 
entrepreneurs” (Letts, Ryan, and Grossman 1997 referenced in Meyerson 
and Wernick 2012, 92). “Venture philanthropists favour ‘big bets’ whereby a 
smaller number of organizations are provided with greater funds, as opposed 
to supporting a range of organizations, but providing fewer resources to 
individual groups.” They leverage “the potential for entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurial solutions to address social problems” (Meyerson and 
Wernick 2012, 97-98).  
Voluntary 
failure  
Voluntary failure is the third failure in the three failures theories, the 
first and second being the market and the state. Salamon identified four 
reasons for voluntary failures: philanthropic insufficiency resulting from 
free-rider problems; philanthropic particularism, which arises from trying to 
address free-rider problems by focusing service provision on particular 
communities, such as religious or ethnic groups, leading to gaps in service 
and duplication; paternalism is the tendency of donors to treat the problem as 
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they see it, rather than how the recipient/customer does; and, amateurism 
refers to the tendency to have less qualified staff or to rely on volunteers 
(Steinberg 2006, 125; see Salamon 1987; Weisbrod, 1978). 
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APPENDIX D – Legislation and Developments by Case  
Table D-5. Capital gains tax exemptions and restrictions on foundations (1995–2016) 
Date Government Legislation/Initiative Policy  
1995 Liberals Bill C-262 (formerly Bill C-
224) 
Bryden's “transparency for overhead” 
for charities, a private member’s bill 
1997 Liberals Budget 1997 Capital gains tax on donations of listed 
securities reduced to 50% 5-year pilot  
1997 Liberals Budget 1997 75% annual income limit on all 
donations to all types of charities  
1997 Liberals Budget 1997 100% lifetime gift to Crown 
foundations decreased to 75% 
1999 Liberals Broadbent Report Recommendations on charitable tax 
incentives and regulations 
2000 Liberals Fraser Institute Conference  Recommend elimination or reduction 
of all forms of capital gains tax 
2001 Liberals Income Tax Act Paragraph 38 
(a.1) 
Capital Gains Tax five-year trial made 
permanent (early) 
2004 Liberals Globe and Mail article Call on the Government to eliminate 
capital gains on donations to 0% 
2004 Liberals 2007 Federal Budget Excess business holdings of private 
foundations: self-dealing 
2005 Liberals Bill s.33 (2005) New rules for disbursement quota 
2006 Conservatives Bill C-13 Budget 
Implementation Act 
Zero capital gains tax on publicly 
listed securities  
2006 Conservatives Bill C-33 Income Tax 
Amendments Act 
New definition of charities and public 
foundation 
2007 Conservatives Bill C-10 Definitions of foundations updated  
2007 Conservatives 2007 Federal Budget Capital gains tax extended to private 
foundations 
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2009 Conservatives Capital gains article  Review on impact of Capital Gains 
Tax exemption; private capital  
2013 Conservatives Standing Committee on 
Finance Report 
Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving 
in Canada report 
2014 
 
Conservatives 
 
MOU complete 
 
CHVI partnership is not renewed, 
funding available until 2017 
2015 Liberals CGTE for private capital  Final report drafted 
2016 Liberals Private capital exemption not 
implemented  
Final report released, partnership not 
renewed 
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Table D-6. PSE Crown foundation tax incentives and regulations 
Date Objective Gov’t Legislation/Initiative Policy  
1984 Regulation PC  Charities and the Canadian 
Tax System 
Private and public foundations 4.5% 
disbursement rule (replaced 
MacEachern’s 90% proposed rule) 
1987 Incentives PC University Foundation Act, 
BC 
First Crown foundation established for 
a public university in BC 
1990 Institution PC CASE planned giving 
seminar 
Presentation on benefits of establishing 
Crown foundations 
1991 Incentives PC Universities Foundation 
Act, AB 
Crown foundations for universities 
allowed  
1992 Incentives PC An Act Respecting 
University Foundations 
Crown foundations for universities 
allowed  
1992 Institution PC CASE chapter established 
in Canada 
10 members in 1992; 1300 members in 
2016 
1993 Incentives PC Manitoba Foundations Act Crown foundations for universities 
allowed  
1993 Incentives PC Higher Education 
Foundation Act, NB 
Crown foundations for universities 
allowed  
1993 Institution PC CAGP established Handful of members in 1993; 1200 
professionals in 2016 
1993 Institution PC Article published on 
benefits of Crown vs. 
parallel foundations 
Blake Bromley of the Benefic Group 
Inc. 
1994 Incentives Liberals Annual Conference of the 
CAGP  
Paper presented on benefits of 
establishing Crown foundations 
1994 Incentives Liberals Crown Foundations for 
Saskatchewan Universities  
Crown foundations for the U of S and 
the U of R were established 
1994 Institution Liberals Planned Giving for 
Canadians 
First issue of professional guidebook 
on planned giving published 
1994 Institution Liberals CAGP conference 1st annual conference of the CAGP  
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1997 Incentives Liberals Budget 1997 75% annual income limit on all 
donations to all charities  
1997 Regulation Liberals Budget 1997 100% lifetime gift to Crown 
foundations decreased to 75% 
1997 Incentives Liberals Income Tax Act 149.1  Reduced taxable of donations to public 
foundation to 50% 
1998 Incentives Liberals Legislation on Crown 
foundations in QC 
Crown foundations for universities 
allowed  
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Table D-7. Organizational developments and the Gates Foundation in Canada 
Date Legislation/Initiative  Policy  
2000 GHVE organization 
established 
Prompted by the 2003 Science article, group of 24 
experts 
2003 Science article 
published 
HIV/AIDS scientific community need for vaccine 
manufacturing capacity  
2003 GHVE Scientific 
Strategic Plan  
Published in 2005 in PLoS Medicine  
2003-2004 ICID established From federal-provincial taskforce  
2006 MOU 2006 
establishes the CHVI 
CHVI Gates Foundation partnership with 
Government of Canada 
2010-2011 MOU 2010 CHVI Gates Foundation partnership with 
Government of Canada 
2014-2015 MOU completed CHVI partnership is not renewed, funding available 
until 2017 
2016 Final report drafted CHVI outcomes reported publicly 
2017 Gates partnership 
funding complete 
Final report released, partnership not renewed 
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